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PREFACE

Although C.

S.

Peirce is considered the father of

American pragmatism, his philosophical orientation is most
often characterized as being that of

a

scientist.

Specifi-

cally, it is thought that his theory of belief and method
of inquiry provide only an account of the fixation of

scientific belief

— an

account, that is, of the slow, evolu-

tionary progress made by the community of thinkers toward
"the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by

all who investigate."

Beliefs and actions as they affect

the ordinary person's daily life are thought to be rela-

tively unimportant for Peirce or, worse yet, they are wholly
ignored in favor of his development of the notion of

a

habit.

And it is held that it is Peirce's emphasis on habits of

action and habits of thought which distances his views from
those of James who, instead, emphasized individual actions

Peirce is the logician and

and particular sensations.

scientist whose concern is primarily objective relations
and the community of thinkers, whereas James is the humanist

whose concern is primarily subjective perceptions and the
individual agent.

Mind

,

In his book. Pragmatism and the American

Morton White says:

"The pragmatism of Peirce was

basically a theory about the meaning of scientific beliefs."

IV

And in his discussion of Peirce, James, and
Dewey, Gail
Kennedy says that "Peirce and Dewey were trying
to formulate
a theory of meaning and of truth which
looked to the model
of disinterested scientific inquiry."^

And there are many

other such examples in the literature which place
Peirce in
the camp of the disinterested scientist.

This is a reasonable emphasis to place on Peirce's

^^itings; however, it has the infelicitous effect of down-

playing Peirce's contributions to the field of human actions.
Moreover, it discourages

careful examination of the role

a

of actions in Peirce's overall philosophy.

In what follows,

I

shall try to remedy this situation.

a

Peircean theory of deliberate action, culled from what

I

shall be presenting

Peirce says about belief, volition, desire, and intentions.
And by way of underscoring the importance of deliberate
action in Peirce's philosophy,

I

shall show the various

roles action plays in his semiotics and pragmaticism-- two

cornerstones of Peircean philosophy.

discussion will be

a

The upshot of this

theory of action which is through and

through Peircean and which will fill a gap in Peircean

scholarship

—a

gap which has been taboo for far too long.

V
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ABSTRACT

A PEIRCEAN THEORY OF ACTION

SEPTEMBER 1987
DONNA

BENEDETTI

J.

A.B., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
M.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Bruce Aune

In this dissertation,

by Peircean scholars:

I

examine a topic long-neglected

deliberate action.

I

claim that a

theory of action can be readily developed from Peirce's

writings and, moreover, that deliberate action is an important feature of at least two familiar Peircean theories:

semiotics and pragmaticism.

Further,

I

argue that a proper

consideration in Peirce's philosophy of particular actions
does not commit Peirce to the Jamesian nominalism he emphat-

ically rejected.
I

begin this study by examining Peirce's notion of

habits of deliberate action, and show how habits of action

causally effect actions themselves.

Through my analysis of

the Peircean habit of deliberate action it becomes clear

that acting deliberately requires a prior process of

Vll

deliberation as well as

a

relevant desire.

this process of deliberation,

I

In examining

consider a Peircean dis-

tinction between deliberate and intentional actions, the

exercise of self-control, and resolutions which may become

^^terminations to act.

I

argue that actions themselves are

properly placed in Peirce's category of Secondness, while
desire is an aspect of the category of Thirdness.
extract

a

I

further

Peircean account of voluntary and directly willed

actions, the relationship between desired actions and in-

tended actions, and internal and external freedom.
Finally,

I

argue that a full understanding of Peirce's

theories of semiotics and pragmaticism requires an adequate

account of particular actions.

I

show that actions may be

energetic interpretants of signs, signs themselves, and
they may contribute to one's acquisition and understanding
of general habits of actions.

Thus, having begun with a

consideration of the effect of habits of action on actions
themselves,

I

end with a consideration of the effect of

actions on habits of action.
is that actions

— deliberate

The result of my discussion

actions--have

a

rightful place

in Peirce's philosophy and should be given their due.

viii
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I

BELIEF

One reason for the neglect of Peirce's theory of

action is the limitation commentators have placed
on his
notion of habits.

It is clear from his papers and from the

extensive commentaries on those papers that Peirce's notion
of habit is most often used to point to an essential
or

real element of things.

Habit is quite often intended by

to pick out the lawlike behavior of things

Thirdness.^
L.

In his article,

— their

"Habits and Essences," Michael

Raposa stresses this aspect of habits and suggests

that Peirce linked habits of action to final causation.

According to Raposa,
The essence is no collection of properties, but
rather, it is a special "habit of action." More
specifically, it is a "bundle" of habits or a lawcluster that operates as a final cause specifying
the general patterns of behavior that a given object
or organism will tend to manifest.

With this emphasis, the habit of action is identical with
a

thing's essence, or "final cause"; it supplies

a

thing

"with its distinctive purpose and mode of operation."

3

If this were all Peirce meant when he used the notion

of habits of action,

there would be little justification

for introducing it in a discussion of human action.

1

Such

2

habits would be purely metaphysical in
nature, accounting
for the nature of things generally;
they would have no
special relevance for the subject of human
action.
Yet
one can understand Peirce to be giving more
than a theory
of metaphysical realism based on the notion
of habits of

action; one can understand him as also linking
habits with

action in

a

way which is significant for

a

theory of action.

Consider the following passages:
A cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will
determine what we do in fancy as well as what we do
in action, is called a belief.
[3.160 (1880)]
[Readiness] to act in a certain way under given
circumstances and when actuated by a given motive
is a habit, and a deliberate, or self-controlled,
habit is precisely a belief.
[5.480 (c. 1906)]

Clearly one need not accept the limited metaphysical
account, for Peirce himself did not offer only that.

But

precisely how habits and actions are related by Peirce so
that a theory of action results is a matter for further

analysis.

And here the waters are murky.

It seems promising to begin an inquiry into Peirce's

theory of action by examining the connection between habits
and belief, for these are often linked in Peirce's writings,

though in ways not altogether clear.

In some passages,

Peirce seems to argue that beliefs are habits of mind or
habits of thought; in others, that they are habits of action.
As

I

shall show, beliefs serve well to illuminate not only

Peirce's pragmaticism but also his views about human action.

3

Habits of Thought and Habits of Action

Considered as habits of thought or habits of mind,
beliefs play a major role in all our inferential

reasoning.

And since, for Peirce, the only process of
cognition is
that of valid inference, they assume a predominant
position
in Peirce's overall views about mental action.^

refers to

Peirce

belief as "an habitual connection of ideas" and

a

illustrates this with the following:
For example, to say that I believe prussic acid is a
poison is to say that when the idea of drinking it
occurs to me, the idea of it as a poison with all the
other ideas which follow in the train of this will
arise in my mind. Among these ideas, or objects
present to me, is the sense of refusing to drink it.
This, if I am in a normal condition, will be followed
by an action of the nerves when needed which will
remove the cup from my lips.
It seems probable that
every habitual connection of ideas may produce such
an effect upon the will.
If this is so, a belief and
an habitual connection of ideas are one and the same.
7.359 1873 )]
[

Exactly how

a

(

particular belief "will be followed by an

action of the nerves when needed" remains to be seen.
point

I

wish to note here is that

a belief,

The

according to

Peirce, is a habit of thought; an habitual connection of
ideas.

Whenever

poison,

I

I

have the belief that prussic acid is

will also have

a

cluster of other ideas or beliefs.

No belief stands alone; every belief
of ideas.

And "if

I

a

a

habitual connection

am in a normal condition," it will be

followed by one particular type of action rather than some
other.

My belief that prussic acid is poisonous will be

4

followed by my action of removing the cup of
poison from my
lips, unless, of course, some countervailing
consideration
comes to mind, such as the intention to commit
suicide.

Beliefs also serve as leading principles or guiding

principles of our inferential reasoning.

In "The Fixation

of Belief," Peirce spells out this function of
beliefs.

That which determines us, from given premisses, to
draw one inference rather than another, is some habit
of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired.
The habit is good or otherwise, according as it
produces true conclusions from true premisses or not;
and an inference is regarded as valid or not, without
reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusion
specially, but according as the habit which determines
it is such as to produce true conclusions in general
or not.
The particular habit of mind which governs
this or that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth depends on the validity of the
inferences which the habit determines; and such a
formula is called a guiding principle of inference.
[

5.367

(

1877 )]

In an inference which involves deliberation about the wisdom
of drinking prussic acid, a good guiding principle would be

the belief that poisonous substances should not be drunk.

Knowing that prussic acid is

a

poisonous substance,

infer that the acid should not be drunk.

I

will

The specific role

of belief as a guiding principle of inference is being high-

lighted here, but beliefs play a role at every step in the

inference
Peirce gives us

a

detailed analysis of just how beliefs

or belief-habits function as premises and conclusions of

inferences

5

cerebral habit of the highest kind, which
will
etermine what we do in fancy as well as
what
we do
in action, IS called a belief
The representation to
ourselves that we have a specified habit
of this kind
IS called a judgment
A belief-habit in its development begins by being vague, special, and
meagre, it
becomes more precise, general, and full,
without limit.
The process of this development, so far
as it takes
place in the imagination, is called thoug ht.
A judgment IS formed; and under the influence of a
beliefhabit this gives rise to a new judgment, indicating
an addition to belief.
Such a process is called an
inference the antecedent judgment is called the
premiss the consequent judgment, the conclusion the
habit of thought, which determined the passage from
the one to the other (when formulated as a proposition)
the leading principle
[3.160 (1880)]
.

.

;

;

;

.

According to Peirce, we represent belief-habits to ourselves
as judgments.

And by means of an inference,

a

judgment

(premise) which was once vague becomes a "more precise,

general, and full" judgment (conclusion)
of a belief -habit "

(the leading principle;

the reasoning process).

formed;
[3.161

"under the influence

also

a

premise in

Out of old beliefs, new beliefs are

this is "the spontaneous development of belief"
(1880)].

Moreover, it is a neverending process

which is constantly being altered and revised according to
"fresh peripheral excitations."

"Thus, belief is partly

determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience"
(

Ibid

.

]

.

Finally, this process of thought known as inference

is a habit of thought

(as shall

become clear momentarily)

just as a belief itself is a habit of mind.
We have seen that an inference is the process by which
But a belief is itself
one belief determines another.
a habit of the mind by virtue of which one idea gives
rise to another.
[7.354 (1873)]

6

One can characterize

^

habit of thought which is

t^

process of inferential reasoning and the habit
of
thought w hich
a belief in a way which brings

^

out their

relationship as follows:

A habit of mind is a habit of

inferential reasoning in accordance with a leading principle,
a

belief, P.

is good when

and

(b)

And one's habit of reasoning, according to P,
(a)

P can be

one's relevant reasoning is invalid if -P,

given as one's justification of the

relevant reasoning.
leading principle,
(yet another belief)

Then

(a)

Suppose, for example, that one's
is of the form 'Q
is

'Q',

3

R'

,

the premise

and the conclusion is 'R'.

tells us that the reasoning is valid; it would be

invalid if

i.e.,

if

'Q

&

Peirce says:

-R'

The habit is logically good provided it would never
(or in the case of a probable inference, seldom) lead
from a true premiss to a false conclusion; otherwise
it is logically bad.
That is, every possible case
of the operation of a good habit would either be one
in which the premiss was false or one in which the
conclusion would be true; whereas, if a habit of
inference is bad, there is a possible case in which
the premiss would be true, while the conclusion was
false.
(3.163 (1880)]

And

(b)

tells us that the inference from

justified by the leading principle

'Q^

'Q'

R'

.

to 'R'

is

There may,

of course, be other leading principles which will give us

the valid inference from 'Q'

to

'R'.

But of note here is

that a reasoning process which obeys the laws of logic

occurs and, by it, we are led from old beliefs to new

beliefs in accordance with still other beliefs, i.e, leading

7

principles.

And it shall become clear in Section

4

below

that these are the beliefs on which one either
acts or is

prepared to act.
But it is a matter of constant experience, that if a
man is made to believe in the premisses, in the sense
that he will act from them and will say that they are
true, under favorable conditions he will also be ready
to act from the conclusion and to say that that is
true.
Something, therefore, takes place within the
organism which is equivalent to the syllogistic
process.
[5.268 (1868)]
^

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that beliefhabits are quite clearly thought of by Peirce as habits of
thought or mind.

They function at every step in the

reasoning process as premises and conclusions of inferences,
and each belief is itself "a habitual connection of ideas."

Yet since, according to Peirce, thoughts

having beginning, middle, and end"

[5.395

"...

are actions

(1878)], one might
5

as readily think of belief-habits as habits of action.

Given this,

placing

a

I

believe one should resist the temptation of

restriction on the scope of belief-habits.

They

ought not to be tagged exclusively either as habits of

thought or as habits of action.
This conclusion, however, is not one which would sit

well with some Peircean commentators.
to Thomas M. Olshewsky,

For example according

"Peirce saw scientific laws as

habits of objects, much as beliefs are habits of action and

concepts are habits of thought."

g

But as suggested by

Raposa's account, scientific laws might just as well be

8

thought of as habits of action.
paper,

Moreover, in an unpublished

"A Survey of Pragmaticism,

Peirce claims that many

"

concepts, insofar as they are conjectures, are
indistin-

guishable from belief-habits.
Every concept, every general proposition of the great
of science, first came to us as a conjecture.
Meantime, do not forget that every conjecture is
equivalent to, or is expressive of, such a habit that
having a certain desire one might accomplish it if one
could perform a certain act.
[Readiness] to act
in a certain way under given circumstances and when
actuated by a given motive is a habit; and a deliberate
or self-controlled habit is precisely a belief.
.

.

^

.

.

.

[5.480

(c.

1906)]

To distinguish between beliefs and concepts as Olshewsky

does

— saying

that beliefs are habits of action and concepts

are habits of thoughts

— is

to impose a separation between

beliefs and concepts, or habits of thought and habits of
action, which is not supported by Peirce's writings.
The upshot of this is that Peirce's terminology is some-

what loose.

An understanding of his views on habits will be

aided more by allowing for the various uses of his terms
than by restricting them unnecessarily.

Belief-habits are

habits of thought and should be regarded as such, but they
are also habits of action insofar as habitual connections
of ideas are habits of action.

But there is yet another

sense in which beliefs may be regarded as habits of action,
and it is this sense which is immediately relevant to the

Peircean theory of action

I

propose.

I

should now like to

consider beliefs as guides to action; as rules of action.

9

Habits of Action as Rules of Action

Peirce tells us that belief "involves the
establish-

ment in our nature of
a h abit

[5.397

a

(1878)].

rule of action, or, say for short,
But he goes further than this,

saying that
The e ssence of belief is the establishment of a
habit and different beliefs are distinguished by
the different modes of action to which they give
rise.
If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if
they appease the same doubt by producing the same
rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner
of consciousness of them can make them different
beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different
keys is playing different tunes.
[5.398 (1878); my underscore]
;

In a later paper,

"Reason's Rules," Peirce suggests that the

essence of belief may well be expectation [5.541

— from the
quality — seems

(c.

1902)].

This shift in the essence of belief

establishment

of a habit to an "expectative"

to be the

result of Peirce's considerations of the differences between

practical and theoretical beliefs
discuss shortly)

.

(a

topic which

I

shall

The shift, however, may not be as signi-

ficant as it first appears, for Peirce also says in his
1878 paper,

"How to Make Our Ideas Clear,"

Now, the identify of a habit depends on how it might
lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances
as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly
occur, no matter how improbable they may be.
[5.400]

And here there is the identification of a belief-habit with
those actions which we might expect to arise, no matter how

improbable the circumstances might be.

But in either case.

10

whether we are considering actions under
probable or actual
circumstances or actions under any conceivable
circumstances, the actions are law-governed, following
from rules
of

action— that

is,

from beliefs.

Beliefs, in this way,

establish habits of action.
To give a simple example, one might believe that

wearing warm clothing in cold climates will help reduce the
risks of illness.

And so, assuming normal desires, one

set on that belief as a general rule of action.

One

form the habit of wearing warm clothes in inclement
weather.

Of course, a suicide-prone person may form a

different habit, such as wearing skimpy cut-off jeans in
such weather.
(b)

But a person who

(a)

has normal desires,

circumstances of cold weather, with

(c)

in

the belief that

wearing warm clothing in cold weather will help reduce the
risk of illness, will

(d)

conclude that he should wear warm

clothing in cold weather, and

(e)

he will wear warm clothing

in cold weather.

But notice a corollary to the notion that the establish-

ment of a habit is the essence of belief:

beliefs which

produce the same "modes of action" cannot be differentiated
from each other.

And here, Peirce seems to be standing on

questionable ground, for consider a possible outcome of
this view.

Returning to the example above, we can see that

there is a significant difference between the belief that

11

wearing warm clothing in cold climates will
prevent illness
and the belief that wearing warm clothing in
cold climates
will prevent the evil spirits of vicious men who
died
in

winters past from entering and harming one.

And yet both

beliefs would produce the same habit of action; to wit,
the

habit of wearing warm clothing in cold weather.

So for

Peirce, the beliefs would be the same since they both

produce the same mode of action.
is simply what habits it involves"

".

.

.

[5.400

what

a

thing means

(1878)].

What

a

belief means is given by the habits of action it produces;
"two" beliefs will mean the same thing if they produce the

same habits.

But surely there are two very different

beliefs here.
As a way of avoiding this infelicitous result, one

might suggest that Peirce places more importance on the
condition that they appease the same doubt in order for the
two beliefs to be indistinguishable.

But this is of no help

at all in the case of the two beliefs mentioned above.

For

if two people have a doubt as to whether or not they should

dress warmly, the doubt would be appeased in the first case
by the belief that dressing warmly is a good way to prevent
colds;

in the second case,

by the belief that dressing

warmly will prevent evil, demonic spirts from entering the
body.

In both cases, the same doubt would be appeased by

the same mode of action.

And yet the beliefs seem to be

12

quite different.
The more promising way out of this puzzlement
is to

look to other modes of action which the beliefs
will

establish.

Perhaps the believer in the evil spirits of

winter will also wear

a

talisman when he goes out in cold

weather, whereas the believer who is concerned solely with
his health will not.
^11 iu Peirce

s

The beliefs would be different after

view, since when all the modes of action

which would result from the beliefs are given, the two
would, indeed, differ in their modes of action.

The same

doubt would be appeased, but not by the same modes of
action.

Hence, the beliefs would be different.

If we consider Peirce's pragmatic principle,

this

seems to be what he has in mind.

Consider
have practical
our conception
effects is the
.

.

.

what effects, that might conceivably
bearings, we conceive the object of
to have.
Then, our conception of these
whole of our conception of the object.
[5.402

(1878)]

As it turns out, we may not be able to specify all the

consequences of

a

belief

— the

modes of action which could

conceivably result from a given belief.

But it would be

all of these "effects, that might conceivably have practical

bearings" which would serve to identify our beliefs.

And

by "practical," Peirce means "apt to affect conduct; by

'conduct,' voluntary action that is self-controlled, i.e.,

controlled by adequate deliberation"

[8.322

(undated)].

13

Clearly, an understanding of Peirce's
notion of practical
bearings or practical conduct will provide
a further clue
to his views on action.
In order to make sense
of his

notion of the practical,

I

turn now to an examination of

practical beliefs.

3

.

Practical Beliefs

To begin, Peirce gives an apparently clear example of
a

practical belief:
Now to say that a man believes anthracite to be a
convenient fuel is to say no more nor less than that
if he needs fuel, and no other seems particularly
preferable, then, if he acts deliberately, bearing
in mind his experiences, considering what he is doing,
and exercising self-control, he will often use
anthracite.
[5.538 (c. 1902)]

And he concludes this passage by saying that "A practical

belief may, therefore, be described as

behavior"

[

Ibid

.

]

.

a

habit of deliberate

A person who holds a certain belief--

that anthracite is a convenient fuel, for example

usually act in

— will

a

certain deliberate way, given his needs

and preferences:

he will buy this hard coal rather than

invest in some other less efficient form of heat.
It might seem that there is a problem here for Peirce

at the outset since it seems one could have

belief

—a

habit of deliberate behavior

a

practical

— without

ever having

14

acted on it, and without ever acting on it
in the future.
The solution to this problem is one which
Peirce himself
is well aware of and one which

in the next section.

I

will discuss more fully

Briefly, Peirce resorts to the

language of the subjunctive conditional to handle
these
types of cases.

Thus, a practical belief will be phrased

in terms of the sort of behavior which

[one could expect]

would occur, assuming one were to have certain desires, if
one were to have a practical belief.

In order to handle

those beliefs which are never acted on,

I

will adopt at

this point Peirce's use of the subjunctive conditional.

Returning to Peirce's example of
then,

a

practical belief,

it would seem that for every practical belief, E,

there are some desires or other whose satisfaction conditions are indicated by B.

Having the belief,

B,

is knowing

what those conditions are and, if one were to have the
desires and if those desires were not over-ridden by others
together with other beliefs, then one would be disposed to

realize those conditions by acting appropriately.
if

I

believe that anthracite is

Thus,

convenient fuel, and if

a

that desire is not over-ridden by other desires together

with other beliefs (e.g.,

I

prefer

a

gas, which gives off no smoke), then

form of fuel, such as
I

would be disposed

to satisfy that desire by acting appropriately.
I

would usually buy anthracite.

In short,

My practical belief is

a
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habit of deliberate behavior; it is an
indication of the
deliberate actions which would most probably
occur, given
my belief.

Embedded in Peirce's notion of

behavior are two important elements:
tion.

habit of deliberate

a

desire and delibera-

It is obvious that desire is an essential part of
a

Peircean practical belief:

belief indicates the satis-

a

^^^hion conditions given certain desires.

So desires and

particular actions appear to be related in

a

way.

I

significant

shall return to a full examination of desires and

their relationship to actions in Chapter III.

it is,

perhaps, less obvious how deliberation functions in a

practical belief.

But in considering the relative values

of one's desires and belief s--considering,

that is, whether

there are any which over-ride the desires associated with
the practical belief in questions

mental act of deliberation.

— one

is involved in the

And for Peirce, any resulting

deliberate action will be preceded by

a

rather complex

mental act of deliberation--one which involves bearing in
mind one's experiences, considering what one is doing, and

exercising self-control, among other things.

mainder of this section, then,

I

g

For the re-

would like to consider in

some detail Peirce's notion of the mental act of deliberation which necessarily precedes any deliberate action.

Using the passage cited above, 5.538, one can begin
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to get an idea of what a rich,
complicated affair an act of

deliberation is.

As

I

noted above, it involves bearing in

mind one's experiences, considering what one
is doing, and
exercising self-control. But that is not the end
of the

story, for Peirce also says that

The word "deliberate" is hardly completely defined
by saying that it implies attention to memories of
past experience and to one's present purpose, together
with self-control.
[5.538 (c. 1902)]

An act of deliberation now seems to be stretched to include

attending to one's present purposes and intentions.
closer inspection, this would seem to be simply

a

But on

precise

account of what it means to say a person is "considering

what he is doing."

For when we say a person is considering

what he is doing, we ordinarily mean that he is giving some
thought to his actions and its consequences; he is consi-

dering his actions in light of his intentions and purposes.
In addition, Peirce allows for the possibility that

no memory of an actual past experience may enter into one's

deliberations, only an imagined stimulus together with an
imagined reaction which has received
approval."

a

"deliberate stamp of

And

This act of stamping with approval, "endorsing" as
one's own, an imaginary line of conduct so that it
shall give a general shape to our actual future
(5.538 (c. 1902)]
conduct is what we call a resolve.

And this resolve, according to Peirce, is

a

"frequent

attachment" to practical beliefs, though not essential
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to them.

So this resolve to act in a certain way,
based on

an imagined course of action, would seem to
function as an

alternative to one's memories of past experiences.
should be included in

a

Both

discussion of the deliberation

process
Accordingly, one can summarize what is involved in

a

mental act of deliberation in the following way:

Attending to one's present intentions and

(a)

purposes

Bearing in mind one's past experiences or making

(b)

a

resolve based on an imagined line of conduct;

Exercising self-control.

(c)

Obviously, the notion of an act of deliberation warrants

further discussion.

I

would now like to consider each of

the three stipulations noted above.

Peirce says very little about the notion of

(a)

intentions, and in his 1903 "Lectures on Pragmatism," he
seems to belittle the notion of intention as being psycho-

logical in nature
(a

topic

I

[5.28].

Yet given his theory of signs

shall take up in Chapter V)

,

one would expect

intentions to play some role in his overall philosophy.
Moreover, acting intentionally would seem to be

feature of acting deliberately.

a

necessary

And if, for Peirce, a

practical belief is a habit of deliberate behavior, we
should expect from him some comment regarding the intentions
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which an agent would have were he to
act deliberately on
his belief.^
As It turns out, Peirce does make a
distinction between

—

gpyerned

m echanical

,

^

reason and actions which are purely

the key difference being that intentions
are

involved in the former but not the latter.

He gives a

delightfully clear example.
The merchant in the Arabian Nights threw away
a datestone which struck the eye of a Jinnee.
This was
purely mechanical, and there was no genuine triplicity.
The throwing and the striking were independent of
one
another.
But had he aimed at the Jinnee's eye, there
would have been genuine triplicity, the stone being
not merely thrown, but thrown at the eye.
Here,
intention the mind's action, would have come in.
2.86
1902 )]
,

[

(

In all action governed by reason such genuine triplicity will be found; while purely mechanical actions
take place between pairs of particles.
[Ibid.]

The "triplicity" of which Peirce speaks refers to his

category of Thirdness.

The Peircean categories are not

germane at this point; thus,
of them for now.

I

shall defer an examination

One can glean, however, that, given

Peirce's rich notion of deliberation, an action which is
done deliberately will be an action "governed by reason.
And if all action governed by reason is intentional, as

Peirce suggests above, then deliberate action can also be

considered intentional action.

But then the question

arises:

Is intentional action synonymous with deliberate

action?

Unfortunately, no explicit answer is forthcoming
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from Peirce.

However,

I

shall argue that Peirce seems to

use intentional action as the more
restrictive notion of
the two:
deliberate action is necessarily intentional

for

Peirce, but an intentional action is not
necessarily deliberate.
In order to see this distinction, it
is useful to

understand just what Peirce means by intending
some action.
As a start, it seems quite clear that in
explicating
the notion of intention, we are forced to
introduce its

correlative notion of ends or purposes, as Peirce's
example
suggests.

The merchant's action of simply throwing away the

datestone which happens to hit the genie would be quite

^iffsrent from an action of throwing the datestone at the
genie.

In the former case,

the merchant did not intend to

hit the genie; rather, he was thoughtlessly discarding the

datestone.

But in the latter case (had it occurred), the

merchant would have intended to hit the genie; his purpose
would have been to hit the genie, or to cause him some pain,
or some such thing.

An act which is intentional, then, is

an act done with some purpose or end in mind.

Moreover, it

is preceded by some reasoning to the effect that a certain

action will help realize that purpose or end.

The inten-

tional action is not done mechanically; it is governed by

reason and done with some purpose in mind.
I

shall have more to say about intentional actions in

Chapter IV; however,

I

stipulations

(c)

(b)

and

would like to emphasize here that
need not be introduced in order to
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explain Peirce's notion of acting
intentionally.

Strictly

speaking, for Peirce, an intentional
action is not necessarily a deliberate action. And this seems
quite right.
One can act intentionally--wi th some purpose
in mind

without having previously deliberated about the
action or
its consequences.
Bursting into song whenever one hears
his favorite melody, for example, is an intentional
action
done, perhaps, for the purpose of expressing one's
emotions.

But it would not be considered a deliberate action.
done, rather, on a whim or impulse.

It is

One need not exercise

self-control in order to act intentionally.

Nor must one

bear in mind past experiences or make resolves in order to
act intentionally.

In short,

no process of deliberation

is required in order to perform an intentional act.

Thus,

although deliberation requires that a person attends to his

present intentions and purposes and, hence,

a

deliberate

action is an intentional action, the converse is not true.
An intentional action is not necessarily a deliberate action

since attending to one's present intentions and purposes

does not require that one also undergo a process of deliberation, in Peirce's sense of deliberation, or in any other

sense for that matter.
(b)

Bearing in mind one's past experiences is another

important feature of

a

mental act of deliberation.

But it

may be that the deliberation is not based exclusively on
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one’s memories of past experiences,
but on one’s perception
that a certain action would satisfy
some need or desire
should it arise.
in such cases, a person may have
fonr.ed
a resolve to act in a certain
way based primarily on an

imagined stimulus and an imagined reaction.

Exam.ples of

both cases— memories of actual past
experiences which will
be a part of the deliberate action and
a resolve to act in
a certain way based largely on an
imagined situation--are

readily at hand.
In the first case, our friend the antracite
user will

have recalled that anthracite served him well in
the past
as an efficient fuel.

He will decide which type of fuel

to buy based on his past experiences using anthracite.

In

the second case, had he not actually used the coal but onlv

learned of its efficiency from other sources (friends whom
he trusts,

consumer magazines, etc.), then his deliberate

act of using anthracite on some future occasion would be
a

result of his resolve that should he need an efficient

fuel, he would use anthracite.

The action will still be

deliberate, but his past experiences using the fuel are of
no help here, for clearly he has no such experiences.

But

what serves this non-anthracite user are other related
experiences--hear ing or reading about the fuel, for example-together with his imagining

a

hypothetical situation in

which he might need an efficient fuel.

On the basis of
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this,

he forms a resolve to buy
anthracite should the need

arise
The example Peirce gives of a
resolve is the quick
action his brother took when his mother's
dress caught fire.
He immediately extinguished the flames
by smothering them
with a rug.
Peirce says:
We were astonished at his promptitude,
which, as he
grew up, proved to be characteristic.
l asked him
how he came to think of it so guickly.
He said, "I
had considered on a previous day what I
would do in
^^se such an accident should occur.
[5.538 (c. 1902); cf. 5.487, n.

1]

Fortunately for Peirce's mother, one of her sons had
formed
"a real habit produced by exercises in the
imagination"

[5.487, n.

1

(c.

1906)]; he had resolved, or decided, to

act in the manner he did based primarily on an imagined

course of action.
In "A Survey of Pgramaticism

,

"

Peirce emphasizes the

importance of resolves, calling them "commands to one's
future self."

And he explains just how

a

habit of deliberate

behavior may be acquired either by "reiterations in the
inner world," the "world of fancies," or by "reiterations
in the outer world," the "world of percepts."

He says:

—

Moreover-- here is the point every man exercises more
or less control over himself by means of modifying his
own habits; and the way in which he goes to work to
bring this effect about in those cases in which circumstances will not permit him to practice reiterations
of the desired kind of conduct in the outer world shows
that he is virtually well-acquainted with the important
principle that reiterations in the inner world fancied
reiterations if well-intensified by direct effort.

—

—
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3ust_as do reiterations in the outer
these habits will have power t o influence
in the outer world
—
especiaJIv. if~
each reiteration be accompanied by a
peculiar strong
effort^ that is usually likened to issuing
a command
to one s future self.
[5.487 (c. 1906)]
;

In terms of Peirce's terminology of the
inner and outer

worlds, memories of past experiences may be thought
of as
the result of reiterations in the outer world,
whereas

resolves are primarily the result of reiterations in the
inner world, the world of fancies.

though

I

And in the special,

emphasize common, case of reiterations in the

inner world, an additional "command to one's future self"
or stamp of approval of the imagined action is needed in

order for one's imagined behavior to become or, at least,
to influence actual behavior.

multiple reiterated behaviour of the same kind,
under similar combinations of precepts and fancies,
produces a tendency the habit actually to behave in
a similar way under similar circumstances in the
future.
[5.487 (c. 1906)]
.

.

.

—

—

Thus, memories of past experiences and exercises in

the imagination together with the all-important resolve

would seem to be central to Peirce's account of the formation of habits.

And here it is helpful to note that by

'habit' Peirce means

only that the person or thing that has the
habit, would behave (or usually behave) in a certain
[8.380
way whenever a certain occasion should arise.
(1913); See also 5.538 (c. 1902)]
.

I

.

.

shall return to this sense of 'habit' in Sections

3

and

4
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below.

For my purposes here, it is enough
to notice that a

habit of deliberate behavior— practical
a
belief— will not
necessarily result in some actual behavior
or action.

may, but it need not.

m

it

this sense, the Peircean habit

seems to be quite similar to what philosophers
now call

disposition.

a

But more of this later.

There is one more point which warrants comment
here.

Peirce seems to limit unnecessarily the work of
resolves.
As he describes them, they are associated with
exercises in

the imagination or reiterations in the inner world;
they are
the end-products of a very specific mental activity.

But it

seems to me that by a resolve Peirce actually means a reso-

lution to act in a certain way whenever the appropriate

circumstances present themselves.
^she up his mind to act in

a

As such, a person will

certain way (given the relevant

circumstances) after having considered an imagined line of

conduct or past experiences or a combination of both.
over

,

a

I^ore-

resolution concerning one's future behavior will

also be made on the basis of one's desires and intentions.
If this is so,

a

resolve is not simply the end-product of

an imagined line of conduct; rather, it is the conclusion
of one's entire process of deliberation.^^
(c)

Peirce also claims in the lengthy passage cited

at 5.487 that both kinds of reiterations will produce habits
"if well-intensified by direct effort."

The condition is a

25

mysterious one, but

I

believe it can be clarified somewhat

in terms of the exercise of
self-control— the final stipu-

lation for acting deliberately.

Very roughly, self-control

introduces another element of conscious
reasoning into the
notion of deliberate behavior.

According to the maxim of Pragmaticism, to say
that
determination affects our occult nature is to say that
It IS capable of affecting deliberate
conduct; and
since we are conscious of what we do deliberately,
we
are conscious habitual iter of whatever hides in
the
depths of our nature; and it is presumable
that
a sufficiently energetic effort of attention
would
bring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation
of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a
special sense, a conscious operation; and this no doubt
is the consciousness of reasoning.
[5.441 (1905)* See
also 5.493 (c. 1906)
.

.

.

Peirce also says at one point that "deliberate conduct is

self-controlled conduct"

[5.442

(1905)].

But neither this

nor the claim that controlled behavior in some way involves
a

"consciousness of reasoning" helps one to understand just

what Peirce is thinking about when he maintains that

a

person acts deliberately when (among other things) he
exercises self-control.

However, he provides a major clue

to this notion of self-control in a letter written to
F.

C.

S.

Schiller.

The power of self-control is certainly not a power
over what one is doing at the very instant the
operation of self-control is commenced.
It consists
(to mention only the leading constituents) first, in
comparing one's past deeds with standards, second, in
rational deliberation concerning how one will act in
the future, in itself a highly complicated operation,
third, in the formation of a resolve, fourth, in the
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°Th?s'op«it?o;

The notion of self-control now
looms before us as the
central feature of Peirce's account
of deliberation, just
as the notion of deliberation was
found to be at the heart
of his notion of a practical belief.
The Peircean notion

of self-control might be thought of
as spanning stipula-

tions

(a)

,

(b)

,

and

(c)

of the mental act of deliberation.

But obviously it involves more than

(a)

present intentions and purposes, and
one

s

past experiences or making

imagined line of conduct.
a

a

(b)

attending to one's

bearing in mind

resolve based on an

Self-control involves not simply

consideration of what one is doing in terms of one's

intentions and purposes, but

a

rational deliberation con-

cerning how one will act in the future.

It involves not

merely the memory of past experiences and resolves, but
comparison of one's past deeds with standards.

a

And finally,

on the basis of the resolve, it involves "a strong determination, or modification of habit.

Some of these elements of the power of self-control

have already been examined; others, such as comparing

one's past deeds with standards, are new and seem just as

mysterious as the notion of self-control for which they
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serve as e xplicans

.

In Lecture

I

of the "Lowell Lectures

of 1903,

Peirce speaks about "rules of conduct"
which
might be thought of as standards.
But in referring to
these rules, he usually has in mind
future conduct rather
than past deeds. For instance, he
says that
convenient and serve to minimize
the effects of future inadvertence
and, what are wellnamed, the wiles of the devil within
him.
[1.592ff.]

Implicit in the use of rules as guides to
future acts,
however, is the assessment of one's past
actions or deeds
in terms of these same rules.

And this assessment is under-

taken for the purpose of minimizing a future breach
of one's

standards or rules of conduct.

Thus, past deeds are com-

pared with one's standards of conduct so that one can

deliberate rationally about future actions.
aware of having done something well
of conduct)

One becomes

(according to one's

in the past and will consider that this

is how it should be done in the future also.

aware of having done something which was

a

Or one is

violation of his

rules of conduct and considers altering his future conduct.
In sum, when one exercises self-control he is,

among other

things, consciously reasoning about past deeds and future

actions in light of standards of conduct.
To say that conduct is deliberate implies that each
action, or each important action, is reviewed by the
actor and that his judgment is passed upon it, as to
whether he wishes his future conduct to be like that
or not.
His ideal is the kind of conduct which attracts
him upon review.
[1.574 (1906)]
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The other constituent of
self-control warranting
further discussion is the notion
of a strong determination
or modification of habit, based
on a resolve. We have
already seen that a resolve is like
a command to one's
future self.
But the resolve itself need not issue
in

action.

When

a

person is at the stage of having made

a

resolve or resolution to act, there is
nothing which
suggests that he or she will follow the course
of action

decided upon, that there will be

a

modification of behavior

or actions.

This resolution is of the nature of a plan; or, as
one
might almost say, a diagram
It is a mental formula
always more or less general.
Being nothing more than
an idea, this resolution does not necessarily
influence his conduct.
[1.592 (1903)]
.

But then, according to Peirce, a "conversion" takes place,

though
We do not know by what machinery the conversion of a
resolution into a determination is brought about.
[1.593

By

(1903)]

determination' Peirce means "a really efficient agency,

such that if one knows what its special character is, one

forecast the man's conduct on the special occasion"
[1.592

(1903)].

Our determinations would seem to take us

far beyond our resolves,

if knowing what the determination

is one could predict behavior.

How are we brought from
tion?

a

resolution to a determina-

Somehow our resolves or resolutions are impressed
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upon us in "a process similar to
that of impressing a
lesson on one's memory.
So although Peirce readily admits
that he does not know exactly how
the conversion from
resolution to determination occurs, there
is the suggestion
that conscious repetition serves as
the bridge from the
earlier stage of resolution to a subsequent
determination.
And together with this conscious repetition,
there is
A peculiar quality of feeling [which]
accompanies the
irst steps of the process of forming this
impression;
but later we have no direct consciousness of it.
[1.593

(1903)]

Peirce is understandably vague when he tries to give
an

account of what this feeling might be.

He says that

We may become aware of the disposition, especially if
it is pent up.
In that case, we shall recognize it
by a feeling of need, of desire.
Ibid
[

I

.

suppose by this accompanying feeling Peirce means some-

thing such as a need or desire we are aware of (at first,
anyway)

to act in a particular way.

For example,

"I

really should act in way W, if occasion 0 arises."

"I

really want to act in way W, if occasion 0 arises."

Or

So given this type of feeling and a conscious repetition of
the sort,
"If occasion 0 arises,

we could predict how

I

I

will act in way W,"

will act whenever occasion 0 arises.

Peirce provides us, as he often does, with
tration of the entire process.

a

lucid illus-
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In order to fix our ideas,
let us suppose a case
in
the course of my reflexions,
I am led to think that it

certain
certain'wlf
way. ' iI°"
resolve that

"

certain^p^^Lnln

f

will do so when we meet
conversation? T
miL?
g t be led to take a different tone, I
proceed to
^®^°l^tion upon my soul; with the result
that^wh
that
when the interview takes place, although
my
thoughts are then occupied with the matter
of the
talk, and may never revert to my
resolution, nevertheless the determination of my being
does influence my
conduct.
[1.593 (1903)]
I

_

Here one can see just how the "logical
sequence" of
self-control "is converted into mechanical sequence
or some-

thing of the sort"

[8.320

(undated)].

In exercising self-

control, one compares past deeds with standards,
deliberates

concerning future actions,

form.s a

converts his resolution into

certain way.

a

resolve, and, finally,

determination to act in

a

This involved mental activity of self-control

will, under normal circumstances, influence one's conduct
in a habitual way

In Peirce

s

in a way which makes prediction possible.

terminology

,

it would seem there is a logical

sequence of mental action which becomes

a

mechanical sequence

of deliberate action.

Recall now that

I

slipped into a discussion of self-

control by trying to make sense of Peirce's perplexing

statement that reiterations will produce habits "if wellintensified by direct effort."
some light on this statement.

It seems we can now shed

Our resolutions to act in a

certain way based on reiterations in the inner world as well
as reiterations in the outer world are now consciously
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impressed on

a

person through

a

process of reptition.

IS as though we say to ourselves
over and over again,
IS how I will act if a certain

occasion arises."

it

"This

Added to

this, there is a need or desire
to act according to one's

mental resolution, the result being

a

determination to

act according to one's resolution and
desires.

And this

determination will have "really efficient
agency."
it is
quite clear that, for Peirce, the notion
of exercising
self-control--with all it implies--is an important
feature
of the deliberation process and of the
very possibility of

deliberate action.
In my opinion, it is self-control which makes
any
other than the normal course of thought possible,
just as nothing else makes any other than the normal
course of action possible; and just as it is precisely
that that gives room for an ought-to-be of conduct, I
mean Morality so it equally gives room for an oughtthought, which is Right Reason; and where
there is no self-control, nothing but the normal is
possible.
[4.540 (1906)]^^
,

There are two comments

I

would like to make here.

First, as an account of how we control our actions, Peirce's

theory seems overly optimistic.

In most cases of deliberate

action, a Peircean notion of self-control seems to play no
part.

Rarely does one have his wits about him enough to

impress a resolution on his soul.

How often does one

mentally rehearse how he wants to act on some future
occasion?

But even when such a rehearsal occurs, combined

with that "peculiar quality of feeling," there is nothing
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which will guarantee that the desired
behavior or actions
will occur in the future and, hence,
prediction of expected
behavior cannot be guaranteed.
Second, Peirce admits that we do not
know how the

conversion from resolution to determination
occurs.
He
suggests that conscious repetitions combined
with feelings
of some sort will account for this
conversion.
But there
IS another weak area in his analysis
which he seems to over

look altogether.

He speaks of a determination as being a

"really efficient agency" without offering any account
of

how such a determination "influences" behavior.
some causal connection?

Is there

The expression "efficient agency"

suggests this, but then some explanation of how

a

deter-

mination (still mental) influences, i.e., causes behavior
should be forthcoming.

And none is.

Be that as it may, we have thus far travelled a some-

what tortuous path in giving an account of Peirce's notion
of a practical belief.

beliefs,

I

discussion.

And before examining theoretical

would like to summarize the key points of this
I

began by considering Peirce's notion of

a

practical belief--a habit of deliberate behavior--and found
that a key element of such beliefs is deliberation.

But

deliberation is a mansion with many rooms, among them,
intentions and purposes, memories of past experiences.
resolves, and self-control.

And self-control leads off
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into still other areas:

comparing past deeds with standards,

deliberating concerning future actions,
and converting
resolutions into determinations or modifications

of habits.

Much of Peirce's account of deliberation
seems generally to
be correct when we deliberate we do
often recall past
experiences or imagine possible lines of conduct;
we do

consider what we are doing insofar as our intentions
and
purposes are considered; we often compare past deeds
with
standards; we make resolutions to act in certain
ways under

specific circumstances.

However, as

I

pointed out, Peirce's

notion of resolves is far too limited and the role of selfcontrol remains rather obscure.

Peirce had considered resolves in

One can only wish that
a

broader sense and

provided more in the way of clarifying such
as self-control.

a

key concept
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4

Theoretical Beliefs

.

Practical beliefs, as we have just seen, are habits
of deliberate conduct.

And according to Peirce, deliberate

conduct is self-controlled conduct.
•

•

•

Ke further claims that

it is to conceptions of deliberate conduct that

Pragmaticism would trace the intellectual purport of
symbols"

[5.442

(1905)].

purport or meaning of

To determine the intellectual

belief, one must determine the

a

deliberate conduct which could possibly follow from the
belief
s conception
that is, the rational purport
of a word or other expression, lies exclusively
in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of
life
[5.412 (1905); See also 7.361 (1873)]
•

•

•

,

.

.

.

Thus, here again we see that the meaning of a belief is

identified with the habits of action and, in the specific
case of a practical belief, with the deliberate conduct

which could conceivably result from the belief.

Practical

beliefs, it would seem, must be the primary concern of the

pragmaticist

,

for these are the beliefs to which we can

"trace the intellectual purport of symbols."

But in Peirce's account of the quality of expectation

which occurs in his explanation of theoretical beliefs, it
becomes quite clear that intellectual purport is not to be

restricted simply to practical beliefs.

In fact, before his

category of theoretical beliefs is able to stand on its own.
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Peirce merges, to some extent,
theoretical beliefs with
practical beliefs in the following way:
If an opinion can eventually
go to the determination
o
a practical belief, it, in so
far,

becomes
practical belief; and every proposition that itself
is not
pure metaphysical jargon and chatter must
have some
possible bearing upon practice.
[5.539 (c. 1902)]
a

And regarding those beliefs which we may
think are purely

theoretical and have no possible consequences, Peirce
says:
if they are to mean anything,

tive"

[5.541

(c.

1902)].

they must be somehow expecta-

For any proposition or belief to

have meaning or rational purport, there must be some
element
of expectation.

To say that a quadratic equation which has no real
root has two different imaginary roots does not sound
ss if it could have any relation to experience.
Yet
it is strictly expectative.
It states what would be
expectable if we had to deal with quantities expressing
the relations between objects, related to one another
like the points of the plane of imaginary quantity.
[5.541 (c. 1902); Cf. 5.32-33 (1903)]
In this way, Peirce illustrates just how a theoretical

belief--if it has any meaning at all--will have "some

possible bearing upon practice.
Notice, however, that the arena of possible actions or

consequences has now shifted to the highly contingent future
situation in which the theoretical belief may at some time
function as

a

guide or rule of action.

What could we expect

to occur if other conditions were in fact to occur?

Such is

the rather inelegant expression of the expectative state

involved in theoretical beliefs.

But it is because there
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is this element of expectancy that
any theoretical belief

will have intellectual purport, as much as any
practical
belief.

A theoretical belief is not a practical belief
in

the sense that deliberate, self-controlled action
results

from the belief.

However, it can be considered a practical

belief in the sense that it "can eventually go to the deter-

mination of

a

practical belief"; it could be a rule for

certain deliberate behavior
held.

,

if such and such conditions

We could act according to such

a

belief; there are

certain actions which could be expected to follow from

theoretical belief,

^

a

it has any meaning at all.

An example of a highly theoretical belief which seems
to fascinate Peirce is that of the belief in transubstan-

tiation.

In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear"

(1878)

,

seems to dismiss such a belief as senseless jargon.

Peirce
However,

in a later work, he appears far more sympathetic to the idea

that such a belief could actually mean something.

The

example is instructive insofar as it shows the extent to

which Peirce was willing to go in merging theoretical beliefs
and practical beliefs.

In "Reason's Rules"

(c.

1902), Peirce

grants that the belief in transubstantiation may be purely
expectative.

The Roman Catholic Church maintains that the

communion wafer and wine become body and blood, under the
appearances of bread and wine.

And as a matter of faith,

the Roman Catholic layman is supposed to believe that this
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actually occurs.

Peirce echoes the layman's puzzlement
at

what this could possibly mean, and then
proceeds to account
for the meaning of the belief in terms of
the believer's

expectative attitude.

He says:

What does that mean? It means that the layman
is
trust that if he could understand the matter and to
know
the truth, he would find that the priest was
right.
But trust--and the word belief means trust primarily-essentially refers to the future, or to a contingent
future.
The implication is that the layman may sometime know, presumably will, in another world; and that
he may expect that if he ever does come to know, he
find the priest to be right.
Thus, analysis shows
that even in regard to so excessively metaphysical a
matter, the belief, if there can be any belief, has to
involve expectation as its very essence.
^

[5.541

(c.

1902)]

Peirce's reflections on the nature of theoretical
belief have led him to observe, as noted above, that "It
now begins to look strongly as if perhaps all belief might

involve expectation as its essence"

[5.542

(c.

1902)].

And

where any expectation can be discerned, even the most highly
theoretical belief will be imbued with meaning or rational
purport.

Thus, it now becomes clear that intellectual

purport is not restricted to just those beliefs which are
obviously practical beliefs.

Any belief, insofar as it

involves some element of expectation, has meaning and could

function as a rule of deliberate behavior.

The dividing

line between practical beliefs and theoretical beliefs

appears, on closer scrutiny, to be very hazy, indeed.

All beliefs, then, whether they be practical or
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theoretical, will involve some element of
expectation.
And to accommodate this expectative quality,
Peirce relies
on the form of the subjunctive conditional
the "would-be"

—

or

would-acts" or "would-dos

Peirce

.

This is illustrated in

"

explanation of what it means to say that there is
a one-third probability that when a die
is thrown, a number
s

divisible by three will turn up.
The statement means that the die has a certain
would-be
and to say that a die has a "would-be"
is to say that it has a property, quite analogous
to any habit that a man might have.
Only the
"would-be" of the die is presumably as much simpler
and m.ore definite than the man's habit as the die's
homogeneous composition and cubical shape is simpler
than the nature of the man's nervous system and soul;
and just as it would be necessary, in order to define
a man's habit, to describe how it would lead him to
behave and upon what sort of occasion--albeit this
statement would be no means imply that the habit
consists in that action so to define the die's
"would-be," it is necessary to say how it would
lead the die to behave on an occasion that would
bring out the full consequence of the "would-be";
and this statement will not of itself imply that the
"would-be" of the die consists in such behavior.
;

—

[2.664

(1910)]

The die example is particularly apt here because it serves
to highlight the "would-act" or "would-do" involved in a

belief.

As Peirce explains, a belief can be defined in

terms of "how it would lead him to behave and upon what
sort of occasion."

And although

a

habit does not consist

in the action, he claims he knows "no other way of defining
a

habit than by describing the kind of behavior in which

the habit becomes actualized"

(2.666

(1910);

See also 5.491
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’

•

it involves"

•

^hat

•

[5.400

a

thing means is simply what habits

(1878)].

With the consideration of theoretical
beliefs, we have
been brought face to face once again
with Peirce's pragmatistic principle (See p. 11 above)
We have been brought
.

to this point by considering the expectative
quality of

beliefs.

And with this, we seem to have strayed far
from

those beliefs which are habits of deliberate
action— the

beliefs which would seem to be especially relevant
to
theory of action.
all.

a

But we have not gone so far afield after

This expectative quality of both theoretical and

practical beliefs invites examination of the relationship

between beliefs as habits of action and action
to which

I

now turn.

— the

topic
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^

•

Belief and Action

Throughout more than thirty-five years of
writing in
which he changed his views on various topics,
Peirce

main-

tained a core view about the relationship
between beliefs
(or

habits of action) and actions.

In "The Logic of 1873,"

for example, he tells us that "A belief which
will not be

acted on ceases to be a belief"
of his series of lectures,

Important Topics"

(1898)

[7.356].

And in the first

"Detached Ideas on Vitally
the following connection between

,

belief and action is made:
We believe the proposition we are ready to act upon.
Full belief is willingness to act upon the proposition
in vital crises, opinion is willingness to act upon
it in relatively insignificant affairs.
But pure
science has nothing at all to do with action
There is thus no proposition at all in science which
answers to the conception of belief. But in vital
matters, it is quite otherwise. We must act in such
matters; and the principle upon which we are willing
to act is a belief
[1.635-36]1^
.

.

.

.

In his 1905 article,

"What Pragmatism Is," Peirce claims

that "Whenever a man acts purposively, he acts under a

belief in some experimental phenomenon"

[5.427].

And

finally, he tells us that "pragmatism is scarce more than
a

corollary" to Bain's definition of belief "that upon which

a man is prepared to act"

[5.12

(c.

1906)].

Although the emphases in these passages differ,

I

cite

them to indicate Peirce's commitment to the view that

beliefs play a significant role in influencing individual
actions.

('Influencing'

is an unfortunately vague term.
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intended to cover the various locutions
we find in Peirce.)
As we have seen, Peirce claims
that a belief is that upon
which we are willing or prepared to act,
and when

we act, it

IS on or under a belief.

i

defer, once again, to an example

Peirce gives which illustrates what it means
to act on a
belief
belief that prussic acid is poisonous
when the particular occasion comes up I am led unless
to the
further belief that that particular acid is
poisonous;
and unless I am further led to the belief that
it is
a thing to avoid drinking.
For all these things are
necessary to my acting on my belief.
[7.356 (1873)]

For Peirce, it is quite possible that a belief will be
a
"motive for action directly"; that is, we may come to a

point in our reasoning where we finally act on
belief "without the intervention of
[7.357

(1873)].

a

a

particular

more special belief"

And it is in this sense, then, that a

belief will function as a direct motive for action.
Still it is unclear just what Peirce means when he
says a person acts on a belief and, therefore, when he says

that a belief is a direct motive for action.

that

a

belief causes us to act in

a

If he means

certain way, then he

would be attributing causal efficiency to the belief
itself--an interpretation suggested by Dewey.

In his essay,

"The Pragmatism of Peirce," Dewey says:

Moreover, not only are generals real, but they are
physically efficient. The meanings "the air is stuffy"
and "stuffy air is unwholesome" may determine, for
example, the opening of the window.
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Now Peirce did hold that
"Real general"

[6.485

a

belief or habit of action is a

(1908)],

though the act itself is

"the most perfectly individual"
of objects

[5.529

(c.

1905)]

And as we have seen, he did maintain
that "habits will have
power to influence actual behavior in the
outer world"
[5.487

(c.

1906)].

beliefs have

a

Moreover, Peirce did maintain that

causal influence on actions:

To ask whether a given fact is due to
psychical or
physical causes is absurd. Every fact has a
physical
side; perhaps every fact has a psychical side.
Its
physical aspect--as a mere motion is due exclusively
to physical causes; its psychical aspect as
a deed
IS due exclusively to psychical causes.

—

[1.265

But now recall that Peirce considers
a

really efficient agency, and

belief; rather,

a

a

—

(1902)]

determination to be

determination is not

a

it is a repeated resolve to act in a certain

way accompanied by a feeling of need or desire.

determination may directly lead us to act in

a

Now this

certain way,

and the determination will be based on certain beliefs.

But

then it would seem that the causal agency has shifted from

beliefs to determinations based on beliefs.
arise.

More questions

If these determinations are the causes of actions,

what role do beliefs play in influencing actions?

How do

beliefs (or determinations, for that matter) cause actions?

And still, what does Peirce mean by "acting on a belief"?
To answer the first question, one need only recall the

role determinations play in the analysis of practical
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beliefs.

Having a determination, remember,
is an element
of exercising self-control, and
that,
in turn,

the stipulations for an act of
deliberation.

is one of

And finally,

deliberation is one of the key elements for
saying that
a person has a practical belief—
a habit of deliberate
behavior.
So although determinations may cause

us to act,

there is nothing on the face of it which
could preclude

Peirce from holding the view that beliefs also
cause us to
act.

Beliefs as well as determinations may serve as causal

influences on what we will do.
is clear that they do.

And on the Peircean view, it

But remember that Peirce gives us no

account of just how determinations cause us to act, nor does
he justify his excessively optimistic view of the role of

self-control and, hence, of determinations in getting us to
act.

We are met with greater success, however, in piecing

together an account of the causal efficacy beliefs themselves have on actions.

And,

indeed,

the more interesting

question is just how beliefs can cause us to act.

As it

turns out, an answer to this provides us with Peirce's view
of acting on a belief.

The first point

I

wish to make concerns the generally

uncontroversial view that beliefs provide reasons for our
actions.

They occur in the reasoning process that leads

one to act and, thus, provide an explanation of why a person
has acted as he has.

If an agent were asked why he acted as
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he did, he would,

in all likelihood, offer an
account in

terms of some of his beliefs.

For example, if asked why he

did not drink the prussic acid,
the pale, would-be victim
who knew what was in the cup would
probably reply that the
liquid IS poisonous and had he drunk
it, he would surely
have died.
Of course, there are other beliefs
as well
which may surface as reasons for refusing
the potion.
He
may believe, for instance, that he is
physiologically like

other people, and those who have drunk
prussic acid in the
past have not had a very good survival record.
The point
I

wish to make here is simply that beliefs provide
reasons

for our deliberate actions.

Peirce would not dispute this,

but neither would he say that this is the sense in which

beliefs cause us to act.
A belief, for Peirce, is that upon which we are willing
to act

to speak,

.

It puts us into a "ready position," so

to act in a certain way whenever a certain occa-

sion arises.

In this sense, a belief is a cause of my

being prepared to act in a certain way whenever

occasion may arise.

a

certain

In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce

tells us that

Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into
such a condition that we shall behave in some certain
way, when the occasion arises.
[5.373 (1877)]
This dispositional sense of a belief is brought out nicely
in a letter Peirce wrote to F. A. Woods on the "Would Be.
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and if it [the conditional
proposition] conveys
any meaning, i.e. if it is
calcu
mind, in a person who
.

.

.

-i-

Peirce also expresses the would-be of
deliberate conduct
as a "should do," telling us that
a man will reason about
his future conduct as follows:
If I should do so and so, I should bring
about such
and such a result.
Now I will not bring about that result.
Ergo, I shall not do "so and so."
8.381 1913 )]^^
(

(

To illustrate graphically this "should-do" of
deliberate

conduct

one which predisposes me to

acting

have only to consider my belief that prussic acid

I

is poisonous.

less,

certain way of

a

Though

acrid liquid,

I

I

have never been offered this color-

do believe that it is poisonous, and

that if

I

should drink it, the results would most surely be

fatal.

I

do not want to bring about such results; ergo,

shall not drink prussic acid whenever
some.

I

I

I

might be offered

am willing and prepared to act on the belief that

prussic acid is poisonous even though the occasion for
acting on the belief has never arisen and, with some luck,

will never arise.

I

am predisposed to act in a certain way

given my belief that prussic acid is poisonous.
belief

— my

habit of action

— is

a

And my

causal factor of my
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predisposition

— mvY

m

beina
eing in

a
a

v-^ ^
ready
position to refuse the

lethal potion when offered.

Should

I

be offered the acid,
however,

on my belief, all things
being equal.

I

will then act

And since a belief

causally affects one's disposition
to act, the ensuing deliberate action-should it
occur-will have been causally
affected by my belief.
this way, beliefs affect the
causal order in virtue of the
habits they produce.
We act
on those beliefs which predispose
us to act in a certain
way.
Moreover, it can be said that one

m

acts on a belief,

B,

just when B could be given as one of
the reasons for that
action; that is, when B could be given
as a justification of
one's action.
Thus, beliefs directly cause us to be
disposed
to act in a certain way (a belief
is that upon which we are

prepared to act) and, consequently, beliefs
indirectly cause
us to act ("habits will have power to
influence actual
behavior in the outer world").
One final comment here.

For Peirce, there is no diffi-

culty in explaining how these mental habits of deliberate

action (beliefs) can cause physical actions
or indirectly.

— either

His doctrine of continuity

directly

synechism --

enables him to avoid the overwhelming difficulty of Cartesian
dualism; that is, the difficulty of explaining how mental

and physical phenomena are able to interact.

puts it;

As Peirce
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broadest
philosophy which performs itslegitimate meaning as the
analyses with an axe
ultimate elements, unrelated chunks'of
bIino"®th® ""
to synechism.
In particuia?' ^he^
not admit that physiLl and
Dsvchica^ .Ptienomena
Oh^
are entirely distinct, whether
categories of substance, or
as eni?r!r^
shield,
but will
insist that
phenomena are of one character, though
some are more mental and spontaneous,
others mire
material and regular.
[7.570 (c.

—
—

1892)]

For Peirce, there is no wedge between
mental and physical
phenomena.
Synechism is "the tendency to regard everything
as continuous" [7.565 (c. 1892)].
The present writer holds that in advance
of positive
knowledge, the presumption ought to be that
there is
such a unity in the universe that the diffe
rence
between mental and natural phenomena is only a dif^rence of degree
Presumably, the same elements are
in both; and if so, so far there is no essential
difference in their intelligibility.
[7.463 (1893); my underscore]
.

physical events are but degraded or undeveloped
forms of psychical events
the phenomena of matter
the result of the sensibly complete sway of
habits upon mind
[6.264 (1892)]
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Granted that the difference between mental and physical

phenomena is one of degree only, Peirce nevertheless maintains that mind is primary in some sense, and he supposes
that "matter is merely mind deadened by the development of

habit"

[8.318

(1891)].

With this, Peirce hints at the way

in which his synechism operates under the law of habit-

taking

:

Supposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of
inveterate habit, the law of mind still applies to
it.
According to that law, consciousness subsides
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as habit becomes established,
and is excited again
at the breaking up of habit.
But the highest quality
of mind involves a great readiness
to take habits.
and a great readiness to lose

them

[6.613

(1893)]

As habits are established.
consciousness subsides; as habits
are broken up, consciousness awakens.
In the former case

phenomena are "more material and regular";
in the latter,
phenomena are "more mental and spontaneous."
Now the manner in which habits generally get
broken
up IS this.
Reactions usually terminate in the
removal of a stimulus; for the excitation continues
as long as the stimulus is present.
Accordingly,
habits are general ways of behaviour which are associated with the removal of stimuli.
But when the
expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur, the
excitation continues and increases, and non-habitual
reactions take place; and these tend to weaken the
habit.
[6.264 (1892)]
Thus,

the phenomena of matter are but the result of the

sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind"

[

Ibid

.

]

.

And

Peirce goes so far as to say that "mechanical laws are

nothing but acquired habits, like all the regularities of
mind"

[6.268

(1892)].

In sum, Peirce's synechism points to a solution of the

Cartesian problem of mind-body interaction; of psychical
phenomena causally affecting physical phenomena.

The

difference between psychical phenomena and physical phenomena
is one of degree only,

and the degree to which they differ

depends on the degree to which habits have taken hold.

Although Peirce's metaphysical views are open to challenge
it is doubtful,

for example that the doctrine of continuity
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would pass Peirce's own pragmatistic
test--this doctrine of
synechism can be offered as Peirce's
explanation of the
mechanics" of mental beliefs causing physical
actions.

6

I

•

Concluding Remarks
began this discussion noting that Peirce's use of

the term 'habit'

is understood most often as pointing to a

thing's essence.

This emphasis is found in Peirce, to be

•

But if this is the only way in which we regard habits

as they are presented in the Peircean corpus, we are blinded
to their significance for a theory of action.

action also serve as

a

For habits of

description of beliefs, and the link

between belief and action is quite clear in Peirce.
I

disentangled two ways of looking at beliefs:

Thus,

beliefs as

habits of thought or mind, and beliefs as habits of action.
The former provides us with an account of beliefs as they

function in the inferential reasoning process; the latter

provides us with an account of beliefs insofar as they are
rules of action.

Both emphases are important for a Peircean

theory of action.
Next,

I

considered Peirce's notion of

which has practical bearings
what it means to have such

a

—a

a

rule of action

practical belief.

belief and found

a

I

examined

rather
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tangled web.
a

As a start,

practical belief is

and

a

I

pointed out that, for Peirce,

habit of deliberate behavior,

suggested that deliberation and desire
are the two
key elements of such a belief or
habit.
Included in the
I

notion of deliberation were
intentions and purposes,

experiences or making
of conduct,

and

(c)

a

(b)

(a)

attending to one's present

bearing in mind one's past

resolve based on an imagined line

exercising self-control.

stipulation led me to

a

This last

consideration of still other mental

activities involved in the act of deliberation:

comparing

past deeds with standards, deliberating about future conduct, and converting one's resolutions into determinations
to act.

All of this, recall, was given as an account of

the deliberation process which necessarily precedes any

deliberative act.
On first blush, these practical beliefs or habits of

deliberate behavior were the ones which seemed to be
especially important to Peirce, since these were the ones
to which "Pragma ticism could trace the intellectual purport
of symbols."

But theoretical beliefs also have meaning in-

sofar as they involve some elem.ent of expectation.

With

this, the notion of a "would-act" or "would-do" was intro-

duced.

And with this, theoretical beliefs become as

relevant to a Peircean theory of action as are practical
beliefs
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Finally, beliefs of either type are
those on which I
am prepared to act and, in some cases,
they are what I do,
in fact, act upon.

They directly cause us to be disposed

to act in a certain way and,

in this sense,

of our dispositions to act.

But beliefs also indirectly

they are causes

cause us to act in the sense that one's disposition
to act
may, in turn, causally affect one's actions.

And with this,

the link between beliefs and actions seems to be soldered
in a natural yet Peircean way.

And although

I

have been

discussing beliefs in terms of deliberate action, and have
attempted to clarify Peirce's notion of deliberation and,
hence, deliberate action, it now seems useful to examine

more fully action itself.

I

turn now to such a discussion.
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NOTES

Peirce

view that the lawlike behavior of
things is

s

due to habitual behavior— behavior
which characterizes a
thing's essence— is shared by C. D.
Broad in "The 'Nature'
of a Continuant,
an excerpt from his book. Examination
of
M cTaggart's Philosophy
In his discussion. Broad makes the
.

following three points:
(i)
Every substance has a set of supreme dispositional
properties, each of finite order
(ii)
No substance can change in respect of any of its
supreme dispositional properties
(iii)
Any substance whose inner nature had differed
in any respect from that which S in fact has would
necessarily have been a different substance from S.
.

These are propositions Broad believes are "self-evident" to
t>oth

science and common sense.

sophical Analysis
(New York:
2

,

ed.

.

Michael

L.

Raposa,

4

Ibid
See,

.

,

p.

,

in Readings in Philo-

Herbert Eeigl and Wilfrid Sellars

Appleton-Century-Crof ts

of the Peirce Society
^

[Rpt.

,

Inc.,

1949), p.

478.

"Habits and Essences," Transactions

20

(Spring 1984), p. 158.

159.

for example,

"Some Consequences of Eour Incapa-

cities," especially 5.266-82 (1868).
5

See also 5.396-99

(1878).

Peirce also held, in his

later writings, that "Thinking is a kind of action
[8.191

(c.

1904)].

..."
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^Thomas M. Olshevsky, "Peirce's
Pragmatic Maxim,"
Transactions of the Peirce Society
.

7

19

(Spring 1983), p.

205.

For variations of the pragmatic principle,
see 5.438

(1905);

5.9

(c.

1905);

5.2-3

(1902);

6.490

1910).

(c.

I

shall return to a discussion of pragmaticism
as it relates
to action in my last chapter.
g

This bears some similarity to Aristotle's notion
of

deliberating about the means to some desired end.

However,

according to Aristotle, "wish relates rather to the end,
choice to the means"
ends but about means"

[lllb26]

,

[1112bl3]

and "we deliberate not about
.

I

believe Peirce would

not restrict deliberation to means only, and

would hold that deliberation is prompted by

believe he

I

combination

a

of desires and beliefs, not simply desires.

See Bruce

Aune's Reason and Action (Dordrecht and Boston:

Publishing Company, 1977)

,

pp.

Reidel

117-19, for a concise account

of these two questionable Aristotelian claims.

from Aristotle are from the Nicomachean Ethics
9

D.

[Quotations
.

See Aune's article, "Formal Logic and Practical

Reasoning," for

a

defense of the view that "practical

reasoning, narrowly understood, involves premisses or con-

clusions that include actual or potential expressions of
intention"

(in Theory and Decision

,

20

(1986)

,

p.

306)

.

In the article, Aune presents a "logic of practical in-

ference" which includes, as premises, volitional statements
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which express intentions.
IOt,

See especially pp.

309-13.

.

Peirce

notion of

s

a

resolve would seem to be

similar to Aristotle's notion of the "object
of choice,"
for consider:
The object of choice being one of the things
in our
own power which is desired after deliberation,
choice
will be deliberate desire of things in our own power;
for when we have decided as a result of deliberation,
we desire in accordance with our deliberation.
Nicomachean Ethics 1113al0]
[

,

^^It should be noted here that Peirce's notion of self-

control bears little similarity to the Platonic notion of

sslf~control with its emphasis on moderation or temperance.
See,

for example,

the Republic

And in the Philebus

,

,

390b,

430c-431a, and 461b.

Plato says:

Temperate people are of course constantly restrained by
the proverbial maxim they all follow, bidding them do
'Nothing in excess.'
But with intemperate, unrestrained people the intense pleasure that possessed
them sends them roaring about like lunatics. [45d7-e4]
12

Frank

Ramsey offers the following two senses of

P.

self-control

Self-control in general means either
(1) not acting on the temporarily uppermost desire,
but stopping to think it out; i.e., pay regard to all
desires and see which is really stronger; its value
is to eliminate inconsistency in action; or
(2) forming as a result of a decision habits of acting
not in response to temporary desire or stimulus but in
a definite way adjusted to permanent desire.
The difference is that in (1) we stop to think it out
but in (2) we've thought it out before and only stop
to do what we had previously decided to do.
[From The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical
Essays ed R. B. Braithwaite (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1931), p. 201.]
,

.
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It would seem that Peirce
is interested in self-control
in

sense (2), although he, too, is
interested in the consistency of actions [See, for example,
7.357 (1873)].
See also 5.453-58
and 8.380-81

(1908);

(1905);

5.467-68

(c.

1906);

6.485

(1913).

Note here that Peirce's views about the
expectative

quality of beliefs (theoretical and scientific
beliefs included)

,

as given in "Reason's Rules"

(c.

1902), would

seem to supersede this statement made in 1898
that "pure

science has nothing at all to do with action."
15^
u
John
Dewey,

Love and Logic

,

ed

"The Pragmatism of Peirce," in Chance,
.

Morris

R.

Cohen (New York:

Harcourt,

Brace and Co., Inc., 1923), pp. 303-304.
Also, he may not wish to die just yet.

desires may be understood as providing

acting as he does.

And,

a

In this way,

reason for his

in general, desires often serve

as reasons for our deliberate actions.
17

Compare

a thing in "The

C.

D.

Broad's example of a disposition of

'Nature' of a Continuant," especially pp.

473-74 and 481.
1

The reasoning process associated with the would-be

of deliberate conduct is simply that inferential reasoning
in accordance with a leading principle

(the first premise

56

here) which

I

discussed in Section

1.

Compare Aune's valid

inference patterns, particularly with
respect to Peirce's
second premise in Aune, this is a volitional
statement
expressing an intetion (in "Formal Logic and
Practical
Reasoning," pp. 309-13).

Chapter ll

VOLITION

A belief, be it practical or theoretical,
is that
on which

I

^uld

act whenever appropriate circumstances

present themselves.
often

^

And as should be quite apparent,

act on a belief.

Further, as

belief can function both as

certain way and as
a

a

a

I

I

have argued, a

cause of my acting in

a

cause of my being prepared to act in

certain way whenever

a

certain occasion may arise.

But

this causal role of beliefs casts doubt on whether it can
be said that an agent ever acts freely.
a

One problem for

Peircean theory of action is, therefore, to determine

what it means to say that

a

person acts voluntarily, given

that the performance of his action is causally determined
(at least in part)

by his belief.

Of course,

action must come to terms with the notion of
action;

in effect,

am,

I
•

no exception.

saying that

any theory of
a

voluntary

Peircean theory is

a

1

There are yet other reasons for examining such notions
as "a voluntary action," "a willed action," and a "volition,"

for in his writings Peirce says:
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"If

I

act from a reason at
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all,

I

act voluntarily

act in a way of which

[5.339, n.

have

I

a

1

(1868)];

will to

general conception"

[2.696

(1878)]; and "The final upshot of
thinking is the exercise
of volition, and of this thought
no longer forms a part"
[5.397

(1878)].

than they answer.

But these passages raise more questions
For instance, what does Peirce mean by

"volition," by a "voluntary action"?

volition" identical to
to act"?

a

is the "exercise of

"voluntary action," to "willing

Finally, all these phrases suggest that an agent

acts freely though he acts on his beliefs.

How does

a

Peircean analysis account for this in view of the causal
and expectative aspects of beliefs?

A natural point of departure for an examination of

these questions will be Peirce's category distinctions.

Volition, as it turns out, figures prominently in the

category of Secondness, as action.

Thus, an understanding

of what Peirce has to say on the topics of volition.

voluntary actions, and actions themselves will best be
approached via an understanding of the Peircean categories.
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1

The Categories

.

Peirce's overall division of philosophy
into the
branches of phenomenology, normative
science, and metaphysics gives phenomenology a central
position.
As one

philosopher aptly puts it:

Phenomenology takes inventory of what appears
without passing any judgment upon what it deserves
It says neither "true" or "false" nor "good"
or
"bad" about the phenomena.
One might say that, for
Peirce, phenomenology merely observes and catalogs
the contents of experience.
Normative science
evaluates and judges the data thus collected, while
metaphysics tries to comprehend their reality.
It
is clear, therefore, that in some sense phenomenology
the most basic of the philosophical disciplines
the one without which the enterprise could not even
begin.
The categories which phenomenology provides
will be the conceptual frame in which the other
psrts of philosophy will make their analyses and
explanations
.

According to Peirce, phenomenology is
the Doctrine of Categories, whose business it
is to unravel the tangled skein [of] all that in any
sense appears and wind it into distinct forms.
[1.280 (1902)1
.

.

.

The subject matter of this tangled skein is, of course,

phenomena, by which Peirce means
our minds in any sense"

[8.265

"...

(1903);

whatever is before
cf.

1.186

(1903)].

In some passages Peirce expresses his discontent with

using the language of 'phenomenology' and 'phenomena' and

introduces the terms

'

phaneroscopy

'

and 'phaneron.'

The

shift in language is not one of content; rather, it is

a

defensive measure Peirce takes to distinguish his views from
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those of Hegel.
I

in a letter to William James, he says:

am not sure that it will do to call this
science phe -

nomenology owing to Hegel's Phanomenologie being
somewhat

different

[8.298

to Peirce?

(1904)].

And the difference, according

Hegel

restricted himself to what actually forces itself
the mind and so colored his whole philosophy with
the ignoration of the distinction of essence and existence and so gave it [phenomenology] the nominalistic
and I might say in a certain sense the pragmatoidal
character in which the worst of the Hegelian errors
have their origin.
[5.37 (1903)]
.

.

.

Peirce expands the range of phenomena to include "whatever
is experienced or might conceivably be experienced or become

an object of study in any way direct or indirect"

[

Ibid

.

]

The science of phaneroscopy

does not draw any distinction of good and bad
in any sense whatever, but just contemplates phenomena
as they are, simply opens its eyes and describes what
it sees; not what it sees in the real as distinguished
from figment--not regarding any such dichotomy--but
simply describing the object, as a phenom.enon, and
stating what it finds in all phenomena alike.
.

.

.

[5.37

(1903)]

In Peirce's phaneroscopy, no judgments are made as to

whether a phaneron is good or bad, real or imagined; rather,
an exhaustive inventory and classification is made of all

that is or can be experienced.
In keeping with his propensity for triads, Peirce

categorizes all phaneron according to just three divisions:
"conceptions of quality, relations, and synthesis or mediation"

[1.378

(c.

1890)], or "quality, fact, and law"

[1.427
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(1896)].

The category of Secondness

relations or

f acts--encompasses

— the

category of

volition and, as Peirce

himself notes, "The practical exigencies
of life render
Secondness the most prominent of the three
[categories]"
[8.266

(1903)].

This is the category

I

am primarily in-

terested in here; however, first things first.
The category of Firstness includes as its
phaneron
the

being of positive qualitative feeling"

It IS the category of mere possibility.

First IS

mere m.ay-be and exists as

a

[1.23

(1903)].

What exists as a
possible object of

a

experience
Among phanerons there are certain qualities of
feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of
sttar the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of
quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating
a fine mathematical demonstration, the quality of
feeling love, etc.
I do not mean the sense of actually
experiencing these feelings, whether primarily or in
any memory or imagination.
That is something that
involves these qualities as an elem.ent of it. But I
mean the qualities themselves which, in themselves
are m.ere may-bes, not necessarily realized
[1.304 (c. 1904); my underscore]
.

.

.

,

,

.

The quality has being even if there is no mind to perceive
it and even if there is no material thing in which it in-

heres.

It is a

mere abstract potentiality; and the error of
those schools [the nominalistic schools] lies in
holding that the potential, or possible, is nothing
but what the actual makes it to be.
[1.422 (c. 1896)]
.

.

.

The quality of feeling of magenta-ness

,

for example, does

not refer to a sensation or feeling of something being
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magenta colored, though such an experience
would "involve"
the quality of magenta-ness
Rather, the quality of feeling
has being in the sense that a thing
could be magenta-colored
whether or not any magenta-colored thing actually
.

exists or

there is a mind to perceive it if it does exist.

That mere quality or suchness, is not in itself
an
occurrence, as seeing a red object is; it is a mere
may-be.
Its only being consists in the fact that
there might be such a peculiar, positive, suchness
in a phaneron.
When I say it is a quality, I do not
mean that it "inheres" in [a] subject.
,

^

[1.304

1904)]

(c.

This quality of feeling, then, apart from any experience of
the feeling, is the Peircean "pure monad."

be imagined to be without any occurrence.

".

.

.

.

.it

Its mere

may-being gets along without any realization at all"
(c.

1904)

]

.

can

[1.304

It is "in itself without parts or features,

and with embodiment.

Such is a pure monad"

[1.303

1894)].

(c.

The category of Firstness, then, consists of these

general qualities of feelings; it consists of mere possibi-

These possibilities are, however, real

lities.

reality

— though

— they

have

they are not existent, according to Peirce.

He distinguishes between reality and existence, saying that

reality means a certain kind of non-dependence
upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character,
while existence means reaction with the environment,
and so is a dynamic character
the two meanings
are clearly not the same.
[5.503 (c. 1905)]
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

It is,

in part,

.

.

this distinction which is brought out in

Peirce's rejection of Hegel's use of 'phenomenology.'
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Peirce

phaneroscopy includes phaneron which are
real but
do not exist; whereas Hegel
"restricted himself to what
actually forces itself on the mind.
"
s

.

.

There is another point regarding the
category of
Firstness which requires clarification.
It concerns three
types of things related to Firstness which
are easily confused:
and

(1)

the qualities of feelings,

true feelings

(2)

,

feelings which are recognized only in a judgment.

(3)

Strictly speaking, only

Peircean First.
above.

(2)

and

(1)

satisfies the description of a

These are the pure monads
(3)

I

have examined

on the other hand, are, for Peirce,

matters of "psychology"

[1.378

(c.

1885);

1.552

(1867)].

A "true feeling" is

mere passive feeling, which does not act and
does not judge, which has all sorts of qualities but
does not itself recognize these qualities, because it
does not analyze nor compare this is an element of
all consciousness to which a distinct title ought to
be given.
[1.376 (c. 1885); my underscore]
.

.

.

—

It is "the consciousness which can be included with an

instant of time, passive consciousness of quality, without

recognition or analysis"

[1.377

(c.

1885)].

True feeling,

for Peirce, just is immediate consciousness.

although the entire consciousness of any one
instant is nothing but a feeling, yet psychology can
teach us nothing of the nature of feeling, nor can we
gain knowledge of any feeling by introspection, the
feeling being completely veiled by introspection, for
the very reason that it is our immediate consciousness.
.

.

.

[1.310

(1907);

cf.

1.343

(1903)]
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We can, according to Peirce, understand
"what a feeling in
general is like
[I bid
but once we attempt to understand
.

]

,

this momentary state of consciousness

— this

true feeling

we have introduced an element of comparison
and analysis
into an otherwise "immediate consciousness."

We can never

get at this individual, monadic feeling.
Thus, if you perceive that you must at the instant
in question have been looking at a given
specimen of
red- lead, you know that that color has some resemblance to your feeling at that instant. But this
only means that when the feeling gives place to comparison this resemblance appears. But there is no
resemblance at all in feeling, since feeling is whatever it is, positively and regardless of anything
else, while the resemblance of anything lies in the
comparison of that thing with something else.
[1.310 (1907)]

Thus, a true feeling, being immediate consciousness, is not
a

quality of feeling, for the quality is "an element

separated from everything else and in no world but itself";
it is "merely potential"

But neither is

a

[1.424

(c.

1896)].

true feeling something we could

recognize in a judgment.

It is not, for example, the

redness of the book in front of me, since

a

recognition of

that redness involves a comparison from, at least, one

moment to the next.

Like pleasure and pain, redness "can

only be recognized as such in a judgment"

[1.376

(c.

1885)].

Empirical psychology has established the fact that
we can know a quality only be means of its contrast
with or sim.ilarity to another.
[1.552 (1867)]
In his discussion of Peirce's categories, Christopher
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Hookway elaborates on an example
Peirce uses and, in so
doing, explains clearly just how
qualities may be "realized"
in the world of existents— in Seconds,
that
is.

The

quotation is lengthy, but bears repeating
in full since it
captures the way in which Firsts are related
to Seconds.

Suppose that

—

observe a red object Peirce uses
livery of a guardsman in London
^cc
[SS 24)
Now what I observe may involve elements
drawn from all three categories-- the guardsman
is
experienced as other than me, and as marching in a
law-governed fashion (Secondness and Thirdness]
But,
I can concentrate upon the colour
of the uniform and
prescind from the law-governed behaviour and even from
the fact that the shade is decorating the uniform of
an existing individual.
Thinking just of the shade
I think of it in abstraction from its
setting:
it
is something which could be realized in an actual
individual but need not be [Firstness]
I do not
have to think of it as reacting with me or anything
else:
it is 'as it is independently of any other
thing.'
I don't think of it as part of the existing
universe but as a qualitative character which could
possibly be accompanied by the secondness that marks
actual existence.
I do not have to think of it as a
relational phenomenon at all.
It is monadic, firstness ^
I

.

.

_

.

.

As the monadic elements of the world. Firsts are non-

relational.

They "could be realized in an actual individual

but need not be."

And if they are "realized" or "instan-

tiated" in an actual individual, we can know of it only

through some judgment which we make concerning the experienced existent.

What we encounter in perception, then, is the instantiation of qualities by particular existing things.
The perceptual judgment refers to an individual, a
quality, and asserts that the former instantiates the
latter
.
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The monadic category of Firstness differs
from the

dyadic category of Secondness insofar as

feeling "is all

a

that it is positively, in itself, regardless
of anything
else"

[1.306

(1907)], but "A dyad consists of two subjects

brought into oneness"

[1.326

1894)].

(c.

conjunction of two qualities of feeling"

A Second is "the
[7.533

(undated)].

We can now think of existing things or, more generally,

facts as being the embodiment of qualities.

Owing to its

immediacy, a First is not "an event, a happening, a coming
to pass

fact

[1.307

[1.23

(1907)

(1903)];

]

But a Second is a "being of actual

.

it is the being of existence or

actuality
All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment
it is thought.
But a sensation is not had until I am
really acted upon by something out of my control.
[7.543

(prob.

c.

1900)]

The notion of being acted upon by something external
to the self as well as the notion of acting on something

other than the self are key features of Secondness.

"The

individual fact insists on being here irrespective of any

reason

..."

[1.434

(c.

1896)].

"In itself, as reaction,

it is arbitrary, blind, and brute exertion of force"

(undated)].

[7.532

It has no generality, no law governing it.

is "anti-general"

[7.532].

The chair I appear to see makes no professions of
any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any
It obtrudes itkind, does not stand for anything.
for anything
deputy
a
not
as
gaze;
but
self upon my

It
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anything.
it simply knocks at the
portal of my soul and stands there
in the doorway.
[7.619

(1903)]

Viewed simply as Seconds, facts fail
to have any meaning
for us, they lack intentionality or
any degree of law-like
behavior.
They are simply brute and irrational.
Yet we become aware of facts through

a

sense of resis-

tance.

Through sensation and volition, the self (ego)
is
confronted with something other than the self

(the non-ego)

In a colorful passage, Peirce explains:

Whenever we come to know a fact, it is by its resisting us.
A man may walk down Wall Street debating
within himself the existence of an external world;
if in his brown study he jostles up against somebody who angrily draws off and knocks him down, the
sceptic is unlikely to carry his scepticism so far
as to doubt whether anything beside the ego was concerned in that phenomenon.
The resistance shows him
that something independent of him is there.
_

[1.431

(c.

1896)]

And just as one only knows that there is something other
than the self by means of some resistant force, so also one

comes to believe that facts exist only because they, too,

come up against something other.
the fact fights its way into existence, for it
exists by virtue of the oppositions which it involves.
For just as we can only know facts by their
acting upon us, and resisting our brute will ... so
we can only conceive a fact as gaining reality by
actions against other realities. And further to say
that something has a mode of being which lies not in
itself but in its being over against a second thing,
is to say that that mode of being is the existence
which belongs to fact.
[1.432 (c. 1896)]
.

.

.

.

.

.

A thing without opposition ipso facto does not exist
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11.457

(c.

1896)].

I

shall return to a more detailed
dis-

cussion of sensation and volition below,
since the latter
relates directly to actions.
Thirdness is "being of law that will govern
facts
in the future"

[1.23

(1903)].

it is the category which

includes law, habit, thought, meaning, representation,
and

mediation

a

seemingly eclectic grouping.^

Thirdness is

intended as the category which captures all that is
rational
in the world,

and this is something which is wholly missing

in Firstness and Secondness.

A First is "eternal, indepen-

dent of time, and of any realization," and it lacks reason.
to ask why a quality is as it is, why red is red
3nd not green, would be lunacy.
If red were green it
would not be red; that is all.
[1.420 (c. 1896)]
.

.

.

But Thirds, considered as thoughts,

"can be produced and

grow," and they must have some reason for their being.

Furthermore, Seconds lack the generality of law, whereas

Thirds are general.
No collection of facts can constitute a law; for the
law goes beyond any accomplished facts and determines
how facts that may be, but ^1 of which never can
have happened, shall be characterized.
[1.420

(c.

1896)]

And although for purposes of analysis it is possible to

separate the three categories, it will never "be possible
to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that
is not accompanied by Thirdness"

[5.90

(1903)].

Clearly, for Peirce, Thirdness is the most important
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and complex of the three categories.

Besides the grouping

mentioned above, Peirce also includes
"generality, infinity,
continuity, diffusion, growth, and
intelligence" as
"ideas

of prominent Thirdness"

[1.340

(c.

1895)].

And it is the

category of Thirdness which places Peirce in
the philosophical tradition of scholastic realism, for
one consequence of maintaining that Thirds are real is the
need to

acknowledge that
in nature "

"

[5.101

general principles are really operative
(1903);

Peirce's emphasis].^

An investigation of Thirdness, with its wealth of
ideas, would be a task which would take me far beyond the

scope of this project.

But now dwelling on it at length

in this section does not mean

I

will be ignoring it alto-

gether.

I

argued in the last chapter,

On the contrary.

As

beliefs, as habits of action, causally affect one's dispo-

sition to act.
laws

— as

Thirds

As habits of action, beliefs function as

— so

that given a certain belief, we can

expect certain actions to follow.

7

In this chapter,

I

shall claim that a voluntary action is one which is mediated
by a Third, and it is this aspect of a voluntary action

which distinguishes it from an involuntary action.
the remaining chapters,
of Thirdness when

I

I

And in

shall be introducing other aspects

present the topics of desiring, intending

and action as it relates to pragmaticism and semiotics.

Thirdness is an important feature of Peirce's phaneroscopy
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and it is just as important as a
feature of a Peircean
theory of action.

The three categories, then, give us
of all that there is.

ducible

(a

a monad;

a

complete listing

And each of them is simple and irre-

First cannot be reduced to something simpler
than

a Second cannot be reduced to a

monadic relation;

and a Third cannot be reduced either to a
dyadic or a

monadic relation [5.82 ff.

(1903)].^

An account of the

phaneron would be imcomplete were any of the three categories omitted.

Peirce often made

point of saying how

a

wrong Hegel was in disregarding Seconds in his account of
what reality consists of.

"The brute element exists and

must not be explained away as Hegel seeks to do"
(1902)].

9

It is,

I

[8.27

believe, to Peirce's credit that he

saw the importance of Seconds in his universe, dominated
as it was by reason and representations.

the third category--the category of thought,
representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine
thirdness, thirdness as such--is an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute
reality, since this category
can have no concrete
being without action, as a separate object on which to
work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act.
.

.

.

.

.

.

[5.436

With this sketch of the categories as

a

(1905)]

background,

I

turn

now to that aspect of the category of Secondness which

Peirce refers to as "psychological."

It is this aspect

which is immediately relevant to the topic of actions.
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2

.

SGnsation

and.

Voliti on

According to Peirce, both sense and
will provide
instances of dyadic relations--reactions
of Secondness.
In sense and will, there are reactions
of Secondness between the ego and the non-ego.
In
events leading up to the act are internal, will the
and we
say that we are agents more than patients.
In sense,
the antecedent events are not within us;
and besides
which we form a perception (thouqh not
5k
that
which immediately acts upon the nerves) remains
unaffected. Consequently we say that we are patients,
not agents.
[1.325 (Unidentified Fragment)]
In this way, Peirce considers sense and will to be
two

varieties of that state of consciousness which involves
an awareness of the ego and non-ego.

between the two

a

A "struggle" occurs

commotion, an action and reaction,

between our soul and the stimulus"
sense of resistance occurs

—a

consciousness of activity.

[1.322

(c.

1903)].

A

sense which gives us our only

"We are conscious of hitting or

of getting hit, of meeting with a fact"

[1.376

(1890)].

Without resistance there would be no effort; without resistance there would be no consciousness of fact, for it is

resistance and reaction to it which informs us of fact and
existence.

As Hookway explains it:

Peirce finds in this sort of phenomenon the clue
to the analysis of individual existence; existing
objects react against us and each other.
In this way,

too, a polarity is established between subject

and object (ego and non-ego)

,

action and reaction, and

parallel is drawn between sense and will.

a
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together.
The common
cnse or
tt
of
an actual occurrence of ao-t-n.,!element is the sense
action
and
reaction.
There is an in+-f^nco
i
about this kind of
exDe^Pn.r i
sundering of subject and object,
While I am'sLt^d'"^
seated calmly
the dark, the liqhts are
ai
T
turned
on, and at that instant I
^
am conscious
change, but yet of something more
thL Ln
i have a lense
of a saltus,
sa^tus Tf
of there being two sides to
that instant
polarity would be a tolerably gcS^
phrase
phrasf'trd"®"'-K"
to describe what occurs.
For will, then, as
one of the great types of consciousness,
we ought to
sense. [1.380 (c. 1885); cf. with
Idlin'"
1.330 (Unidentified Fragment)]
a.

•

-i

'

m

This polar sense which includes both the
consciousness of
willing and sensation is also referred to by
Peirce as the

altersense."

"Altersense is the consciousness of

rectly present other or second, withstanding us"
(prob.

c.

1900)].

a

di-

[7.551

This awareness of something other than

oneself occurs by means of shock.

And again, this is true

^ith respect to the experience of willing as well as the

experience of sensing, though Peirce admits that one might
not think so.

He says:

Now the only way in which any force can be learned
is by something like trying to oppose it.
That we
do something like this is shown by the shock we
receive from any unexpected experience. It is the
inertia of the mind, which tends to remain in the
state in which it is.
No doubt there is a marked
difference between the active and intentional volition
of muscular contraction, and the passive and unintentional volition that gives the shock of surprise and
the sense of externality.
But the two are to be
classed together as alike modes of doubt consciousness, that is, of awareness, at once and in the same

'
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swaiTGnGss,

of an Ggo and a non-Gqo
[1.334
.

.

.

1905)]
In the volition of muscular
contraction and in the volition
(c.

"that gives the shock of surprise and
the sense of externatilty" we become aware or conscious
of both an ego and
non-Ggo

Now it should bG notGd that "volition" is
usGd by
PGircG in two diffGront ways, though he does
not sggiti to
bG awarG of it.

Hg oftGn usgs it in a broad sonsG to covGr

thG GntirG psychological aspect of the category
of Secondness.

He refers, for example, to the psychological triad

as "feeling, volition,

cognition"

[1.332

(c.

1905)].

And

when he speeks of volition in this way, it seems clear he
does not intend any differentiation between sense and will.

Volition is through and through dual. There is
the duality of agent and patient, of effort and
resistance, of active effort and inhibition, of
acting on self and on external objects.
[1.332

(c.

1905)]

But just as often, Peirce intends "volition" in a stricter

sense to cover that phenomenon which seems to bear, at
least initially, some resemblance to what has been tradi-

tionally referred to as "willing." 12

Volition understood

strictly is to be understood as something different from
sense.

This should be clear from the preceding discussion,

yet this difference between sense and will merits further

elaboration
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Peirce tells us:

fo^ck'upofth: ^ind?

J'

voluion

uu LLom us.

17.543

(prob. c.

1900)]

Another way of understanding the
difference between the
two can be gleaned from a
distinction Peirce makes between
two different types of dyadic
relations.
Monoidal dyads are
coincidences,
p ar excelence contingent,
or 'accidental'"

[1.429];

"two monoid dyads oppositely
situated" involve

an exertion of strength.

The coincidence or accidental

relation characterized here as

a

monoidal dyad would seem

to describe the relationship of sense;

it is "the passive

and unintentional volition that gives the
shock of surprise
and the sense of externality" [1.334 (c.
1905)].
But an

exertion of strength involves two monoid dyads and
seems to

characterize volition.
in the exertion of strength, although I act
on the object and the object acts on me, which are
two relations of one kind and joined in one relation,
yet in each of these two relations there is an agent
and a patient, a doer and a sufferer, which are in
contrary attitudes to one another. So that the action
consists of two monoid dyads oppositely situated.
.

.

.

[1.429

(c.

Peirce's example of a man trying to open

1896)]

a door helps

to clarify his conception of these dyadic relations.

Standing on the outside of a door that is slightly
ajar, you put your hand upon the knob to open
and enter it.
You experience an unseen, silent
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resistance.^ You put your shoulder against
the door
and, gathering your forces, put
forth a tremendous
effort.
[1.320 (c. 1910)]
This is "the active and intentional volition
of muscular

contraction."

in the language of Peirce's earlier
writings

the man is both agent and patient, doer and
sufferer,

acting on an object (the door) and being acted on by
the
door.

He is exerting effort both on self

(by straining his

muscles) and on an external object (by pushing the door)

And the door is both agent insofar as it resists the man's
and patient insofar as it is acted upon by the man

But precisely how volition or will is exhibited here re~
•l^ires further examination.

It is volition in this strict

sense which is of interest to the topic of action.
that in mind,

I

With

will now leave aside further discussion

of sensation as an instance of Secondness and will focus

on volition as an act of willing in the remainder of this

Chapter
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^

•

Volit ion, Desire^ and Voluntary Actions

We have seen that Peirce uses the term 'volition'
to

refer broadly to the psychological aspect of the
category
of Secondness and to refer strictly to anything
having to

do with will as it is considered in a traditional way.
is this stricter sense of volition which

more fully at this point.

I

It

plan to examine

Taking a clue from Peirce, there

is now a further refinement which should be made on this

sense of

volition,

and that is the dissociation of desire

'

or purpose from will.
In a letter to James, dated December 17,

1909, Peirce

describes the "psychological" aspect of Secondness as
"

Molition

— volition

minus all desire and purpose, the mere

consciousness of exertion of any kind"

[8.303];

consciousness of exertion and resistance"

"double

[8.304].

this refinement to "volitions or acts of willing"
(c.

Applying
[7.541

1900)], we should consider any volition as having no

element whatsoever of desire or purpose
Thirdness, that is.

— no

element of

Let us see just how this might work.

In his clearest example of a "pure dyad," Peirce illus-

trates what one would suppose is an instance of molition.
His example:

light

...

fiat"

[1.327

"God said,

let there be light, and there was

we must simply think of God creating light by
(c.

1894)].

For Peirce, this is an act of

arbitrary will, unmediated by any process of reasoning,
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desire, or purpose.
subjects.
The act of creation^?o
tion IS to be regarded, not as
any third object
suchness of connection of God
and light.
The dyad is the fact.
It determines
the existence of the light, and
the creatorship of
process intervening
hPtw^^n'-hh
this would
havrhL ^
element.
Thirdness,
^r^hp
® category, is the same as
mediareason, pure dyadism is an act of
arbitrary will or of blind force; for if
there is
any reason, or law, governing it, that
mediates
between the two subjects and brings about
their
connection.
[1.328]

One might wonder to what extent this
particular example

illustrates

a

pure dyad.

It would seem that purpose and

reasoning are important aspects of the action itself,
for
after all, assuming the act of creation occurred, was not

purpose and design part of the Divine Plan?

along with the view that creation was

a

One might go

purposeful act,

but Peirce would reject outright the view that purpose,
desire, reasoning, or any such intentional element is part
of the action itself.

"The

upshot of thinking is the

f ina

exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms
a

part

..."

[5.397

And of this,

(1878)].

desire no longer forms

a

part either.

would add,

I

For Peirce volition

as a pure dyad is simply the exercise of brute will.

say brute will, because after

when

I

I

"

(I

have determined how and

will exert my strength, the mere action itself is

in itself brute and unreasoning)

.

.

."

[1.432

Reasoning, desire, or purpose is no longer

a

(c.

1896)].

part of the
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action, though it may well have
preseced the action itself.
This sundering of volition from desire
and purpose is
also discussed in his "A Guess at the
Riddle." Here Peirce

specifically addresses the question of whether
the will
involves desire, and he emphatically disagrees
with those
who say that "the will is nothing but the
strongest desire"
[1.380

(1890)].

He thinks that the difference between the

two should be evident to anyone who considers the
difference

between dreaming (i.e., wishing, desiring, etc.) and doing.
This is not a question of defining, but of noticinq
^hat we experience; and surely he who can confound
desiring with doing must be a day-dreamer.
[1.380]

This differentiation is further brought home in Peirce's

comment on the role of volition in light of conflicting
desires.

Our desires, he admits, may have nothing to do

with volition, with what

a

person will do.

Though "desire" implies a tendency to volition,
and though it is a natural hypothesis that a man
cannot will to do that which he has no sort of
desire to do, yet we all know conflicting desires
but too well, and how treacherous they are apt to
be; and a desire may perfectly well be discontented
with volition, i.e., with what the man will do
[1.331 (Unidentified Fragment); my underscore]
.

So far, so good.

The difference between desire and volition

is again pointed out.

and through.

And Peirce seems consistent through

(There is a further point to be noted here

which is the identification of volition with
action.

I

a

will return to this point in Section

person's
4

below.)
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However, Peirce again addresses the
question of volition and desire in "A Guess at the Riddle,"
but this time
he seems to suggest that there is some
element of desire

which

^

a

part of the volitional act.

In this particular

passage, he is criticizing the traditional
threefold

division of mind into "Feeling, Knowing, and Willing."

And

there is the strong suggestion that there is a certain
type
of volition which,

in its analysis, would include in some

way, some aspect of desire or purpose.

Consider the

following

Wishing is not willing; it is a speculative variation
of willing mingled with a speculative and anticipatory
feeling of pleasure.
Desire should therefore be
struck out of the definition of the third faculty,
leaving it mere volition. But volition without desire
is not voluntary; it is mere activity.
Consequently,
all activity, voluntary or not, should be brought
under the third faculty. Thus attention is a kind
of activity which is sometimes voluntary and sometimes
not so.
[1.376 (c. 1890)
Granted that Peirce is commenting on

a

division which is

not his, and granted the passage is somewhat confusing.

Still there is something to be learned here.

Peirce's revision emphasizes activity

It seems that

— voluntary

or not--as

being the proper constituent of the category of "Willing"
or volition.

In the passage at hand, Peirce refers to

attention as an activity which is sometimes voluntary and
sometimes involuntary.

And here, he is using the notion

of volition as attention.

14

And so if Peirce were to have
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his way, the traditional division
of the mind would have
the third faculty, the faculty of
Willing.

I

can infer, then, from what Peirce says
that all activity
is volitional,

though not all activity is voluntary.

The question arises now as to where desire
should be
placed in this scheme since, according to Peirce,
it somehow

contributes to an action being voluntary
desire is not voluntary.
as

I

.

.

"

[1.376

— "volition

(c.

1890)].

without
And yet,

have argued, desire is something wholly distinct from

volition or action, from what the man will do.
phrased more directly:
and, hence,

The problem

Are desire and volition always

is there really no such thing as a

voluntary volition, or are desire and volition sometimes
and in some way mixed together as would seem to be the

case with voluntary volitions (action)?
The answer, of necessity, straddles the disjunction.

For Peirce, desire should be struck out of the defintion
of the traditional third faculty of willing, and it should

be struck out of his category of Secondness

(the category

which might be thought of as being parallel to the traditionalist's third faculty).

And so it would seem there

could be no voluntary actions.

But this would be a most

undesirable result for this pragmaticist

.

As

I

pointed

out in my discussion of deliberate behavior in Chapter

I,

Peirce maintains that we do deliberate about future actions
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and we resolve to act in the future
based on that deliberation.
It would be incoherent for him to
maintain that there
are no voluntary actions. Thus, I
suggest that when Peirce
alludes to a voluntary volition a volition
with desire--

—

such volitions exist, though the desire which
is "an element
of volition"

in actuality precedes the action.

So he is not

saying that there are no actions which "involve"
purpose or

desire and, hence, there are no voluntary actions.

Rather,

he seems to be committed to a far less radical view which

holds that while the presence of desire or purpose distin-

guishes a voluntary action from an involuntary action,

desire is not part of the action itself.

There are volun-

tary actions and these are determined by the preceding

desire or purpose or reasoning.

Thus, volition is some-

times voluntary and sometimes not so, but no volition or

action "contains" an element of desire in its analysis.

Returning to the somewhat ethereal example of God's
fiat we can see that if there was such an event as creation
by fiat and if God has his reason for performing it, then

God's action would have been voluntary.

But the purpose

God had in mind would have preceded the event.

1

Still,

reason would have mediated between "the causal act and the
effect" in the sense that it would have brought about

connection between God and his action of creation.
that action would have been voluntary.

It is clear.

a

And
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however, that Peirce does not
consider the example as he
uses it to be a voluntary
action-it is an example of a
pure dyad without an intervening
process of reasoning.
So
let us turn to a more mundane
but felicitous example of a
voluntary action.
I

lift a cup of coffee to my lips
so that

enjoy the warm brew.

thought as to how
action;

might

A desire for warm coffee and some

might obtain what

I

I

I

desire preceded the

in Peircean terminology, reason
mediated "between

the two subjects and brings about their
connection"
(c.

1894)].

[1.328

And so the voluntary action is mediated by

reason or law

Thirdness.

In fact, it would seem that most

all of our actions will be governed by some aspect
of

Thirdness
If I act from a reason at all, l act voluntarily;
but which of two reasons shall appear strongest to
me on a particular occasion may be owing to what I
have eaten for dinner.
Unless there is a perfect
regularity as to what is the strongest motive with
me, to say that I act from the strongest motive is
mere tautology.
[5.339, n. 1 (1868)]

At this point

I

would like to fill out this discussion

of voluntary actions by taking a brief look at what would

seem to constitute a genuine involuntary action, i.e.,

a

"mere activity" which is not preceded by some process of

reasoning.

An example might be the unconscious movement

of my hand, perhaps a nervous tic.

subject to my control, it is not

a

This condition is not

deliberate act, and

I
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have no desire to move my
hand in this particular way.
Nevertheless, it is an action
according to the Peircean

account of Secondness and,
furthermore, it would be an
example of a volition, albeit an
involuntary one.
A mental operation may be
precisely like reasonina
in every other respect except
that it is performed
unconciously.
But that one circumstance It
11 ITreasoning.
For
reaLnLg
IS deliberate, voluntary,
critical, controlled all
"""
consciouh?!'
An uncon^c"
involuntary; an involuntary
=°"trol; an uncontrollable
Is not deliberate nor
act IS
subject to criticism in
tne sense of approval or blame.
[2.182 (1902)]
In this passage from "The Minute
Logic," Peirce spells out
the difference between reasoning as a
conscious and, there-

fore, voluntary activity, and other
actions which are per

formed unconsciously and are, therefore, involuntary.

Recall now that

a

pure dyadism is

... an act of arbitrary will or of blind force;
for if there is any reason, or law, governing it,
that mediates between the two subjects and brings
about their connection.
[1.328 (c. 1894)]
possible to describe an instance of
(other than the theistic type Peirce gives)

,

a

pure dyadism

then the in-

voluntary, unconscious act would seem to qualify, simply

because in this case there clearly is no intervening (or
preceding) process of reasoning of any kind.
wise, when Peirce speaks of

a

And contrari-

voluntary action, then the

action itself is preceded by some reasoning process or
purpose, i.e., some element of Thirdness.

An element of
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law ana reasoning plays

a

significant role in any volnntary
actron, though reasoning
plays no role in the
action itself.
It is this sort of
consideration which prompts
Peirce to
remark.
We may say that the bulk
of
consists of Secondness— or what is
bettL
predominant character of what

a

^ a

ha^ beerSone?"
[

1.343

(

®

""

1903 )]

And so it would seem that
it is volitional activity
which
covers the field of human
action, whether that be
voluntary
or involuntary action.
And a voluntary action, it
would
seem, is just a special case
of a volitional

action-one

which is mediated by a Third; one
which is mediated by
reasoning
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Volition and Action
Thus far,
a

I

have examined action linked to
volition in

way which was essentially negative.

l

argued that desire,

reason, and purpose should be excluded
from any account of
Dyadic Secondness— "fact, action, and
actuality"
1.419 (c.
[

1896)].

also claimed that it is the presence
of some
such element of Thirdness which makes a
volition
I

or an act

of willing voluntary.

But

have not yet explained why and

I

how Peirce thinks volitions are identified
with actions--

human actions.

Answers to these questions will bring us

fact to face with yet another refinement of
Peirce's notion
of volition;

to wit,

there is a distinction between those

actions which we directly will (i.e., do) and those which
we indirectly will.

And what we directly will is an action

of the nerves and muscles; any other human action can only
be indirectly willed.

Allow me to explain.

First, it is easy to find passages throughout the

Peircean corpus which forge
some physical phenomenon.

link between volition and

a

Recall that Peirce defines

volition as "what the man will do"
Fragment)].

[1.331

(Unidentified

And Peirce's answer to the question, "what is

man?" includes the notion of

a

material force called volition"

soul which exerts "a certain
[7.580

(1866)].

17

By means

of the aspect of Secondness which is part of the physio-

logical triad, it appears that a solid link is made between
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external and internal volitions,
and a physical activity,
Consider the following, taken
from "A Guess at the
Riddle"
sens;, as wragrefd^to^cair?t''^r
ofn^rvouf 4ne gf

with the dischirge

vontion,

casr;^?r"-

IL moTt%lTa.l

discharge into muLle
cells..
celL
In internal volition, or
self-control
inhibitory action of the nerves^ whlch
^s also
a?so\^°“®
IS
known to involve the movement of
nervous
force.
®

'

.

.

.

[1.386

(1890);

cf.

8.41

(c.

lTs 5 )]^S

This is perhaps as technical as
Peirce gets on the matter,
The explanation of just what the
connection is between
volition and the nervous system is simply
that this is
what volition involves
a nervous reaction.
'Involves'
:

IS unfortunately vague,

but pressing along with Peirce, we

find the relationship described as one of
concomitance.

Remembering that the polar sense is the sense of
the difference between what was before and
what is
after a dividing instant, or the sense of an instant
as having sides, we see clearly that the
physiological
concomitant of it must be some event which happens
very quickly and leaves a more abiding effect, and
this description suits the passage of a nervous discharge over a nerve-fibre so perfectly, that I do
not think we need hesitate to set this phenomenon
down as the condition of dual consciousness.
[Ibid.]
The physiological concomitant of the polar sense is a

nervous discharge; we are not much better off than we were

with the vague "volition involves
I

a

nervous reaction."

think we can do better.
In the now-familiar Unidentified Fragment, Peirce

But
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states that what we directly
will in the case of our own
physical movements is the contracting
of certain muscles.
Trying to shove something too
heavy for the man
^^heless accomplishes
in considerable
measure,
measure the only thing that he
directly
willed to
do -namely to contract certain
muscles.^
[1.331; See also 8.41 (1885)]
We may think we have willed to
shove the table, but
this is a half-truth at best.

On the Peircean analysis,

we could only wish or desire to shove
the table, we could
not directly will the shoving of the
table.
We could
only directly will the contraction of
certain arm and
leg muscles.

And it may be that we also desired the

contraction of those muscles, but that is beside
the
point.
I

To summarize,

I

can desire to move the table and

can desire to contract the muscles necessary to complete

such an action.

Furthermore,

I

can indirectly will to

move the table, but the only thing

I

can directly will

is the contraction of certain muscles.
a

Given this account,

directly willed volition seems to be identified with an

activity of muscular contraction by means of
of nervous energy.

a

discharge

1

In the same passage,

of "table-turning."

Peirce also uses the example

In this seance activity favored by

spiritualists and non-spiritualists alike,
people seated some distance from

a

a

group of

table try with all their
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might to get the table to move
Should move.
•

•

sim.ply by

willing that it

And of this, Peirce says:

W

-while we were pos sessed
table thanlfe^^I^F

ove^e

of no othe r "might"
muse es w.
1

.

direct consciousness
of willing that the table move,
accompanied by the
vision of Its wondrous obedience. Until
it moved,
we were only l onging not willing
[1.331 (Unidentified Fragment)
my underscore]
Though at first blush it may not appear so,
this example
^

,

.

,

IS consistent with his earlier example.

The volitional

action of willing the table to move occurred when
and only

when the table actually moved.

But here again, one only

wills directly the contraction of certain muscles by means
of a nerve impulse.

Indirectly, one can will the table to

move; directly one can only will the "nervous discharge

over a nerve-fibre."

At this point, it might seem that Peirce's position
is similar to that of James and Prichard.

But it would

be a mistake to saddle Peirce with either view.

according to James,

".

.

.

First,

the only direct outward effects

of our will are bodily movements."

Now as is the case

with many of James's pronouncements, this initially sounds
as though it bears a close resemblance to Peirce's position

But on closer scrutiny the dissimilarity becomes glaring.
For notice that James holds that we will something to occur
and, while that may be a certain bodily movement, the act

of willing is something distinct from its effects,

i.e..
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bodily movements.

Moreover, volition is something which is

essentially mental in nature.

James says:

volition is a psychic or moral fact pure and
simple and is absolutely completed when the stable
state of the idea is there.
The supervention of
motion is a supernumerary phenomenon depending on
executive ganglia whose function lies outside the
mind
.

.

.

Peirce would protest loudly.

The act of willing is not

distinct from its effects, nor is volition something
psychic, nor is the physical phenomenon which occurs with
the act of volition supernumerary to the volition.

have seen, volition for Peirce
force";

it

^

^

"a certain

"what the man will do."

material

It is this con-

sideration which prompts Peirce's disagreement with
on the question of free will.

As we

Jam.es

In a letter to him dated

March 18, 1897, Peirce takes issue with his account of
freedom of the will as it was presented in James's paper,
"Dilemma of Determinism."

Peirce says:

I cannot admit the will is free in any appreciable
measure, for reasons that may be found in my "Man's
Glassy Essence." Namely, chance can only amount
to much in a state of things closely approximating
to unstable equilibrium.
Now in the act of willing
there is no such state of things. The freedom lies
There
in the choice which long antecedes the will.
a state of nearly unstable equilibrium is found.
But this makes a great difference in your doctrine.

[8.311]

Any choice, any exercise of freedom, occurs prior to the

volitional act

— the

act of willing.

In the act of willing

itself, there is nothing which is at all like an unstable
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states of equilibrium.
this,

The willing is the doing,
and of

thought or choice is no longer

a

part.

Second, according to Prichard,
"doing something is an
act of willing. "22
Prichard's views are fleshed
out, any superficial
resemblance to Peirce evaporates,
for Prichard maintains that
willing is a kind of mental
activity having causal efficacy.
Moreover, Prichard's
view would more aptly be characterized
as the mirror image
of Peirce’s insofar as he
(Prichard) analyzes any intentional bodily movement in terms of a
mental set of willing.
Consider his words:
When, e.g., we think of ourselves as
having moved
our hand, we are thinking of ourselves
as having
performed an activity of a certain kind, and,
almost goes without saying, a mental activity it
of
a certain kind, an activity of whose
nature we
were dimly aware in doing the action and of
which
we can become more clearly aware by reflecting
on
ssk 'What is the word used for
this special kind of activity?' the answer, it
seems, has to be 'willing.
*

•

•

Thus,

_

It should be clear from my gloss on the distinction

between James and Peirce on the matter of willing that

Prichard's views would also be antithetical to those of
Peirce.

Peirce, of course, finds nothing whatsoever

mental about volition.

He does maintain that when we act

we are aware of some sense of effort or exertion, but
this awareness occurs only through the activity of doing

itself.

This awareness does not come by means of a mental
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event that precedes the action; it
is simply the experience
of what it is we are doing.
By an experience of exertion, I
do not mean a consciousness of resolving to do something,
nor
collection of force preparatory to an effort, the
but
merely what we experience in the very act
of doing.
[7.531 (Undated)]

The experience of exertion, then, is what
we experience in
the very act of doing; it is not the reflection
that some

unique mental activity has occurred.

Prichard and James

on the one hand, and Peirce on the other, are as
far apart
as they could be on these points.
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5

Concluding Remarks

.

began this study of volition by
asking how it could
be said that a person acts freely
when his beliefs, in part,
cause him to act as he does. For
Peirce, this apparent
dilemma poses no real difficulty.
But the key to understanding why this is so rests with
his special uses of
volition.
After examining volition, first as a
general
way of speaking about Secondness and
then, more specifically
as action, I showed that Peirce thinks
of volitions as
I

either voluntary or involuntary.

And a volition is volun-

tary just when it is preceded by some process
of reasoning,

purpose, or desire; without a mediating Third, a
volition
is involuntary.

I

also claimed that, for Peirce, what one

directly wills is nothing more than
energy to the muscles.

a

discharge of nervous

We can indirectly will all sorts

of things, but can directly will only a discharge of

nervous energy.
A question now arises:

Does Peirce think that a

directly willed volition is a voluntary volition?

If so,

some element of Thirdness should mediate between the person

and the directly willed action which, as should be clear
by now, can only be an activity of the nervous system.

voluntary volition
lifting

a

I

examined earlier was the action of

cup of coffee to my lips so that

some warm coffee.

The

I

might enjoy

The action was conscious and voluntary
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since both beliefs and desires
preceded the action. But "an
unconscious act is involuntary"
(2.182 (1902)], and unquestionably most of one's directly
willed volitions occur
unconsciously. Thus, if my volition
is directly willed it
is not necessarily a voluntary
volition; it may be, but it
need not be.
For Peirce, the term 'volition'
covers the
field of human actions, including
those actions which we
"perform" unconsciously and, thus,
involuntarily. A discharge of nervous energy is, on the
Peircean account, a
volition.
It IS unconsciously and involuntarily
performed,
perhaps; nonetheless, that is the volition
which is directly
willed
It should be obvious, at this point,

which are the result of
volitions.

a

that the actions

process of deliberation are

Moreover, they are voluntary volitions, in a

Peircean sense, since reason, desire, or purpose--some
aspect of Thirdness--media tes between the agent and his
action.

It now seems appropriate to take a more careful

look at the important role of desire in a Peircean theory
of action, for it has been considered in only a tangential

way in both this chapter and the previous chapter.

Yet it

appears to be an essential link between beliefs and actions.

.

,

.

.

,
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NOTES

For example, according to Bruce Aune

,

"an action or

doing is voluntary only if it is either
intentional, an
essential part of something intentional,
or a foreseen consequence of an intentional act" Reason and
Action (Holland
[

Reidel Publishing Co., 1977), p. 87].

D.

not Aune

'

complete account of

s

a

Although this is

voluntary action, it is

adequate for seeing the sort of action which might
be considered voluntary.
2

an_d .

.

Vincent

Potter, S.J.

G.

Ideals (Amherst:
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3
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Christopher Hookway, Peirce (Boston:

Kegan Paul, 1985)

p.

Routledge

&

For an illuminating discussion
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of Peirce's categor ies--one which is far more detailed than
I

intend to give

quite useful
^

1.343

Ibid

(pp.

168

^See 1.420

(c.

.

,

(1903);

4.50

(1903);

5.105

s

treatment in Chapter III is

1.476

1896);

(c.

1896);

1.337

(c.

1875)

(1903).

(1893);

5.423

'
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p.

^Cf.
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— Hookway

5.48-49

(1905);

5.453

(1903);
(1905).

5.77n (1903);

5.93-

For further dis-

cussions of Peirce's scholastic realism see Hookway, pp.

:

.

.

.
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112 17, John P. Boler,
Charles Peirce and Scholastic BpaH.n,
(Seattle:
University of Washington Press,
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Charles K. McKeon, "Peircp'c;
o-iirce s Scotistic
Realism," in Studies
in the Philosophy of Charles
Sa n ders Peiroe
ed. Philip p.
Wiener and Frederic H. Young
(Cambridge:
Harvard University
Press, 1952)
i->

•

t

•

.

^Peirce describes this law-like
behavior of habits as
follows
n expectation is a habit of
imagining
A habit is
not an affection of consciousness;
it is a general
law of a(^tion, such that on a
certain general kind
of occasion a man will be more
or less apt to act in
a certain general way.
[2.148 (1903)]
.

For further discussion on the categories,
see Isabel
S. Stearns, "Firstness, Secondness,
and Thirdness," in

Judies
Philip

in the Ph ilosophy of Charles Sanders
Peirce
P.

Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge:

University Press, 1952); Donald W. Mertz, "Peirce;

,
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Harvard
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Categories, and Triads," in Transactions of the Charles

Peirce Society
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8.268

,
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(1903);

(Spring 1979)

15

(1885);

5.436

a

1.40-41

(c.

1892);

1.524

(1903);

(1905).

In his article,

thing which has

"Willing," A.

I.

Melden says some-

distinctive Peircean ring to it:

do not try to raise my arm unless, for example,
it is held down--I simply raise it; and I do not
try to flex my biceps unless there is some obstacle
to overcome or some chance of failure.
I

S.

.

)
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[Ph ilosophical

Review

,

69

(1960), rpt.

Action, ed. Alan R. white (Oxford:
1968

,

in The Philosophy of

Oxford University Press,

71

p.

^^Hookway, p. 106.
In his book, Reason and Action

,

Bruce Aune gives a

brief, lucid explanation of the traditional
view of willing.

When a person raises his arm,

^

one brings about the movement
one's conscious,
voluntary activity. This conscious activity was called
willing'; and the traditional view is that, when we
make a voluntary movement, we will that movement into
being.
The activity of willing is thus regarded as a
kind of mental cause;
it is a conscious process from
which the physical movement of an arm or leg might
naturally result.
.

.

.

[(Dordrecht, Holland:
P.

1]

D.

Reidel Publishing Co., 1977),

.

13

In the case of humans,

it is plausible to accept the

view that some intentional element precedes all voluntary
action; however,
14

in the case of God,

this is not so clear.

In some of Peirce's earlier writings, we find him

referring to volition as "the power of concentrating the
attention, of abstracting"

[5.248

(1868)].

And in a Lecture

of 1893, he speaks of man's "power of effort or attention"

[7.589].

This notion of volition as attention seems to

be applicable primarily to internal volition in which we

exhibit self-control.

But the view is held concurrently

6
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with that of volition as "a
certain material force" [7.580
(1866)], and this seems to be
appropriately applied to both
internal and external volition
[see
1.386

Section

below]

(c

.

1890)

,

and

The volition-as-attention
view seems to
be absent from his later
writings.
4

.

In his dismantling of the
"myth of volitions,"

Gilbert Ryle gives an infinite
regress argument to show
the absurdity of characterizing
volitions as either voluntary or involuntary.
The Concept of Mind
(Chicago:

[

University of Chicago Press, 1949),

p.

67.]

The

But it should

be clear that Peirce's use of 'volition'
is quite different
from that given in what Ryle refers to
as the "traditional
dogma" of the tripartite division of the
mind— the division

which Peirce is also criticizing.

Thus, by using 'volition'

to mean activity, Peirce avoids the infinite
regress problem

Ryle describes.
1

Whether any of God's actions are free or all are

necessitated is
17

a

question

I

leave to the theologians.

Had Peirce been aware of the proscriptions of the

American Philosophical Association in the eighth decade of
this century, he surely would have replaced the offending
'man'

with a less offensive 'person.

'

Surely he would have

done that.
18

That aspect of internal volition mentioned here

.

.

.

.
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covers the notion of "reiterations
in the inner world" or
fancied reiterations which we looked
at earlier.
19 „

•

Peirce sometimes elliptically refers
to a volition
which involves a nervous action affecting
the muscles as
a

"muscular contraction"

(undated)].

When

I

[1.344

(c.

1905);

see also 1.331

speak of a directly willed volition in

this way, i.e., as a muscular contraction,

I,

too,

am being

elliptical
20 ,,.

.

lilism James, Psychology (1892; rpt. Cleveland:
T

,

The World Publishing Co., 1948), p. 415.
21
22

Ibid
H.

.

,

p.

449

Prichard, "Acting, Willing, Desiring," in Moral

A.

Obligation (1949), rpt. in The Philosophy of Action, ed.
Alan
p.

R.

White (Oxford:

64

^^

Ibid

.

,

p.

61

Oxford University Press, 1968),

Chapter

in

desire

In "The Fixation of Belief,"
Peirce tells us with

what seem to be carefully chosen
words that "Our beliefs
guide our desires and shape our
actions"
[5.371

As

I

pointed out in Chapter

I,

(1877)].

Peirce advances the view

that beliefs are a direct cause of
our disposition to act
and an indirect cause of our actions.
But Peirce also
mentions quite often that beliefs are not
alone in getting
us to act as we do.
Recall that in my examination
of

practical beliefs,

I

stated that one of the conditions for

saying a person has such
needs or wants.

a

belief is that he has certain

A desire of some kind, then, guided by

belief, also seems to be an essential element of a
person's
action:

a

desire or wish "to remove

a

stimulus" is evi-

necessary for an action to occur.

This point is

implicit in Peirce's reminder:
Meantime, do not forget that every conjecture is
equivalent to, or is expressive of, such a habit
that having a certain desire one might accomplish
it if one could perform a certain act.
[5.480

(1906)]

And in an even stronger statement, Peirce says that desire
"is cause,

not effect, of effort"

99

[5.486

(1906)].

The

.

100

effort of which desire is

cause would, of course, be
a
volitional act of Secondness.
So it seems that desire
is
necessary for action to occur
and it is one other causa
1
factor of actions.
a

Furthermore, in the last chapter

I

argued that Peirce

considers desire and volition to
be distinct.
Yet at the
same time he maintains that any
voluntary action must be
preceded by desire. Obviously any
discussion of a Peircean
theory of action must take up the
question of desire. To
paraphrase Peirce, what, then, is desire?
what is the
something" that has the features just
mentioned? These
are some of the questions I shall
be addressing in this
chapter

.
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1

Desire as Judgment

•

As a start, Peirce considers
desire or a wish to be
"a sort of proposition.
To long for anything is to judge
it to be good and urgently good"

[7.58

1902)].

(c.

He does

not seem to be saying only that we
desire something which
we judge to be good; rather, he is
making the stronger
claim that desiring, longing, wishing--call
it what you
that the thing longed for is good.

Now while it may seem plausible (at least to
some)
that desire is a judgment, it is disputable that
the judg-

ment in question must be to the effect that something
is
good.

It is certainly true that in many cases when

desire something

judge it to be good.

I

If

l

I

desire

a

piece of chocolate candy, for example, then quite clearly

my desire includes the judgment that chocolate candy is
good

(in some sense or way)

at gunpoint and

I

being Jack Benny,

am told,
I

in fact,

I

Thus,

long for it.

I
I

I

am being held

"Your money or your life."

hesitate not

not harm me is something

"urgently good."

But suppose

a second.

Not

That the robber

readily judge as good and

want the robber to take my money;
But is my desire that the robber

take my money something which

I

also judge to be good?

It

seems to me it would be unusual to consider that desire-as it stands

— good.

Yet with only a minor modification.
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it becomes reasonable to
sav
Y

tha-tmat

-t-hi c
tnis,

o
is a judgment

too,

•

•

that the thing longed for is
good.
The modification

I

am suggesting is called for
because

of the special circumstances
of the case.
a

sense in which

I

There is certainly

do not want the robber to take
my money.

Yet there is also a sense in which

I

do desire that this

act of thievery should happen, and
that is the sense in
which the theft is a necessary means
"unqualified" (as Kant

would say)

.

l

long for the robber to take my money
given

that he holds a gun to my head.

in this way, my desire can

be seen to be good but with a qualification.

In general, a

qualified desire might be expressed as D
read as "the
(q/p)
desire for q given p. " Although I might not ordinarily
,

desire q,

I

do given the special circumstances p.

because of these special circumstances

my desire for q

p,

is also the judgment that q is good, given
p.

would not ordinarily judge that

a

something good,

I

circumstances.

And in this case,

Moreover,

So even if

I

robber taking my money is

would judge it to be so given the special
I

judge that it is

urgently good, though with qualifications.

Thus, Peirce's

claim that to long for anything is to judge it to be good
and urgently good passes muster with respect to the value

placed on the thing desired.
I

now wish to examine more carefully Peirce's claim

that desire is a judgment, and for this,

a

brief digression
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into the nature of judgment
is called for.
Peirce considers
a judgment to be ’'something
closely allied to assertion"
[5.29 (1903)].
As an example of an
assertion. he describes
what is involved when a person
gives an affidavit ("where
the assertive element is
magnified").

Here a man goes before a notary
or a magistrate and
takes such action that if what
he says is not true,
evil consequences will be visited
upon him.
[5.30

(1903)]

The judgment is the act of mentally
accepting a proposition
[2.309

(c.

1902)];

It is "a psychical act, which
is the

most obscure of phenomena or facts"

[2.309, n.

1

(c.

1902)].

Thus, when a person gives an affidavit,
he is vouching for
his own acceptance of his testimony to
the extent that he

will accept the unpleasant consequences if it
is found that
what he ways is not true. In a similar way, a
judgment is a

peculiar act of assent"

[2.309

(c.

1902); Cf.

5.117

(1903)]

It expresses acceptance of, or assent to, that which
is

judged.

So if desire is an expression of a person's judg-

ment that some x is good, then that person has accepted the

proposition that x is good; he has the belief that x is good

And his judgment is simply the representation to himself
that he has this particular belief

prepared to act.^

— one

on which he is

This is the first thing, then, to be

noted about Peirce's analysis of
of accepting a proposition.

a

judgment:

it is the act

It signals to oneself

perhaps to others) that he or she has

a

(and

certain belief.
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The second thing to notice about
Peirce's account of
judgments is that he distinguishes
between the mental act
of acceptance of a proposition and
the proposition itself-the object of one's acceptance.
And not surprisingly,

Peirce thinks that the proposition is the
more intelligible
notion of the two, affording us a better
understanding of
judgments broadly construed.
To explain the judgment in terms of the
"proposition"
it by that which is essentially intelligible.
To explain the proposition in terms of the
judgment" is to explain the self-intelligible in
terms of a psychical act, which is the most obscure
of phenomena or facts.
[2.309, n. 1 (c. 1902)]
Thus,

for Peirce, a judgment broadly construed seems to

include two elements which are now generally assumed in the

philosophical literature:

propositions and propositional

attitudes such as believing that, wishing that, fearing
that, etc.

2

Identifying the proposition itself is, as

Peirce suggests, largely unproblematic.

And

"judgm.ent"

a

narrowly construed closely resembles the propositional

attitude insofar as it is a mental act or disposition.

But

it must be remembered that, for Peirce, this mental act is

distinctively pragmaticistic
tional attitude" is

a

.

That is, a Peircean "proposi

mental act of accepting

a

proposition

And given Peirce's magnified example of the affidavit,
accepting a proposition seems to be quite similar to

believing

a

proposition.

The state of belief
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satisfactory
no^ ^ish
not
wish to avoid, or to change tostate which we do
a belief in anvcontrary, we cling tenaciously,
not
not^merelv*
merely to*^h
to believing, but to believing
what
^ iust
^
we do believe.
3
[5.372
1877
(

)

]

In fact, accepting a proposition
is believing that proposition, and that means being prepared
to act on that belief.^

return now to Peirce's claim that desire
is the
judgment that some thing is good. Given
the account of
judgment I have just presented, a desire as
judgment will
I

be the act of mentally accepting the
proposition that some
X is good,

and that means being prepared to act on
the

belief that some x is good.

desire as

a

Is it plausible to think of

judgment in this sense?

When we desire

do

x,

we always mentally accept the proposition that x is
good
to the extent that we are prepared to act on it?

Do we

always do what we can to satisfy our desire for x?
not.

I

think

As often as not, we curb our desires, opting to do

what is suggested by the dictates of reason.

I

may desire

to watch yet another viewing of Casablanca on television

tonight, but

I

decide to forgo that particular pleasure

and work instead.

Though

I

have a strong desire to see

Casablanca again, it would seem

I

do not have a Peircean

"desire" for the simple reason that

I

am not willing or

prepared to act to satisfy that desire.
of desire as judgment,

Peirce's account

therefore, seems inadequate unless

it can accommodate the effect other desires and beliefs
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have on the particular
desire in question. And
it shall
become clear below that
Peirce’s overall views can
handle
this apparent inadequacy.
Peirc(=
m’TTQc- us a
i^eirce gives
Y
more detailed
account of the nature of desire
h-io discussion
ire in his
of natural
classes where he explains three
features of desire:
generality, vagueness, and a
"third dimension." Although
each of these features is helpful
in understanding Peirce's
account of desire (and the "third
dimension is specifically
helpful in accounting for the problem
of conflicting
desires)
I am particularly
interested in the feature of
desire referred to as "generality." i
would now like to
examine these features with a special
emphasis on the
,

generality of desire.
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2.

Additional Features of

Dpc;ir<^

In describing the way natural
classes are determined,

Peirce tells us that the broadest
and most fundamental
classes are defined by purpose. And
purpose, he says, "is
an operative desire."
He continues:
general; that is, it is always
some\?n^''o?
some kind of thing or event which is
desired* at
least, until the element of will, which
is
exercised upon an individual object upon an always
individual
occasion, becomes so predominant as to
overrule the
generalizing character of desire. Thus, desires
create classes, and extremely broad classes.
But
desires become, in the pursuit of them, more
specific.
[1.205

(1902)]

A desire, according to Peirce, is always general
insofar as
it is always some kind of thing or event which
is desired.

When a desire gives way to a volitional act (which is
always exercised upon an individual object upon an indivi-

dual occasion)

,

it is no longer general.

But the desire

does not at that moment "become particular"; rather, it is
no longer operative,

though some other desire may be.

And

even though an object of desire may become more specific
"in the pursuit" of it,
is an object of desire.

it is still general as long as it

Peirce's example is helpful here.

Suppose we desire economical illumination.
satisfy that desire in several different ways:

We may

through

the use of combustion, electricity, or phosphorescence.

And if we choose either of the first two methods, we must

again decide between more specific ways of satisfying the

—
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desire.

Through it all, the object of desire
is general
(though it has become more specific),
and it has not given
way to an act of volition. Thus, for
Peirce, an operative
desire is always general, i shall
examine this feature of
desire in greater detail below.
But now it might be thought that a
judgment of desire
IS not the same as an operative desire,
for Peirce used the

notion of

a

purpose as an operative desire in order to show

how natural classes evolve.

In saying that purpose "is an

operative desire," Peirce seems to be referring only
to an
endeavor

toward habit-taking

—a

theme prominent in the

Lamarckian theory of evolution which he, in part, adopts
[6.

299ff

(1893)

]

.

For Peirce, the operative desire repre—

ss^ts the strain of agapasm

— evolution

by creative love

which, together with synechism (continuity) and tychism
(chance)

variety.

,

explains the evolution of

a

world of order and

On the face of it, this does not seem to be the

sort of thing one ordinarily thinks of when considering the

judgment of desire.

So if there are two different notions

of desire at work here, then it may be that the judgment of

desire is not something general after all.
I

believe that Peirce's notion of an operative desire

is applicable both to the formation of natural classes and

to judgments of desire.

This seems quite clear from the

analogy he continues to draw between desire as it operates

.

.

-
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in humans and desire eo
esire as it operates
in nature.
t

explains vagueness

— the

t-

semnrq

-p

Peirce

°f desire-by saying

and different
individuals may satisfy
the same
type of desire in
different ways
in this sense
In
y
desire is
vague.
Peirce concludes:
•

•

dividual,' and^prLticalL^^t^?!^'^
number of individuals-

^ larae
Nature's ways with ours,
compare
^
given to varietv than wL sh^seems^to'^L''^''
mu
very different on their
subjecUv^side^^rf
purposes of classification
^hey IL'eguivaLnt?"
,

[

1.206

(

1902 )]

The type of desire
operative in nature is
equivalent to
the type of desire
operative in individuals
insofar as
both are vague. And vagueness
is a feature which is
"closely connected with the fact
that every desire is
general" Ibid
[

.

]

The remaining feature of desire
which Peirce discusses is also closely related
to the feature of generality
Peirce refers to it as the "third
dimension"; I would
call It the feature of being
subject to compromise,
for

it addresses the need we often
have for choosing between
(or among) conflicting desires.
His example makes this

clear
A brighter lamp than what I use would
more agreeable to my eyes; but it wouldperhaps be
be less
so to my pocket, to my lungs, and
to my sense of
heat.
Accordingly, a compromise is struck; and
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somewhat vague,
the result is that'^the'^obi^'^t^'^
about certain middling
cluster
^les, some being removed
this way, some that way quaU^Lf

tributions will
characL^i^e-purposivf cL'sses"

1.207
1902 )]
This amounts to Peirce's
acknowledgment that in nature,
as
in the actions of men,
a compromise of
desires is called
for in order to achieve
the "best possible world."
[

(

mo;t-p:rfect?y":at?s?y'a"dLirf\:[ a"sif T'®""
to^
that

will^be ?ar be^te?"
general, when a state is not

sLtrthfLiter!

"

®PP'^°^’=hes

U?!o7^

conclude that throughout Peirce's
discussion of
the operative desire which
determines natural classes, an
analogy is drawn from the way in
which desires as judgments
operate.
There is no attempt to soften the
I

analogy; on the

contrary, as far as the features of
desire are concerned,
there are no differences between the
two.
And it is telling
to note that in each case, Peirce
relies on an example of
a feature of desire as judgment
in order to explain that
particular feature of desire as it operates
in nature,

not the other way around.

important force for Peirce

actions of men.

and

An operative desire is an

— both

in nature and in the

Thus, desire of either type would seem

to have the three features of generality,
vagueness, and
a third

dimension (being subject to compromise)

.

In

addition, in a lengthy account of the generality of

,

Ill

Thirdness, we are treated
both to a defense of desire
as
something general and to an
explanation of desire as a
Third.
I now wish to
comment more fully on these
two
aspects of desire.

3

•

Desire As Something General

In his early writings on the
category of Thirdness,

Peirce examines the idea of generality
in terms of the
nature of desire, specifically, the desire
for something
which will give pleasure: the baking and
eating
of an

apple pie.

He says:

Now, observe that we seldom, probably never,
desire
a single thing.
What we want is something which
shall produce a certain pleasure of a certain
kind.
To speak of a single individual pleasure is
to use
words without meaning. We may have a single
experience of pleasure; but the pleasure itself is
a quality.
Experiences are single; but qualities,
however, specialized, cannot be enumerated.
[1.341 (c. 1895)]

We desire something which is general

— something

produce a certain pleasure of a certain kind.

which will
It is

"always some kind of thing or event which is desired"
(1902)

]

[1.205

though my experience of desiring or my experience

of having some pleasure is something sincrular.

Further, when Peirce asserts here that "qualities,

however specialized, cannot be enumerated," he is not
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speaking about the vagueness of

being subject to compromise,

a

desire nor about its

Rather, he is driving home

the point that an object of
desire as a quality can never
other than something of a certain
kind.
His example:
to me

metals well known

r
^

^^"^ember to have examined lumps
of those
the limitation of experience
whrch attaches that number; there
is simply nren^tS

/cL

qualities 1 can imagine.
imagLf
^ between tin and lead, or betLen
c^DDer and
copper
anrf silver,
=
or between iron and nickel, or
between magnesium and aluminum. An
apple pie, then
IS desired.
[1.341 (c. 1895)]
an

.

.

Peirce has introduced this example to
show the general
nature of any quality.
But even though there are infinite
varieties of qualities between any two of the
metals he
has mentioned, it seems to me that this alone
is not

sufficient to show that any particular metallic quality

which is desired is general.
plausible that

a

For instance, it seems quite

person specifies the form, amount, and

degree of purity of the tin he desires.

And in that case,

the object of desire would seem to be something quite

specific and not general at all.
Peirce, and

I

Not so, according to

believe his reasoning rests ultimately on

pragmaticis tic grounds of the following sort.
Between any two qualities of metals, there will be an
infinite variety of other qualities.

Should

I

desire, for

example, a sample of tin, with all the specifications as

given above, my desire is for something that looks like tin.

.
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feels like tin and, in
short, behaves like
tin.
Furthermore, it is a desire for
a .etal of a certain
form, amount,
and degree of purity.
Pragmaticistically speaking, 1
desire something which will
be indistinguishable from
tin
and which will meet the
requirements I have specified.
What I want is something which
will behave in every way
as I expect tin to behave.
since there are many metallic
qualities which closely approximate
tin insofar as they
behave like tin, it is reasonable
to maintain that what I
desire is something of a certain
kind-no matter how
specific the object of my desire may
be.
I believe that
this pragmaticistic interpretation
of the general nature
of an object of desire-a quality-is
the most plausible
one to attribute to Peirce's enigmatic
example from

metallurgy
In a similar way,
a

the desire for an apple pie is also

desire for something general— no matter how
specific one

is about the type of pie desired.

—

An apple pie, then, is desired
a good apple pie,
made of fresh apples, with a crust moderately light
and somewhat short, neither too sweet nor too sour,
etc.
But it is not any particular apple pie; for
it is to be made for the occasion; and the only
particularity about it is that it is to be made
and eaten today.
[1.34 (c. 1895)]
The cook must choose some applies, but "as long as they
are sound and fine, any apples will do"

[

Ibid

.

]

.

Again,

the object of her desire is general until it gives way to
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volitional act on her nart^
part, until, that
is, she takes
some particular apples,
a

•

what she
apple.
From the nature of thina^^
the quality but must

tLf t^^pIrhcuLf^h?"

a?L1^rof ac‘^Io^-and

irrl?;terL"qu:“tiel"°u:?IiV^895n^^
The cook's desire to select
good apples for the pie is the
desire for something of a given
quality.
However, what
she finally selects are particular
apples, for "she cannot
take the quality but must take the
particular thing."
In terms of my earlier discussion
of desire as judgment,
the general quality of desire is
represented by the propositional object.
The object of the cook's desire is a
general
quality; the object of any desire is, according
to Peirce,
a

general quality.

For example, suppose

talks in Geneva are successful.

I

desire that the

Then the propositional

object, that the talks in Geneva are successful

,

represents

the general quality desired since there are many
different

ways in which the talks may be successful, with varying

degrees of specificity.

This example lends support to the

notion that desire or, more precisely, the object of desire
is general.

But what about a harder test case?

Suppose

I

wish

that the clerk standing before me in Vessey's Drugstore
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1^1

to me, right now,

5!yjHnd.

^iue

tj

ballpoint pen

.

T

is this propositional
object simply a general

quality?

Surely, my object of desire
has become more
specific "in the pursuit of it."
Whereas before 1 was
uncertain about what 1 wanted in
the way of a pen, I now
know Which pen 1 want, the color,
style, etc.
And I know
when, where, and from whom 1
want to purchase it.
Is there
anything about this desire which is
general, or does this
example show that there are particular
things we desire
after all? i believe Peirce can
consistently maintain
that we "probably never desire a single
individual thing,"
even when the desire in question is
quite specific and,

hence, something more complicated than the
desire for a
metal sample.

The desire

I

am now considering is that the clerk

standing before me in Vessey's Drugstore sell to me,
right
now,

the blue ballpoint pen

I

have in my hand.

Although

this might appear to be a desire which lacks generality as
I

have explained it, it is actually as general as the desire

I

have that the talks in Geneva are successful.

What

I

desire now, however, is a pen which, for all practical
purposes, is indistinguishable from the one
in my hand.

I

am holding

And barring some extraordinary circumstances,

another clerk selling me either the pen

I

am holding or "an

identical" pen on the shelf would quite probably satisfy my
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desire.

desire something general-"
something of a given
quality." Inelegantly
expressed, I desire that
someone
who, for all practical
purposes, is like the clerk
in front
of me in Vessey’s Drugstore,
sell to me, for all practical
purposes, right now, something
which, for all practical
purposes, is like the blue
ballpoint pen in my hand. For
Peirce, "it is always some
of thing or event which is
desired" and, as I have argued,
this is best fleshed out
in terms of his pragmaticism.
I

1^

There is, however,

a

related aspect of the qualitative

nature of the object of desire which
warrants comment.
Peirce tells us that desire "is an idea
bout
an idea"

(c.

1895)].

[1.341

Here, the first 'idea' refers to the
proposi-

tional attitude of desiring; the second,
to the propositional object.^ In the sense that this object

is an idea,

it is always something general.

Notice, though, that it

seems odd, indeed, to say that we desire some idea.

Yet

that IS what we seem to get with this notion that
desire
is an idea about an idea.

The oddity, however, is one of

linguistic usage rather than substance, for even though
the propositional object of a desire is characterized here
as an idea,

idea.

it does not follow that what is desired is an

The notion of a desired thing and the notion of

a

propositional object can be related in the following way:
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If I desare

then the (propositional)
object of my desire
is the idea of 4.
What I desire is still
general, it is
still some
or other.
The propositional object
merely
expresses this generality-as
the idea of 4
I repeat a
point made earlier: what
I desire is something
of a certain
kind, no matter how
specific the object of my
desire may be.
It is something which,
for all practical purposes,
behaves
as we would expect the
object of our desire to behave.
4,,

4.

.

]

:
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I

Desire As

•

a

Third

have concentrated

object of aesire.
desire

/

thnc
tnus far, ^
on the general nature
Rn4- Peirce
But
also treats desire as
-i

a whole,

considering the attitude of
desire together with
the object of desire.
As I have pointed out,
considered
as the object of desire,
reference to a particular
i^ea,
namely, the idea
Of
i
it would be for me, the cook's
master
master, to eat an apple pie.
[1.341 (c. 1895)]

?hing® it

iran

But the object of desire together
with the propositional
attitude of desire must be treated
differently.
Peirce
continues

desired is not a mere unattached
aSaTTtv' what is desired is that
quality,
the dream of eating
an apple pie should be realized in
Me; and this Me
IS an object of experience.
So with the cook's
desire.
She has no particular apple pie she
partiularly prefers to serve; but she does
desire and
intend to serve an apple pie to a particular
person.
[Ibid.

Here we find Peirce pulling together the
object of desire
and the attitude of desiring, combining them
in a way which

more accurately captures what one means when speaking
of
desire.
Understood as both object and attitude, desire
includes an element of particularity which an object of

desire considered alone and as something general can never
have.

Moreover, the attitude of desire introduces an element

of Thirdness and this, again,

is something which an object

]
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of desire considered
alone does not involve.

itself has no prominent
Thirdness- it ic
®=<Perience as a reality

is a second
But th^ a
one to the ithe^fif |

^

- --ch

[1.341

(c.

the

1895)]

Allow me to elaborate.
The propositional attitude
of desire plays the role of
a Third or a medium.
it seeks to attach a First-a
general
quality or "dream," to use Peirce
alternative expression
to a Second
a particular object of
experience. The
actual desire that x, then, is the
attitude of desiring
that X (a First) is actually realized
for some object of
experience (a Second)
And in this context, desire is a
Third.
To repeat:
.

desired is not a mere unattached quality;
what IS desired is that the dream of eating
an apple
pie should be realized in Me; and this Me
is an obiect
of experience.
[1.341 (c. 1895)]
Using Peirce's dream of eating an apple pie,
we can schematize the elements of desire in the following way:
Third

First

This Desire = Desiring that

apple pie

)

[

(

the dream of eating an

is realized in

(me)
I

Second

Notice here that the attitude of desiring involves
First, but is not itself a First.

a

It involves a First inas-

much as one wishes that his dream or idea

(a

First)

is

.
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realized in (or satisfied by)
some particular object of
experience (a Second)
So it is with any law of
nature.

af fdef

Were it but a
nature Sf
The cases to

®

which
n It
it"iLT
applies are seconds.

[1.341

(c.

1895)]

But as a medium between a First
and a Second, desire is a
Third.
True, Peirce often speaks
as though desire just is
the general idea or dream.
But once the two aspects of

desire-the propositional attitude and
the propositional
object— are distinguished, it is clear
that desire as a

relational notion is always a Third.

And it is, of course,

desire in this sense which is of immediate
relevance for
understanding desire as a motive for action.
I

have claimed that Peirce speaks about desire
both

as a propositional object and as an attitude
including a

propositional object.

Unfortunately for his readers,

Peirce does not always keep these two aspects of desire
distinct.

I

have also argued that the object of desire is

always general and, according to Peirce,

a

First.

But

I

now wish to point out that desire considered as an attitude
and including its object is also general.
sense,

is a Third and,

hence, general.

says generality is an idea of Thirdness

Desire, in this

Thus, when Peirce
[1.340

(c.

1895)]

and then illustrates this by using the particular relation
of desiring, one should be alert to the fact that desiring
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is general on two scores:

the object of desire as an
idea

is general and the
attitude of desiring as a medium
is

general.

Thirdnes s is general; desire
is doubly so.

Belief, Desire, and Volition

Having distinguished the
propositional object of
desire from the propositional
attitude of desire, it is
clear that it is the latter which
will function, in some
way, as a motive for action.

But as

I

argued in Chapter

beliefs also move us to act in the sense
that they are
causal factors of our actions and
dispositions to act.
then, are desires, beliefs, and actions
related?

I,

How,

Further-

more, there are motives for action other
than desires.

How,

on the Peircean account, are these related
to desire, if at
all? If we are to understand how one is moved
to act, these

are questions which demand answers.

points,

I

In addressing these

propose to look first at desire as

a

motive for

action, and then to consider other motives and their rela-

tionship to desire and to action.
Recall now that

I

began this chapter by referring to

some of the very few things Peirce had to say on the triad
of belief, motives, and action.

following passage:

Among them, there was the
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M 03.ritirn 0 do not toTTro-h
^ that every conjecture
is
equivalent to or
^
tLt having certain
=
it if one =ouirpelllr"l“L?a"L"l?^| accomplish
.

-i

^

5.480 1906 )]
Never short of examples,
Peirce comes through once
again,
illustrating just what he means
in this passage.
He comthat It IS quite likely a
man living long ago would
have been asked at some time
by his son whether
[

(

the sun
that rises in the morning is
the same as the one which set
the previous evening.
Our sage of old can then be
Imagined
to have replied:
I do not know, my boy;
but I think
put my brand on the evening sun, I that if l could
should be able
to see It on the morning sun
again.
[

If he could brand the evening sun,

5.480

(

1906 )]

our primitive man would

expect to see that brand on the morning
sun.

Here we see

again the expectative quality of a belief—
in this case,
the belief that the morning sun is the same
as the evening
sun.

(For simplicity,

I

shall refer to these as the Evening

Sun and the Morning Sun, knowing full well that

croaching on Quine's skies.)
elements of Peirce's notion of

deliberation and desire.

I

am en-

But now recall that two key
a

practical belief are

In Chapter I, my attention was

drawn to an analysis of the deliberation which necessarily

precedes a deliberate action.

And at that point, it seemed

fitting to postpone a detailed examination of desire as it

)
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related to belief and
actionrion, at this
th.'o point
in my discussion, such an examination
is paramount.^
So let us look once
again at the case of the
primitive
astronomer.
what would his motivating
desire beP Poliowing
the form I suggested
earlier, one can schematize
his desire
in the following way:
His Desire

—

[

(

the idea of deterini nH

nr.

Morni ng Sun is the eame
the Evening Sun)

is realized in

Morning Sun having his brand
on

(

the

it

)

Here again. desire would act
as a medium between an
idea
and a particular object of
experience; between a First and
a Second.
As a motive for action, the
primitive astronomer
would want to have his idea or
dream of determining whether
the Morning Sun is the same
as the Evening Sun realized,
or satisfied, by the Morning
Sun having his brand on it.
If our primitive star gazer
had such a desire and were to
act deliberately on his desire and
belief, then he would
put his brand on the Evening Sun if
he could.
Clearly,
acting deliberately on a desire presupposes
that there is
a desire.

Thus, a desire is necessary for deliberate
action

to occur.

Furthermore, if one were to act deliberately on

a desire,

then he would often act in a certain way only
if

he could act in that way.

modern

would reach

a

(Any astronomer--ancient or

mind-boggling impasse were he to try

—
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to put his mark on the
sun!)

Using the Morning Sun/Evening
Sun example, the relationship between having a
practical belief, desiring to see
an object of desire satisfied
or realised, deliberating
about future actions, and a
subsequent deliberation action
can be recast in the following
way:
To say that a person has the
belief that the Morning
Sun is the same as the Evening
Sun "is to say no more
nor less than" if (i) a person
were to desire to see
his brand on the Morning Sun, and
if (ii) he were to

deliberate about his future actions, then
(iii) he
would usually act in a certain deliberate
way,

i.e.,

he would put his brand on the Evening
Sun if he could.

Assuming conditions

(i)

and

are met, then we can

(ii)

expect that (iii) would follow.
There is, however, one further stipulation which
should be made, one which

I

mentioned briefly in Chapter

I,

that is the desire in question cannot be overridden by
some other conflicting desire.

desire,

d^^,

In general,

if an agent's

conflicts with his desire, d2» we cannot con-

clude that he will act on d^ rather than on d2*

Here,

that feature of desire known as the "third dimension"

being subject to compromise

— would

the conflicting desires, one will

come into play.
(ideally)

Given

opt to act on

that desire which will result in the best possible results.
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In "The Fixation of
i^eiiet,

Peirce gives us yet
•

>-

another apt example
of the
f
rne triadic relationship
of belief,
desire, and action:
•

Our beliefs guide our desirec;
^^^s and shape our actions.
The assassinc: nv
i

Mountain!^;sed°L^°isrin?o°L“h
mand, because they believed
that obedience^to hi^
Had
rnis, tney
^hlf
tterwouirnorh"®
would not have acted as they they doubted
did.
[5.371

(1877)]

The actuating desire of these
assassins would be their
desire that their dream of eternal
happiness might be fulfilled in them.

The belief on which they are
prepared to
act IS the belief that obedience to
the Old Man of the
Mountain will insure eternal happiness.
There is a significant difference between this and the
earlier example,
however.
Whereas our ancient astronomer could not act

deliberately on his belief and desire, the eager
assassins
could and did act on their shared belief and desire.
With
the pondering sage of old, a readiness to act
could not

give way to the expected action of branding the Evening
Sun, even assuming the requisite desire was present.
How, one might ask at this point, is desire a "cause,

not effect, of effort"
'^ith the

[5.486

(1906)].

As was the case

astronomer of old, we often cannot act on our

beliefs and desires due to physical limitations.

Moreover,

of the desires we could act on, many are subject to com-

promise:

when two desires conflict, we cannot act on both.
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Fortunately, perhaps, for
us, our desires do not
come neatly
isolated from each other or
from the array of beliefs
we

hold.

And in discussing the
reasoning process which precedes a decision to act or
not to act, Aune points out
that
"I might decide not
to give in to my desire
for remarkably
7
sophisticated reasons."
In what sense,
then,

can we say

that desires cause us to act?
In order to give a Peircean
answer to this question,

return once again to Peirce's
notion of what it means to
say someone believes something.
Having a belief means that
If one were to desire something
pertinent to the belief
(= proposition believed), and
were to deliberate concerning
his future actions, then that
person would often
I

act in a

certain way.

Moving from the subjunctive conditional

language of the meaning of

a

belief to the non-conditional

language of actions, the following can be
said:
a

person does have

a

Given that

desire pertinent to one of his beliefs,

and does deliberate about his future actions,
then that

person will quite probably act in

a

certain way.

To use a

specific example here, suppose that Peirce's cook does

believe that certain apples will be good in an apple pie.
Given that she does desire to make a pie of those apples
and that she does deliberate about what she will do, then

quite probably she will pare, core, and slice those apples.
One could say that she will be acting here on her desire

;
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and her belief.
But as

pointed out earlier, insofar
as desire is
tive in nature, it is an
P
endeavor toward habi t-taking
a tendency to take on
habits.
And I claimed that desire al
judgment is regarded by Peirce
in the same way as desire as
it operates in nature.
So if desire is thought
I

of by

Peirce as an endeavor toward
habit-taking
of

effort— is, perhaps, best conceived

one's disposition to act.

,

desire— as cause

of as a cause of

And in this way desires would

seem to mimic the causal efficacy of
beliefs:

just as a

belief IS a cause of my being prepared
to act in a certain
way whenever a certain occasion arises,
so also a desire
puts one into the "ready position" to act
in a certain way
whenever a certain occasion arises. They are,
in this

respect, on a par with each other:

both beliefs and desires

are direct causes of one's disposition to act.

Moreover,

just as beliefs may indirectly cause us to act,
desires are
also indirect causes of actions:

they will affect the

causal order in virtue of the habits they produce.

So if a

disposition is directly caused by one's beliefs and desire,
then the actions which are directly affected by one's

disposition will be indirectly affected by one's beliefs
and desires.

But there is still another way to view the "causal"
link between desires and actions.

The deliberation process
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Which precedes any deliberate
action will take into account
how a person can best satisfy
his desires.
We weigh conflicting desires and decide on
that course of action which
we believe will help us to
satisfy the desire
we ulti-

(s)

mately wish to see realized.

m

this way, desires will

directly influence the deliberation
which precedes a
deliberate action, though they will
only indirectly influence the action itself. So once
again, desires may be
understood as indirect causes of those
actions which result
from deliberation. And in this limited
way, Peirce would
agree with Aune's view that "Typically,
desire moves us to
act only indirectly; it does this by
conditioning
the

thought that directly moves us to act."^
Thus far,
for action.

I

have considered only desire as

a

motive

But Peirce does not hold that this is the only

motive one can have which will affect one's disposition to
act.

In a review of Karl Pearson's The Grammar of Science

,

Peirce lists a variety of ethical motives "ordered as to

bring into view the various degrees of generality of
motives."

The list is extension and so

I

will pick out

only a few in order to convey a sense of the plurality of

motives for Peirce.

Among the motives he gives the follow-

ing in order of generality:

A man may act with reference to the momentary occasion,
either from unrestrained desire, or from preference
for one desideratum over another ... or from dread
of blame ... or according to some general rule
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of pleasure^°

before action,

pursuit

or^ bec^^^'

t

^

a^vfnt^.^ro?

Ms

etermined to do nothing not
pronounced reasonable
be filled with the idea
thaf\hl'
reasonably be admitted
as ultiL?e is^'Sari?^®''
that living reason for the
sake of
whioh
ich the psychical and
physical universe is in
process of creation (religionism).
[8.138 (1901)]
This IS one way of categorizing
ethical motives, but there
are others which he considers.
For example, they can also
be categorized
.

.

.according to the degree in which immediate

them, from unrestrained
desire present but restrained, action
for self, action for pleasure
tor
generalized beyond
seit
to such motives as direct obedience,
pancratism, religionism, in which the element
of selfteeling is reduced to a minimum.
[8.139 (1901)]
.

.

.

Now one thing which cannot go unnoticed in
both these
listings is the gradual move away from unrestrained
desire
toward something which involves the generality of
rationality
(in the case of the listing according to generality)

toward a consciousness of otherness

and

(in the case of the

listing according to the immediateness of feelings)

.

The

motive of desire is succeeded in these categorizations by
motives which involve higher degrees of reasoning or
objectivity, so that it might seem as if desire need not
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be present at all in
motivating one towards action.
But I
would argue that this is not
guite Peirce's view. Although
there are other motives for
action-a rich variety of them,
in fact desire must still
be counted among the motives
of
any action.
In fact, these other motives
often present

themselves as beliefs or reasons
for acting and, in this
sense, they are quite different
from any desire.
Yet is is
from these motivating reasons that
the requisite motivating
desire stems.
I look to Peirce for
support of this view.
And once again, Peirce is Johnny-on-the-spot
with a
helpful example.
In disputing Pearson's claim that
a desire
for social stability (mingled perhaps
with utilitarian con-

siderations) is the sole motivation of human
actions, Peirce
outlines the motives he believes underlie a
scientist's
labors.

It is, he tells us, an appreciation for
the ongoing

pursuit of truth, for the contribution he can make
to the
foundations of knowledge, which urge on the man of science.
As Peirce puts it:
He is keenly aware of his own ignorance, and knows
that personally he can make but small steps in
discovery. Yet, small as they are, he deems them
precious; and he hopes that by conscientiously
pursuing the methods of science he may erect a
foundation upon which his successors may climb
higher
This, for him, is what makes life worth
living and what makes the human race worth perpe tuation
The very being of law, general truth,
reason--call it what you will--consists in its
expressing itself in a cosmos and in intellects
which reflect it, and in doing this progressively;
and that which makes progressive creation worth
.

.
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feel-is precisely

o^wMcr-;

taLs^pIace!
[8.136

(1901); my underscore]

It IS his respect for reason,

law,

or the general

truth which urges the researcher
in his investigations.
And his desires spring from these
beliefs.
In one of
his drafts of the Pearson review,
Peirce spells out the

distinction between motivating reasons and
motivating
desire, though admittedly, he does not
refer to them in
this way.
It IS not too much to say that he
[the scientist]
worships the divine majesty of the power of
reasonableness behind the fact. From that sentiment
springs h is ardent desire to further the discovery
of truth
If he cannot discover it himself, he
wishes to lay a sure foundation from which some
successor may come to the truth
[8.136, n. 3 (1901)
my underscore]
.

.

;

So even here, where the motivating reasons are as
general

and as other-oriented as the respect for "reasonableness

behind the fact," there are still motivating desires

which spur the scientist on to discover the truth.

His

beliefs about the nature of the scientific enterprise,
his thoughts about his role in the pursuit of truth, and
the value he places on truth itself serve as a guide for

him in determining what it is he wants to accomplish.
And, according to the Peircean story, these motivating

reasons or beliefs together with the belief-inspired

desires will shape his actions.

Thus, Peirce's view that
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there is

plurality of motives for human
action is perfectly consistent with his view
that desires move
a

us to

act.

And furthermore, although
there may be other motives
operating, desire as a Third is
still a necessary condition
for deliberate action to occur.
As an operative force in
nature, desire is an important aspect
of Peirce's philosophical views concerning natural
classes; as a motive
for deliberate action, desire is of
equal importance in
a Peircean theory of action.
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•

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter,

I

have examined the sort of thing

Peirce considers a motive for deliberate
action.
I began
by considering Peirce's view that
desire is the judgment
that something is good.
l then argued that as
far as the

three features of desire are concerned,
desire as judgment
IS the same as the operative desire
which determines

natural classes.

spent some time examining the feature

I

of generality, and

I

claimed that, for Peirce, any particu-

larity attributable to desire stems from its being
a Third.

An understanding of desire as

a

motive for action is ham-

pered by Peirce's use of the term 'desire' to refer both to
the object of desire

(the propositional object)

attitude of desiring together with its object.

and to the
It is this

latter use, however, which invites an understanding of desire as a Third.

Third which is

a

And as

I

suggested, it is desire as

motive for action.

Finally,

I

a

considered

the motive of desire as it relates to belief and action.

I

suggested two ways in which desire might be thought of as
cause:

as is the case with a belief, a desire is a cause of

one's disposition to act and it is a causal influence on the

deliberation which precedes action.
deliberately from

a

And although we may act

variety of reasons, the desire that

one's dream may be realized in some object of experience is
still a necessary condition for acting deliberately.

134

NOTES

See Chapter

I,

Section

Also, Peirce says:

1.

The actual calling to mind of the
substance of a
as personal to ourselves, but as
holding
annd^o^
good
or true, is a judgment.
[4.53 (1893)]

A belief need not be consciou s.
When it is recognized, the act of recognition is
called by logicians
a judgment, although this is
properly a term of
psychology.
[2.148 (1903)]
Quine, Willard Van Orman, Word and Object
(Massachusetts:

The M.I.T. Press, 1960), p. 150.

3
I

would like to note here that in this passage Peirce

is contrasting the state of belief with that
of doubt.

by contrast,

And

"Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state

from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the
state of belief"
is,

[5.372].

Seen from this perspective, it

perhaps more understandable why Peirce would view belief

as a "calm and satisfactory state."

trast, however,

Apart from such

a

con-

it is difficult to make sense of the notion

that believing something necessarily involves such a state.
If I believe,

for example, that

I

will miss an important

dissertation deadline, it is unlikely that

I

terize my state as calm and satisfactory.

Surely other

would charac-

variables, such as the believer's nature and the subject
and circumstances of the belief, will determine whether

one's state of belief is calm and satisfactory.

.

.
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By saying desire is a judgment
that something is

good, Peirce is not suggesting
that it is an attitude
similar to Donald Davidson's
"pro-attitude." Davidson
iriclud 0 s undsir pro— attitud6s

esires, wantings, urges, promptings,
and a
grea variety of moral views, aesthetic
principles,
economic prejudices, social conventions,
and public
and private goals and values in
so far as these can be
interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed
toward
ac ions o ^a certain kind.
[Essays on Actions and
Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982),
p. 4]
.

.

.

For Peirce, a desire has a distinctively
pragmaticistic

coloring
In distancing himself from Hume's view that
"desire
is a direct passion," Bruce Aune points out that

many desires seem to be far more intellectual
than a mere feeling, involving the idea of a friend's
happiness or the end of a brutal war.
[Reason and
Action (Dordrecht, Holland:
D. Reidel Publishing Co..
1977
p. 56]
.

.

.

)

Aune

s

,

claim that desires "involve" ideas seems to capture

Peirce's notion of desire as an "idea about an idea," and
his examples seem to support this:

happy' or

'I

want the war to end'

In Chapter I,

I

'Would that Mary were
[

Ibid

.

]

determined that insofar as

a

theoretical belief "can eventually go to the determination
of a practical belief" and involves expectation, it bears
a

striking resemblance to

a

practical belief.

theoretical beliefs are, practically speaking.

In fact,
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indistinguishable

fro,n

practical beliefs

the present discussion,
then,

I

between the two types
of belief.
”^Aune,

p.

,

p.

57.
58.

„in

For purposes of

^ot differentiate

Chapter IV

acting intentionally and
acting freely

seems almost a truism to say
that one cannot act
from any motive unless one
intends to and, further, one
cannot act deliberately unless
one intends to do what one
does.
Both acting from some motive
and acting deliberately
seem to involve acting intentionally—
acting to some
purpose. Also, as I suggested in
the last chapter, a person
may have the relevant belief on
which he is prepared to act,
as well as a motivating desire
(and intention to act), and
yet not be able to act. Being free to act
seems to be

another condition necessary for
place.

a

deliberate act to take

So in order to complete my examination of
Peirce's

theory of action,

I

would like to consider these two addi-

tional features of a deliberate act:
and acting freely.

I

acting intentionally

have briefly touched on each of

these topics in earlier chapters;

examine them more fully.

I

I

would now like to

shall do this by presenting

Peirce's distinction between mechanical actions and deliberate actions, and by examining the relationship between

desiring and intending in deliberate actions.
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I

shall then

,
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discuss what it means to be
externally free to act and, more
interestingly, what it means, according
to Peirce, to be

internally free to act.

I

believe this will tie off the

loose ends of a Peircean theory
of action.

^

*

Mec hanical Action and Deliberate Actions

In Chapter I,

l

pointed out Peirce's distinction

between "purely mechanical actions" and
"action governed
by reason."

What makes an action something other than

a

purely mechanical occurrence is a certain action of
the

mind

an agent's intentions, or his "act of intending."

The two examples Pierce gives of the distinction illustrate

quite clearly just what he has in mind.

In the first

example
A man gives a brooch to his wife.
The merely mechanical part of the act consists in his laying the brooch
down while uttering certain sounds, and her taking it
up.
There is no genuine triplicity here; but there
is not giving, either.
The giving consists in his
agreeing that a certain intellectual principle shall
govern the relations of the brooch to his wife.

And the second example:
The merchant in the Arabian Nights threw away a
datestone which struck the eye of a Jinnee. This
was purely mechanical, and there was no genuine
triplicity.
The throwing and the striking were independent of one another. But had it aimed at the
Jinnee's eye, there would have been more than merely
throwing away the stone. There would have been
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The merchant throws the stone away.

The husband places a

brooch in front of his wife while uttering
some words, and
she picks it up.
Neither of these actions is an instance
of a genuine triad;

they are simply actions which "take

place between pairs of particles"

[2.86

They are

(1902)].

mechanical, lacking some third "object" which
would connect
the pairs.

"A Rational Thirdness

being really paired by virtue of
(1902)].

.

a

.

third object, C"

This is the Thirdness that,

exhibits.

consists in A and B

.

I

[2.86

argued, desire

A mechanical action, then, could never be

a

genuine triad for there is no purpose or intentionality
on the part of the agent which would mediate between the

pairs of objects.

Since a mechanical action lacks purpose

and intentionality,

it could never be a deliberate action,

for,

as

I

argued in Chapter

I,

if a person were to act de-

liberately, then (among other things) he would have to

attend to his present intentions and purposes.

Every deliberate act, on the other hand, is

a

genuine

triad since it involves the purpose and intention of the
agent.

The merchant aims the stone at the genie, and the

action is intentional, deliberate.

The husband gives the

brooch to his wife, and again, the action is intentional
or deliberate.

Another example which Peirce gives is the
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intentionality involved in making

a

contract.

Now let us consider th<^
triad, A makes a contract
with C.
To c;;,v
A
^ that A
signs the document D and C
sianc5 +-hQ
^

S"

“-Hi-"”

Intention and its correlative
notions of aims, ends, and
purposes signal action governed by
reason as opposed to a
purely mechanical action; it signals
a deliberate actiona genuine triad.
it is this feature of deliberate
actions
which prompts Peirce to remark that

category of thought, representation, triadic
*1 Irelation,
mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as
sucn IS an essential ingredient of
reality.
[5.436

(1905)]

Elsewhere, Peirce tells us that "purposive
action must
be action virtually directed toward the removal
of stimulation"

[5.561

(c.

1906)].

And he spells out the connection

between the meaning of an action and its aim or
purpose:
if the meaning of a symbol consists in how it
might cause us to act, it is plain that this ''Tiow"
cannot refer to the description of mechanical motions
that it might cause, but must intend to refer to a
description of the action as having this or that aim.
.

.

.

_

(5.135

(1903)]

One cannot give something to another person without having
the purpose of giving in mind.

Thus, deliberate action

(action governed by reason; purposive action)

with some purpose in mind.

is action done

Put more strongly, intentionality

is a necessary condition for acting deliberately.
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Desiring and Intending

*

Within a Peircean framework,
desiring and intending
have at least two things in
conmon:
they are both instances
of Thirds and they are both
necessary for deliberate action
to occur.

How,

then, might the activities of
desiring and

intending be related, if at all?
idle one.

The question is not an

without the additional concern of placing
things

in Peircean categories,

the relationship between desire and

intentions has spawned heated philosophical
debate.^
Borrowing from that debate, I propose to
give a Peircean
view of this relationship by addressing the
following
questions:

(1)

Does desire entail intention? and

intention entail desire?
on the matter,

(2)

Does

In the usual philosophical debate

the first question might never arise.

But

both questions are relevant for Peirce, given his phenomenological analysis of desire.

To Peircean answers

I

now turn.

Does desire entail intention ?

(a)

As might be expected,

entail intention?

the answer to

can be readily given.

(1)

,

"Does desire

Although Peirce

seems to merge desire with intentions in his pie baking

example,

3

the two ought to be differentiated.

Both are

elements of Thirdness, true, and both are necessary for

deliberate actions.
entail intention.

But for all that, desire does not

The partition

seen by way of an example.

I

am suggesting is easily
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Suppose that our fictional merchant
actually desires to
strike the genie with a stone.
His desire can be expressed
desire _that hi s dream of striking
the genie's ey p
w ill be realized in the s to ne
_
hitting the genie's eve
Now
It seems perfectly reasonable
to suppose that, although our
Arabian friend has this desire, he may
never have the intention of striking the genie's eye.
The desire is there,
but he has no intention of acting on
that desire.
Whatever
his reasons are, he has decided to forgo
acting
.

on this

particular desire.
Suppose, however, that the merchant does, in
fact, intend to strike the genie and he is successful.

seems quite clear that this action

— the

Then it

striking of the

genie's eye--is intentional and, moreover, the intention^^^by extends to at least one other act
stone at the genie's eye.

— the

aiming of the

This can be displayed in the

following way, using the symbolism:

^

= the

a =

merchant

his wish to strike the genie's eye with

a

stone

b = striking/strikes the genie's eye with a stone
c =

aims the stone at the genie's eye

Then
S

desires that

a

will be realized in

^ does b for some purpose
^ does

c for the

x.

purpose of

b.

b.

:

143

Thus, S does both b and c
intentionally.

The merchant

intends to strike the eye of the
genie with a stone for
some purpose unknown to us,
and he intends to aim the stone
at the genie's eye for the
purpose of striking
the genie.

Both of these actions would seem
to involve acting on a
desire, in fact, the same desire.
But the relevant point
here is that the intentionality of
the merchant's deliberate
actions stems from his desire, as well
as from his beliefs.
So while desire does not entail
intention,
it is,

in part,

from desire that intentions spring.

At this point, one might ask whether the action
of
aiming the stone at the genie can be analyzed in
a way
similar to the action of striking the genie's eye with
stone.

a

And the answer to that, on first glance, would seem

to be yes.

Starting afresh, then, suppose the merchant

wishes to aim the stone at the genie.

His desire can be

expressed as the desire that his wish to aim the stone at
the genie

genie

s

eye is realized in his aiming the stone at the

Keeping the old symbolism, but adding to it, we

.

have
d = his wish to aim the stone at the genie's eye
e =

aiming/aims the stone at the genie's eye

£ = contracts certain eye and arm muscles
Then
S

desires that d will be realized in

e.
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S

does e for the purpose
of b.

S

does

f

for the purpose of e.

Once again, it appears that
there are two actions (though
there certainly may be more)
which stem from the initial
desire, both of them being
performed intentionally: aiming
the stone at the genie’s
eye for the purpose of striking
his eye, and contracting certain
eye and arm muscles
for

the purpose of aiming the stone
at the genie's eye.
In
general, it would seem that two or
more different actions
(not the same action under different
descriptions)
performed
,

intentionally, may stem from the same desire.

But now one

must pause to consider the plausibility
of considering a
muscular contraction to be an intentional
action.

In Chapter II,

l

showed that Peirce regards nervous

and muscular contractions as the only actions

which we will directly.

But as

I

(or volitions)

pointed out, most often

these actions are performed unconsciously and, hence,
non-

voluntarily.
of

Contracting one's muscles "for the purpose

taking aim would seem to be one such action:

it is

both unconsciously performed and, hence, nonvoluntar.ily
performed.

Should this action, and others like it, none-

the less, be treated as actions done intentionally

— as

actions done with some purpose in mind?
If the analysis

I

have just given is correct, then it

might seem the answer must be

a

resounding yes.

The merchant
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contracts certain eye and

ari.

muscles for the purpose of

aiming the stone at the genie's
eye.

This action would be

as intentional as his action
of aiming the stone or his
action of striking the genie. And
if we were to hold Peirce
to a reductive account of

volition, directly willed actions—

nervous reactions or muscular contractions—
would be the
originating intentional actions; all
others would be only
derivative. On this analysis, if we really
understood the
nature of our actions and our desires, we
would begin,
rather than end, any analysis of intentional
actions with
a desire to contract certain muscles
for the purpose of
some X.

Allow me to elaborate by way of an example.

Suppose

I

have a desire to water the lawn.

This would

be a derivative desire, and the original desire from
which

this has evolved would be the desire to contract the muscles

necessary for putting the sprinkler in place and turning on
the faucet.

So if these actions were performed, we would

say that the contracting of muscles is done for the purpose
of putting the sprinkler in place and turning on the faucet,

and that in turn is done for the purpose of watering the
lawn.

We could go on to single out other mediate and

ultimate ends, but it does not seem necessary here.

The

point is that if we interpret Peirce in this reductive way,
all of our desires and intentions will be seen to stem from

originating desires and intentions having to do with

a
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discharge of nervous energy
or

son,e

muscular contraction.

reject this interpretation of
Peirce for two reasons.
First, It is quite clear, as
we have seen in the
numerous passages I have cited,
that Peirce recognizes that
the things we desire and intend
are not limited to a release
of nervous energy or a muscular
contraction.
His wonderful
examples are replete with desires of
a very mundane
I

kind.

True, an athlete or dancer, or
someone undergoing physical
therapy, or someone exerting great
physical strength in

order to move

a

table, might have as his originating
desire,

the desire to contract certain muscles.

And, of course,

there are other such cases for which there would
be an

originating desire to move

a

muscle.

But few of the de-

liberate actions most of us perform stem from

contract muscles.
ful,

a

desire to

Our desires and intentions are as color-

troublesome, and varied as are the individuals who

have them.

Peirce recognizes this and would reject any

attempt to reduce desires and intentions in this way, though
one might have thought that a critical examination of

Peirce's views forces one into just that position.
Second, it is not even clear that having the intention
of watering the lawn involves having the intention of

contracting certain muscles in order to realize that end.
To use our old example, the merchant may desire to strike
the genie and it is probably that he would also desire to
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do that which is necessary
in order to strike him.
But for
all that, it is doubtful he
would ever have the desire to
contract the muscles necessary
for him to take proper aim.
Hence, it is also doubtful that
he would intend to contract
those muscles.
To say that we perform an
action inten-

tionally— with some purpose in mind— and
yet are not aware
of that purpose seems muddled
indeed.

in fact, we have

taken the intentionality out of the
so-called intentional
action.
Purposive action, action governed by reason,
intentional action— these expressions point
to actions which
are done consciously and voluntarily.
Seldom do we con-

sciously and voluntarily contract our muscles,
and

I

am not

sure It IS even possible to trigger a nerve
impulse con-

sciously and voluntarily.

To hold Peirce to the view that

these actions are desired and intentional in such a way

that they function as originating desires and intentions

even though we may not be aware of them, would be to saddle

Peirce with an incoherent view.

Furthermore, it would be

^^tithetical to one of the functions of pragmatism:

"to

lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially
clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension.
[5.206

(1903)].

I

"
.

.

conclude that Peirce does not maintain

that directly willed actions

— nervous

reactions and muscular

contractions--are necessarily intentional actions.

Nor

does he maintain that these actions are our originating
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intentional actions.
Does int ention entail desire
?
I

turn now to the more
interesting of the two Questions

posed earlier-interesting
both for moral philosophers
in
general and for Peirce in
particular.
The question is:
Does intention entail desire?
It is this problem which is
at the nub of philosophical
debate concerning issues of
moral culpability. And whereas the
first question I
examined show that, for Peirce, desires
and intentions do
not point backward to some originating
desire and intention,
this question will bring us to a
consideration of desires
and intentions in terms of future,
expected but unwanted
consequences. My inquiry now reaches forward.
I

The specific question

I

shall be addressing is whether

the expected but unwanted consequences of
intended actions

are themselves intended.

answer,

I

To prepare the way for a Peircean

would first like to present two sides of the con-

troversy surrounding this question current in the philosophical literature.
If one holds the view which G. E. M. Anscombe puts

forward, then one is committed to the view that one intends

certain consequences of one's actions only if one desires
those consequences.

And conversely, if one does not desire

the consequences of one's actions,
to have intended them.

then one cannot be said

The consequences of Anscombe

's

view

5

:
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are quite clear.

A person may know what
he or she is doing,
know the consequences of
those actions, and yet if
not all
of the expected consequences
are desired, then the agent
will be said to intend to do
only that which he or she
desires to do.

The example Anscombe uses is
that of a water pumper
who is paid to bring water to a
house where various party
chiefs live.
They are plotting, among other
things, the
extermination of the Jews.
The water has been poisoned by
a would-be assassin, and the
water pumper knows this.
The
problem stated by Arthur R. Miller is this:

Now we
ask:
can this man (the pumper), knowing
full well that the water supply has been
poisoned,
intend to replenish the supply of drinking
water to
the house (X) without thereby intending
to poison
Its inhabitants (Y) ?4

Anscombe

's

reply is that though the man intends to replenish

the supply of water to the household and earn
his pay, he

does not thereby intend to poison the inhabitants
of the
house.

According to Miller, Anscombe 's solution rests on

the connection she makes between wanting and intending.
He says

In particular, Anscombe appears to be committed
to the view that intending entails wanting; or, in

—

other words, that wanting is a necessary although
not a suf f icient--condition for intending.
For Anscombe, a "desirability characterization" of some

sort must be present for an agent's action to be inten-

tional

.

°
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there must be some feature in
° say
I
ir^tended
which the agent finds desirable, the
something which he (rightly or wrongly)
believes to be

extrinLcally orintrin-

locally.

Miller rejects Anscombe's analysis,
relying primarily
on the way in which mitigating
circumstances influence the
ascription of responsibility and the affixing
of praise
and blame.
of intention on the part of the agent,
‘iZk*
although
it is not always an excusing circumstance
(with respect to wrong acts), is nevertheless
the
sort of thing which functions as at least a
mitigating
circumstance in most cases. ^
^

From this, the crux of Miller's reasoning unfolds:
if a reason R is sufficient for showing that
given act is not intentional, then R is also capable
of functioning to identify a relevant mitigating
circumstance
.

.

.

a

.

By Modus Tollens, if a reason R is not capable of functioninq
to identify a relevant mitigating circumstance,

then it is

not sufficient for showing that a given act is not intentional.

According to Miller, the pumper's denial that he

wanted to poison the inhabitants would not be a mitigating
circumstance.

A protest on the water pumper's part that

he did not want to poison the inhabitants, therefore, would

not be sufficient for showing that his act of poisoning the

inhabitants is not intentional.
we would not countenance the pumper's sincere
disclaimer that he wanted to poison the inhabitants
as being in any way a mitigating (much less an
exculpating) circumstance, as we could countenance.
.

.

.

151

tSt,^in^?heL^ciJc™slh

-ignorance on his part
the water =

poisoning the inhabitarts?9^'

The water pumper who
knowingly replenishes the
water supply
with poisoned water has
conmitted an intentional act
of
poisoning the inhabitants,
even though he did not want
to.
Where doing X = doing Y.
Miller concludes that

foreseeable result of
circumstances,
but foreseen hv th agent himself,
then if doing x is to
count*^,
action on his part, then
so is doing

doina x^in

If an action is intentional
on the part of the agent, and
If he foresees the consequences
of that action, then the

consequences are also intentional,
wanted or not.
Miller anticipates a possible objection

to his position.

One might argue that, in such
cases as the one under consideration, the consequences of an act
are not intended
though they are nevertheless done willingly.
And "this is
why we do not or will not let the agent
off the hook in
such cases." Miller's response is to
claim that "A was

willing to do Y" should not be understood simply
as passive
acquiescence; rather it should be interpreted as
"Y
was

intentional on A's part."

... in the sorts of cases under consideration,
the agent is not simply willing to let certain
things
happen in fact, he is willing to to these things, or
willing to perform certain actions of which these are
the certain and foreseeable consequences.
Thus,
Anscombe's pumper is not only willing to see the
inhabitants die, but he is willing to poison them.^^

.
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In objecting to Miller's
overall line of reasoning,

Wayne A Davis argues, in brief,
that
of culpability:

"...

(1)

There are degrees

person is more deserving of

a

c ondemnation if he wants
to

perform a wrong act than if

he does not want to perform it
(other things equal)."
-

absence of intention is a mitigating but

definitely not an excusing factor when
the agent is willing
to perform the evil act."^^
(3) "'A was willing
to do Y'

is not the same as

'Y

was intentional on A

'

s

part.'

The

latter entails that A did Y, the former does
not."^^

Because of his "firm 'linguistic intuition'" that

(4)

expected but unwanted consequences of intended actions
are
not intended, he

[Davis]

intention entails desire.
suggests

is led to the explanation that

Miller, on the other hand,

that Anscombe and others believe expected but

unwanted consequences of intended actions are not intended
solely because they believe intention entails desire.

"...

an even firmer intuition that the agent is

willing to bring about the unwanted consequences" leads
Davis to "reject the principle that willingness entails
^
desire
•

I

-.16

would add to Davis' list of reasons for rejecting

Miller's position the following objection.
Miller makes between the absence of

a

The connection

mitigating circum-

stance and an intentional action seems to me questionable.
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As

have pointed out, he has asked
us to accept as his
"major premise" that
I

if a reason R is sufficient
for
given act IS not intentional, then showing that
R is alL capable
of functioning to identify a
relevant mitigating
^
^
circumstance.
.

a

This can be read

i

position, we would have

suggest that, by trans-

given

But from this

we cannot conclude that a given reason
R is sufficient for

showing that

a

given act is intentional,

'S

Yet that

is the basis for Miller's rejection of
the view that in-

tending entails wanting.
The problem, once again,

is one of deciding on the

status of expected but unwanted consequences of
intended
actions:

are those consequences themselves intended?^^

Those who, together with Davis and Anscombe, say that the

expected but unwanted consequences of intended actions are
not intended tie their arguments, in some way, to the

principle that intending entails desiring.

Opponents of

this position side with Miller's general view that the

expected but unwanted consequences of an intended action
are also intentional.

Peirce,

I

believe, would reject the

rigid conclusions of Miller and add his voice to those of

Davis and Anscombe.

But Peirce's voice will have that

distinctively pragmaticistic ring to it.
answer,
I

For the Peircean

then, old grounds will be revisited.

have claimed that, for Peirce, we act both on desires

154

and beliefs:

they are causes of one's
disposition to act
and they influence the
deliberation which immediately precedes one s deliberate action.
The question "Does intention
entail desire" is, perhaps,
best examined in terms of the
yses I have given of desiring
and believing,
i would
like to examine the question,
first, in terms of desires,
and then in terms of beliefs.

Recall that from the merchant's one
desire to strike
the genie's eye with a stone, two
actions were performed
intentionally:
the action of aiming the stone and
the

action of striking the eye.
sumably)

But the actions were

for two different purposes:

(pre-

aiming the stone had

as its purpose striking the genie's eye,
and striking the

genie's eye had as its purpose harming the genie or
some
such thing.

However, things are different in the case of

the water pumper's desire to collect his pay.
is performed intentionally

water supply
his pay.

— and

— the

One action

action of replenishing the

this is done for the purpose of collecting

And while there may be other actions which are

performed intentionally following from that same desire,

poisoning the inhabitants of the house is not one of them.
Following my earlier format, the pumper's desire is
that his wish of getting paid is realized in his receiving
the money he has earned
P = the

pumper

.

The following symbols can be used:

155
a - his

desire to get paid

—

^aceiving the money he has earned

c -

replenishing/replenishes the water supply

d = poisoning/poisons the
inhabitants of the house

Then
P

desires that

a

P does c for the

will be realized in b.

purpose of

b.

Replenishing the water supply is done
intentionally for the
purpose of getting paid. But we would not
say that

P does c for the

purpose of

d.

The pumper, as we have seen, does not care one
way or the

other about poisoning the inhabitants.

Nor would we say

that
P

does d for the purpose of

b.

The pumper desires that he receive his pay.

Acting de-

liberately on this desire means, among other things,

attending to his present intentions and purposes.

His

present purpose, stemming from his desire, is that he be
paid.

(".

.

.

purposive action must be action virtually

directed toward the removal of stimulation"
1906)

]

.)

[5.561

(c.

And it is to this end that he replenishes the

water supply--to realize (to satisfy) his desire of being
paid.

There is no intention of poisoning the plotters

which stems from this desire.

He replenishes the water

supply intentionally; he does not poison the plotters

—

8
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intentionally.
But now it will be said that c and
d are identical
actions under different descriptions
(replenishing the

water supply = poisoning the inhabitants);
if replenishing
the water supply is performed intentionally,
so is poisoning
1
the inhabitants.
But here Peirce would protest
loudly:

the two descriptions point to two different
actions— they

are not the same at all.

And this is a natural result of

Peirce's account of intentions.
As

I

remarked earlier, for Peirce,

a

contract between

two people depends on the intent involved.

To say that A signs the document D and C signs the
document D, no matter what the contents of that
document, does not make a contract. The contract
lies in the intent.

[1.475

(c.

1896)]

Nor does a husband's placing a brooch in front of his wife

while uttering some sounds constitute an act of giving.

The

actions are mechanical, lacking some third thing which connects them.
tion.

In these cases, what is lacking is the inten-

Similarly in the water pumper's case.

The pumper

replenishing the water supply with poisoned water and the
inhabitants of the house drinking the water and thereby

dying does not a poisoning make.
the water supply,

In the act of replenishing

the pumper has not, strictly speaking,

poisoned the inhabitants of the house.
the intention of poisoning

— must

"genuine" poisoning to occur.

Some third thing

be present in order for a

But as

I

have suggested, the
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pumper does not see. to
satify

a

desire to poison the in-

habitants, and so he could
have no intention of
poisoning
them.
The pumper is acting
intentionally on his desire to
get paid, but his intentional
action does not include
poisoning the inhabitants of
the house.
For Peirce, poisoning connotes intention; hence,
mechanical pumping is not
properly a poisoning. And thus,
replenishing the water
supply ^ poisoning the inhabitants
of the house.
In terms
of desiring, the expected but
unwanted consequences of an
intentional action are not themselves
intended.
And so it
would seem that, for Peirce, intending
does entail desiring.
In terms of beliefs, the same
result can be supported
in a different way.
There are several beliefs on which the
pumper acts:
The water is poisoned.
if the inhabitants
drink it, they will surely die.
if he does not replenish
the water, he will not get paid.

Although there may be

more beliefs, these would seem to be the most
relevant and
the ones on which he will act.

The reasoning process the

pumper might go through would probably be something of the

following sort:

"I

know the water is poisoned and if

the tank with this supply,
die.

I

I

fill

the inhabitants of the house will

also believe that the only way to collect my pay is

filling the tank.

Collecting my pay is something

really want (this is the operative desire here)

.

But

don't care one way or the other about poisoning the

I
I

.

158

inhabitants of the house,
no matter what evil they
may be
Plotting.
Therefore, 1 will fin the
water tank with the
poisoned water, even thnnrrVi
-it
though this will
have the consequence
that the Inhabitants of the
house will die."
The pumper is prepared and
willing to act on his
belief s
,

to act upon.
®tt upon the proposiopinion is willingness to act
upon It
it in relatively insignificant
affairs.
1.636
1898 )]

FuirMlTlf’'is
tion in vTfal ov

[

(

The situation the pumper finds
himself in is obviously a
vital crises.
Yet he willingly fills the tank
with the

poisoned water which will have, as one
of its inevitable
consequences, the deaths of the inhabitants

of the house.

He has considered the effects his
beliefs have which "might

conceivably have practical bearings," and he
has acted
willingly on those beliefs and on the one operative
desire
he has.

In this sense,

then,

the consequences of the water

pumper's deliberate action are brought about willingly,
though not all of them are desired or intended by him:

he

has willingly poisoned the plotters; he has willingly and

intentionally replenished the water supply.

Miller was

in thinking that "A was willing to do Y" is equivalent
to "Y was intentional on A's part."

For Peirce, as for

Davis, we can willingly bring about something we neither

desire nor, consequently, intend.

For Peirce, as for Davis,
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the principle that
willingness entails
desire must be rejected, just as the
principle that intention
entails desire
must be accepted.

^

in Chapter I,

Internal Freed^^

claimed that, for Peirce,
acting
delrberately on one's beliefs
and desires involves
attending
to one's present
intentions and purposes,
bearing i„ mind
past experiences, making
resolves, and exercising
selfcontrol.
But as I have suggested
previously, this does not
give us a complete account
of acting deliberately,
for
quite clearly a person
could meet these requirements
and
yet not be in a position
in which action could
occur [See
Chapter in, pp. 123-125].
So It would seem that
one must
also be in a position in
which it is possible to act
i

on the

relevant beliefs and desires;
one must be free to act
should
one wish to do so.
Given this additional feature,
it would
seem one could act deliberately.

Peirce does not directly address
the issue of being
free to act, though in key
statements he does

seem to use

carefully chosen words which reflect
his awareness of the
issue.
For instance, in "A Survey of
Pragmaticism, " he
speaks of acting on a belief "if one
could perform a certain

160

act/' and he refers to the
'[readiness] to act in a certain
way under given circumstances"
[5.480 (1906)].
And in a
letter written in 1913, he
speaks of a habit

The notion of being free to act
on one’s beliefs and
desires is quite definitely a part
of Peirce’s views on
action, even though he has little to
say about it.
But

Peirce does have something more to say
about being free to
c hoose to act
Allow me to elaborate on these two addi.

tional aspects of a deliberate action:

the freedom to act

and the freedom to choose to act.

Suppose

decide

I

newspaper.

want to buy the Sunday New York

desire

I

to purchase a copy,

with world events,

I

and
I

I

a

newspaper, the Times

believe that if

I

,

I

intend

am to keep up

should buy and read the Times.

Then

circumstances which would keep me from my purchase,
I

act.

I

buy the Sunday New York Times

circumstances be?
area in which

I

.

What might those

If the Sunday Times is not sold in the

live,

I

could not buy it.

If it is sold,

but also sold-out, again no purchase could be made.

Or if

don't have enough money or

a

means of getting to the only

store which sells the paper,

I

could not make the purchase.

I

Of course,

there are other such circumstances which would

.

.
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make it impossible for me
to buy the Sunday Tim^,
the
common feature of these
circumstances is that they are
all
external to me. Beliefs,
motives, and intentions will
not
be sufficient for buying
the newspaper; in addition,
I must

22£££2al^°Dltraij^;
I

i

must be free to do as

choose.

And this brings us to the
related consideration of
the freedom to choose to act.
it is generally thought
that there is some sort of internal
freedom without which
a deliberate action could
not occur; a person must be
internally free to choose what he will
do.
This internal
freedom is usually tagged "acting of
one's own free will."
And one of the litmus tests for saying
someone has acted
freely is to show that he could have done
otherwise if he
had chosen to and,

furthermore, he could have chosen

otherwise 19
Now it would seem that Peirce's theory could not

comfortably accommodate any account of freedom of the will,
for, as a pointed out in Chapter II, the notion of a
will

^^^itional faculty of the mind is given up by Peirce and
'volition'

other hand,

itself becomes synonymous with 'action.'
I

On the

also argued that freedom of the will is

rejected in favor of the freedom of choice which precedes
an action [Chapter II, pp. 85-86]

This is,

correct and consistent reading of Peirce:

I

believe, a

freedom of the

.
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Will, understood in terms
of a volitional faculty,
is
rejected by Peirce, but
freedom of the will, understood
as
freedom of choice, is endorsed
by Peirce,
still elsewhere,
Peirce expresses himself in
such a way that one might be
seduced into thinking he has
some theory of free will.
(I shall consider one
such passage below.)
But here one
should exercise caution. For
even as one is caught offguard by seduction, one would
be caught off-guard by
Peirce’s eloquence. When all the
evidence is in, it is
clear there is no such thing as
will— free or otherwisein Peirce.
We act free of internal constraints,
not because
we have a will which is free, but
because it is possible
for us to make choices.
I offer two additional
passages in

which a Peircean theory of freedom of
choice is strongly
suggested
The first passage was quoted in part
earlier when

I

considered the absolute separation of desire from
volition
[See Chapter II,

p.

75]

.

I

now wish to consider it in

of Peirce's views on choice.

He says:

... we all know conflicting desires but too well,
and how treacherous they are apt to be; and a desire
may perfectly well be discontented with volition,
i.e., with what the man will do.
The consciousness
of that truth seems to me to be the root of our
consciousness of free will
[1.331 (Unidentified
Fragment)
my underscore]
.

,

Peirce seems quite right about this.
we often do have conflicting desires.

As
I

I

noted earlier,

may want to work
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another hour tonight, but

^i^ht now.

I

might also want to go to sleep

The desire s conflict and

only one of them.

So

can choose to act on

I

continue working, thinking

I

acted of my free will.

in truth,

I

I

have

have done nothing more

than choose between conflicting
desires-desires which have
been guided by motivating
reasons or beliefs.
in terms of
my earlier discussion of the
Peircean account of desire, it
would seem that one desire has
become the operative desire
and, in general the choice
between (or among) conflicting
desires is the preference for one
of them to be realized in
actuality.
So far, the litmus test for an
action being

performed freely still works, though
there is no need to
invoke the notion of free will. One can
say that I could
have acted otherwise if l had chosen
otherwise. And I would
have chosen otherwise if l had wanted to.
What this amounts
to is the following:

A (the desire

I

if

l

had wanted B more than

eventually acted on)

acted on B instead of A.

,

then

I

I

wanted

would have

But as it shall soon become

evident, this is not a test which sits well with the prag-

matistic Peirce after all.
The second passage

I

have in mind is from a letter

written by Peirce to Frederick Adams Wood, M.D.,
in biology at the time
of Technology.

(1913)

a lecturer

at the Massachusetts Institute

In the letter, Peirce speaks about the

logical nature of conditional statements-- the "would-be"

.
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which we encountered in Chapter

But he also makes some

I.

cogent observations in this
letter about counterf actuals
Still speaking about conditional
statements, he says that
,*:^^/"tecedent s u pposes an existenti al
fact
a c tually is or was
The conditional
coiidiLi,.^„1^^^*’*^
propositi on does n ot accurately ..tat ,.
.

IS calculated to produce any
state of mind, in a
that it establi^h^o
ishes a Kh _abit in that mind, using
the word "habit"
n the original sense, as meaning

only that the oerson
habit, would behave (or usually
beha^
^ certain way whenever a certain
occasion
should ^,r'^
arise.
Bgt if this occasion did in actu ality
_ ot arise, suc h h abit of thought as the conditional
proposition m ight p roduce would be a nullity
oraamastically aj^ractically
[8.380: my

^

.

And here we see the pragmatistic coup de
grace given to the
free-will advocate's litmus test.
It is a "nullity pragma-

tistically and practically" to say that
otherwise, if
^

I

"I could

have done

had chosen to do otherwise" when, in fact,

not choose to act otherwise.

admonishing us not to look back.

In a sense, Peirce is

Having acted, it is mean-

ingless and of no practical consequence to say (or think)

that if

I

had wanted B more than

have acted on B instead of A.

I

wanted A, then

I

would

His theory of action is as

forward looking as is his pragmaticism.
What, then, can we say about "internal freedom"?

revert to the example used earlier:

To

If I believe that

working an additional hour tonight will expedite my work
on this project, and

I

want to do just that, then assuming
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there are no external
constraints on my working, I am
free
to choose to act on this
particular belief and desire

^

ng as the possihi

£ossibility.
If,

^

1

i

t ^_pf_

^

And it will be

for example,

staying up exists as
a

a

real

real possibility for me only

have not already chosen to
go to bed for
the night.
Peirce's account of the reasoning
process of
the deliberating man illustrates
this point quite nicely.
Such a man would reason as
follows:
I

should do so and so,

should bring about such
that
result,
result Ergo,
Erar^^'";
J do "so
I shall not
and so."
8.381 1913 )]
1

[

(

And Peirce comments:
e thus comes to a
he had not already
do so and so," in
an idle dream, and

profitable conclusion,
fully made up his mind
which case he would be
a bad dream at that.

provided
not to
pursuing
[Ibid.]

We are internally free to choose to act on
one desire rather

than another only if the possibilities are still
real for
us.

Our internal freedom does not depend on freedom of
the

will; rather, it is a question of choosing between (or
among)

desires.

But turning a familiar phrase from James, they

must be "live possibilities

Thus,

in addition to the

other requirements for acting deliberately on beliefs and
desires, one must also be internally free to choose to act,
as well as externally free to act.

.
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Concluding Remarks

Although my purpose here
is not to consider
intentional
and free action in terms
of a moral theory, it
is difficult
to refrain from making
some observations at this
point
to monal concerns.
concGmQ

ao
As

t
I

k
have
shown, for Peirce

a

person may not desire or intend
nrenc all the consequences
of his
deliberate actions. Nevertheless,
he has willingly brought
them about.
He is not entirely -let
off the hook,as

Miller would say, but neither
is he wholly blameworthy
should the consequences be "bad,as Miller maintains.
Because of the importance of desire
in Peirce's philosophy
in general, and a Peircean theory
of action in particular,
and because of the consequent
entailment relation of intending and desiring, Peirce would have
a lenient attitude
toward the person whose actions had
unwanted but unexpected
consequences. On the other hand, the Peircean
view of not
playing half-time quarterback with respect
to the choices

one has made, would suggest a less than
lenient attitude

toward the person who says "I could have done
otherwise,
had

I

chosen to."

The choice of action, once made, makes

alternative" choices a moot issue:

instead the conse-

quences of the action chosen are paramount.

And that seems

consistent with Peirce's pragmaticistic concern with future
effects

With the foregoing account of intentional and free
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action,

I

believe

full account of a
Peircean theory of
action can be given.
in order to act
deliberately on
one's beliefs and
no desin^Q
u
desires, r,uwhich
requires that one attend
to his present intentions
and purposes, bear in
mind past
a

experiences, make resolves and
exercise self-control, one
must also
intentionally and be (externally)
free to
act, as well as (internally)
free to choose to act.
These
together seem to comprise the
necessary conditions for
deliberate action to occur. Whether
Peirce would include
anything else as a necessary
condition and whether he would
consider these sufficient for
performing a deliberate act,
I cannot say for certainty.
Here we are handicapped by
the simple fact that Peirce himself
did not offer a fullblown theory of action. Thus, the
work of constructing a
Peircean theory based on the little he
does say can be
successful only to a point.
Having access to additional
manuscripts of Peirce's would go a long way
towards pro-

^

viding a fuller, more faithful account of such

a theory.

Still, there is one more thing which can be
undertaken

with the works available for public use, and that
is to

place the Peircean theory of action within the broader
scope of some of his other theories.
round out the theory of action

I

This will not only

have presented, but it

will also give to it the added virtue of compatibility

with other views considered extremely important by Peirce.

.
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I

turn,

then,

to Peirce

of his theory of signs

ing

(pragmaticism)

theory of action within
the scope
(semiotics) and his theory
of mean-
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NOTES

A mechanical action would
be considered a "dyadically
degenerate triad,” as opposed
to a genuine triad or a

monadically degenerate triad.
(c.

See especially 1.473-75

1896).
^See, for example, G. E. M.
Anscombe's Intention

(New

York:

Cornell University Press), especially
pp. 37-42;
"Wanting, Intending, and Knowing What
One is Doing,” by
Arthur R. Miller in Philosophy and
Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 40 (1980);

Voluntarily,” by J.

B.

"Acting Intentionally and Acting

Blumenfeld in Philosophy and Pheno -

menological Research, Vol. 41 (1980), together
with Miller's
rejoinder; "Miller on Wanting, Intending, and
Being
Willing,

by Wayne A. Davis in Philosophy and Phenomeno -

logical Research

,

Davis," in Vol. 45

Vol.

43

(1985)

(1982), and Miller's "A Reply to

of that same journal.

For example, Peirce says,
she does desire and intend to serve an apple
pie to a particular person.
.

.

.

into that particular bowl she intends to put
some apples.
.

.

.

having taken them she means to make a pie of
those apples.
[1.341 (c. 1895)]
.

.

.

"Wanting, Intending, and Knowing What One is Doing,"
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

,
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..
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(1980)
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p
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In the ethics of natural law, discussion of this

question focuses on the problem of determining the moral
status of an action which has two effects--one good, the

other bad.

The "principle of double effect" is appealed

to when this sort of moral dilemma arises.

In general,

the

principle says that "when an act produces two effects, one
good and the other bad, the agent may intend the good and

:
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permit the bad, provided the
amount of good is greater than
the amount of bad'' [Carl
Wellman, Morals and Kth.V.
(Illinois:

Scott, Foresman and Company,
1975), p.

167).
A more precise formulation
which spells out the specific
way in which bad consequences
are considered unintended is

given by C. E. Harris, Jr., in
Applying Moral Theories
(California:
In brief,

a

Wadsworth Publishing Co.

1986), pp.

,

73 - 75

bad effect is unintended when
it is "not

direct means to the good effect"

(p.

73

.

a

)

18 ^

Donald Davidson, for one, would hold
that these are
"two descriptions of the same event." He
says that "Doing
something that causes a death is identical with
causing a
death." What we are seeing here are "related
descriptions"

corresponding to "a single descriptum.
Actions and Events (Oxford:
pp.

"

in Essays on

Clarendon Press, 1982 rpt.),

58-59.
19

J.

D.

Mabbott, An Introduction to Ethics

Doubleday and Co
The Elements
1985)

,

pp

.

.

,

I nc .,

1969), p.

[(Minneapolis:

192-94 especially]

118.

(New York:

In Metaphysics

University of Minnesota Press,
,

Bruce Aune raises sound

objections to a libertarian view such as this--one which
suggests that our choices are not determined but free.

According to Aune, one of the fundamental objections to
the libertarian view is that it rejects the "scientifically
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more orthodox view" Ot
of hnm^r,
human beings being
"physical entities
that obey the laws of
physics"
.

193 - 94 ).

(pp.

This is

rejected in favor of the
"stubborn subjective conviction"
that human beings are
metaphysically free (pp. 193-94),
and that such metaphysical
frepdom
y
rreeaom

any

)cind

of causal determinism"

(p.

"

n o
is
incompatible with

192 ).

Aune also gives

clever objection which points
to the incoherency of the
libertarian's belief that our choices
must be free and not
detennined (See p. 193).
a

For James, the expression is,
of course, "live
hypotheses."
"A live hypothesis is one which
appeals as
a real possibility to him to
whom it is proposed" ["The
Will to Believe," in The Writings of
William James: A
C omprehensive Edition
ed
John J. McDermott
,

(Chicago:

.

University of Chicago Press, 1977),

p.

717

].

The

Chapter V

ACTION AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In this chapter,

I

do not intend to give

complete

a

account of Peirce's theory of signs,
for that would take
me too far afield from the topic
of
action.

seems quite clear to me that

a

Yet, it

Peircean theory of action

warrants examination within Peirce's
semiotics, "the
quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of
signs"

(c.

1897)].

[2.227

For instance, in discussing the
"imagined

investigator's attempts to solve the map-coloring
problem,"
Peirce refers to his activity as "an energetic
interpre-

tant of the interrogatory he puts to himself"
1906)].

[5.490

(c.

And later he says that "the habit conjoined with

the motive and the conditions has the action for its

energetic interpretant"

[5.491].

The terminology of signs,

objects, and interpretants will be explained shortly, but
on the face of it, it would seem that there is

a

place in Peirce's theory of signs for action:

it is an

energetic interpretant.

And as

I

natural

shall argue, action

finds a home in the Peircean semiotics not only as an

energetic interpretant, but also as
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a

sign and as an aid
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to understanding the
final interpretants of
signs. Moreover, desire itself see.s
to play the role of a
sign’s
iminediate object.

There is good reason, then,
to discuss action within
the theory of signs:
on Peirce's own account,
it would
seem to have natural roles to
play within the theory.
Furthermore, semiotics is itself
of extreme interest and
importance to Peirce for, as he held
from his earliest
writings on, "every thought is a
sign" [5.253
(1868);

see also 5.421

(1905);

semiotic account of

a

4.551 (1906)].

Thus, giving a

Peircean theory of action will lend

support to my general claim that action
has

a

natural and

important place in Peirce's philosophical
views.
There are equally good reasons to examine
the
Peircean theory of action I have presented
within Peirce's
theory of meaning.

Recall that in Chapter

beliefs as habits of action.

I,

I

considered

And in moving from habits of

deliberate action to particular actions

— from

beliefs to

actions— I explained that, for Peirce, beliefs function
as direct causal factors in one's pre-disposition to
act

in a certain way given the appropriate circumstances and

relevant desire, and they function as indirect causes of
one's actions.

It is appropriate now to consider another

way in which habits of action and action are related.

Without compromising Peirce's commitment to realism,

I

175

will show just how actions
contribute to the acquisition
and understanding of habits
of action.
This will further
strengthen my claim that a
discussion of action— and more
specifically, a theory of action—
has a rightful place in
Peirce's rich philosophical
system.

!•

Action and Semiotics

Peirce defines semiosis as
An action, or influence, which is,
or involves,
cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, a
its
object, and its interpretant this
tri-relative
influence not being in any way resolvable into
actions
between pairs.
[5.484 (c. 1906)]
,

This action or influence can be thought of as
a triadic or
sign relation, involving three elements:

object, and its interpretant.^

the sign,

its

As expressions of Third-

ness, sign relations always involve some mental element
of mediation between the interpretant and the object.
If you take any ordinary triadic relation, you will
always find a mental element in it. Brute action
is secondness, any mentality involves thirdness.

[8.331

The distinction between a brute action

deliberate action

[a

Third]

[a

(1904)1

Second] and a

is explained by the absence

or presence of some mental element.

notion of an intentional action,

I

In examining the

pointed out how the

•
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presence of the mental
element
ent nf
of intentionality makes
a
set one of ciivina
ts-i-Viq-k-u
9 ving, rather
than
one which is merely
mechanical.
the relation involved
in 'A gives
4-

4

•

.

.

B to

c," can occur only if there
mere is
r
i

c.

••

,
some kind^ of law"
by which
i-

i

A makes C the possessor
[8.331 (1904)].
of this law as a convention
involving

One might think

the intention of

giving and the understanding of
that intention. A's action
of gi ving B to C can only occur
if
1
a intends that B
accept C [as a gift] from A,
(2) B understands that A
intends B to have C, and (3) B accepts
(

)

C

A.

As

[as a gift]

from

giving B to C is an action involving
a sign

relation in which there is a sign, an
object, and an
interpretant sign.
In its genuine form, Thirdness is
the triadic relation existing between a sign, its objects,
and
interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered the
constituting the mode of being a sign. A sign as
mediates between the interpretant sign and its
object.^

At this point,

I

believe an understanding of the three

elements or "subjects" of the sign relation can best be
aided by

a

systematic examination of signs, objects, and

interpretant signs.
now called for

.

Some definitions and explanations are

Note that

I

shall examine in greater

detail these aspects of the sign relation which are more

directly relevant to the theory of action

I

have presented.

As defined by Peirce, a sign or representamen is

.
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>»»•,««.»>

o< th. fir.,

related to a Second
thing, Its Object, in respect
to a quality, in such
^ ^^ird thing, its
Inter^retant
in relation
?n
?ela?ion to
t^'?h
the same object
[2.92 (1902); see also 8.332
(1904)]

thf^

.

.

.

But things become even more complicated
with the introduction of two types of objects and three
types of inter-

pretants

... a sign has two objects, its object as it is
represented and its object in itself. it has
also
three interpretants its interpretant as
represented
or meant to be understood, its interpretant
as it
IS produced, and its interpretant in
itself.
,

[8.333

Exactly what Peirce includes as
problematic.

I

a

(1904)]

sign is somewhat

shall argue below that he does not wish

to restrict his semiotics to mental signs

— thoughts

concepts--though he most often speaks in this way.

or

Rather,

he exploits a broader notion of signs throughout his

writings, as

I

shall explain when

the dynamical interpretant.

take up the topic of

I

For the moment, however,

would like to borrow an example of

a

I

sign which Peirce

uses in order to talk about the immediate object of a sign.
The example he uses is the command to "Ground arms!"

The

object as it is represented is the immediate object and.
in this case,

it is "the will of the officer that the
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butts of the muskets
be brouah^-

<-1906),.

^

to the ground"

[5.473

in keeping With
the analysis
naiysis

I have
h.
argued for
the •'will of the
office^
er can be
h expressed
the ..Wish or
.esire of the officer...
Por
t ere is no such
thing as a will or
willing in Peirce, ana
tne sense of the ohr";^co m u,
phrase rs best understood
as the desire of
the officer.
Given that
® quite natural to
speak of a
esire as being the
inmediate object of a
sign.
The obiect_in_it^
i,
dynamic^ or real object.
It IS that

" Ihas paper,

-

a

-i

-i-

a

'

which, from the naturp^
cannot express which 1
the interprete; to find
•

.

.

1

ra

.ui

4

a

the Sign

ourbrcollatera^experi^nc:
[8.314

(1909)]

Peirce spoke about the real
or dynamical object
in an
earlier paper, ..How to Make
Our Ideas Clear,., where
the
real object was tied to
truth in the following way:
is fated to be ultimately
agreed
to\v^an°who'’^""’
investigate, is what we mean by
the
truth and :^^.°h
th
3 ect represen ted in this ooL:on
Ihe
- rLl That IS the way I would explain reality.
,

[5.407

(1878); my underscore]

The dynamical object is the
more elusive of the two types
of Peircean objects:
it is the object represented
in the
opinion which all men are ultimately
fated to agree on.
It IS the "really efficient
but not immediately present

Object"

[8.343

(1908)].

The immediate object, on the

other hand, is that which finds its
expression in a sign
which then "stands to somebody for
something in some respect
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or capacity.

[8.343

it is

the Object as the Sign represents
it"

(1908)].

The interpretants
of signs]

[5.475

(c.

[the "proper significate effects,

1906)]

are three in number:

immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants.

primarily interested in the last two.

the
I

am

The immediate (or

emotional) interpretant is "the first proper
significate

effect of

a sign";

it is a feeling,

though it "may amount

to much more than that feeling of recognition"

1906)].

[5.475

(c.

It is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the

right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily
called the meaning of the sign"

[4.536

(1906)].

Thus,

the performance of a piece of concerted music
It conveys, and is intended to convey,
the composer's musical ideas; but these usually
consist merely in a series of feelings.
[5.475 (c. 1906)]
is a sign.

The dynamical

(or

energetic

)

interpretant is "what-

ever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign"
[8.315

mental

(1909)].

— and

It is an ef f or t--either muscular or

it is always a single act

[5.475

(c.

1906)].

It is "the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign,

determines"

[4.536

(1906)].

really

And although the sign relation

itself is triadic and epitomizes all triadic relations,
the dynamical interpretant of the sign relation is still

dyadic.

Peirce spells this out, mentioning two likely

candidates for the dynamical interpretant of the command
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"Ground arms!"

m«.

.c,„l l«.rprSi/tio„ 7rj“ai^-.-

in

i::%“
thump
txi.0
-i

c

.

m T.T‘ti’,iUi7a

p; .PbS"

•ijn

of
-1-T
tho mu^lcf^'hc: on
rM^ the
ground, or rather
-I-K^
the
Act of^ A
their Minds.
[8.315 (1909)]
77

t

-i-i-v

4-

Peirce seems somewhat hesitant
about which effect is the
dynamical interpretant of the command:
is it the thump

of the muskets on the ground, or
is it some mental act?
These two actions are certainly quite
different— one is

physical, the other mental.

Are both of them, in fact,

dynamical interpretants of the sign "Ground
arms!"?
In a sense, both effects are dynamical
interpretants,

though not of the same sign.

pretant of the sign "Ground

Strictly speaking, the interarm.s

!

"

is the mental under-

standing that "Ground arms!" means that one should
lower
one's musket to the ground in

a

particular manner.

That

is the interpretation which a mind actually makes of
this
^

person first reacts to this sign with such under-

standing.

Thus, the dynamical interpretant of the sign

"Ground arms!" would be a mental

act."^

But Peirce also notes in an earlier work that "the

imperative command shows that it [the dynamical interpretant]

need not be of a mental mode of being"

1906)].

I

[5.473

(c.

believe this remark can be explained, as can
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Peirce's hesitation in the
1909 passage about identifying
the dynamic interpretant
by recalling that as an
interpretant of a sign, the dynamical
interpretant itself becomes
,

a sign.

It is quite natural at
this point,

then,

to say

that the dynamical interpretant
of this new sign— the

HHderstan^

that one should lower one's
musket to the

ground in a particular manner
when one hears the command
Ground arms!
is the action of lowering
one's musket
to the ground.

deliberate action now serves both

as an interpretant and,
a

new sign.^

since it is an interpretant, as

Thus, both the mental action of
understanding

the meaning of the sign "Ground arms!"
and the deliberate

action of lowering one's musket to the
ground upon understanding the meaning of "Ground arms!" are
dynamical

interpretants

.

And although there may be no discernible

lapse of time between these two actions, they
are, strictly

speaking, interpretants of two different signs.
In a 1904 letter to Lady Welby, Peirce
supports this

claim that an interpretant may be

a

non-mental action.

Yet in that correspondence, he also hints at the view that
if an interpretant is not a concept,

sign.

it is not a bona fide

He says:

Taking sign in its broadest sense, its interpretant
is not necessarily a sign.
Any concept is a sign,
of course.
Ockham, Hobbes, and Leibniz have sufficiently said that.
But we may take a sign in so
broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not
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thought, but an action or experience, or we
may
even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its
interpretant is a mere quality of feeling.
a

[8.332

Any concept is
a

a sign,

of course.

(1904)]

But if we were to give

very broad interpretation of what a sign may be, then

its interpretant will not be a thought, but an action
or

experience, for example.

would not be

a

sign.

And, hence, such an interpretant

Stated more precisely, Peirce's

reasoning seems to be of the following sort:
concepts are bona

f ide

thought nor concept.

signs

.

An action is neither

a

Thus, actions are not genuine signs.

But if interpretants are themselves signs

[2.228],

unclear why Peirce would suggest that actions
clearly can be interpretants
I

Thoughts or

— cannot

it is

— which

be signs.

reject any implicit claim to the effect that actions,

specifically deliberate actions, are not signs.
quences of Four Incapacities," Peirce gives us

picture of what

a

sign might be.

In "Consea

broad

He says that "whenever

we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling,
image, conception, or other representation, which serves
as a sign"

[5.283

And in his correspondence with

(1868)].

Lady Welby, forty years later, he again uses a broad brush

stroke to depict all that

a

sign might be.

define a Sign as anything which on the one hand
is so determined by an Object and on the other hand
so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this
latter determination, which I term the Interpretant
I
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th© sign, is th©reby iTiediat©ly det©rinin©d by
that Object.
[8.343 (1908); see also 4.531 (1906)]

The word which wants emphasis in this quotation is

'

any-

thing which represents an object in the way

described is a sign "which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity."

And it seems auite

plausible to think of deliberate actions such as giving

a

gift to a friend, writing a letter to one's Senator,

nodding one's head in agreement, shaking hands in greeting,
and dancing in front of an audience as being signs.

These

actions are not concepts, yet they do determine ideas--

interpretants

— in

some person's mind.

which is an instance of

a

Each is an action

genuine Third; each mediates

between the interpretant sign and its object.

And one of

the key elements here which makes these appear as bona

f

ide

signs is the fact that in each case there is some mind for

whom the sign represents some object

.

Deliberate actions

of this sort are signs--that seems unquestionable.

If one

one has only to recall

is in need of further convincing,

that Peirce himself considered the performance of a piece
of concert music to be a sign.

Another type of action whose instances Peirce clearly
thinks of as being signs is a category which bears some re-

semblance to speech acts.

".

making an affidavit, executing

.

.

going before

a deed,

a

notary and

signing a note.

.

."

are actions which, according to Peirce, resem.ble assertions.

—
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For each action, "one voluntarily
puts oneself into a
situation in which penalties will be incurred
unless some

proposition is true"

[8.313

And from this, Peirce

(1905)].

reasons that "every proposition involves an
assertion" and
"when the element of assertion is, as far as
possible,
removed from it" the proposition is "a kind of sign"
[^bid

.

]

In this way,

.

the command to "Ground arms!" is a

sign, as are other examples Peirce uses

— the

sort of day is it?" and the reply, "It is
[8.314

a

inquiry "What
stormy day"

Again, as they stand, none of these signs

(1909)].

are concepts, but they are signs.

And one might think of

them more as actions than as concepts before the element
of assertion is removed from them.

Furthermore, Peirce

tells us that the dynamical interpretant of his wife's
query,

"What sort of day is it?" is

question "

[

Ibid

.

]

.

"

my answering her

This interpretant is not a concept; it

is an activity undertaken deliberately and it stands as a

sign to his wife.

And as

I

have already suggested, Peirce

would seem to be quite comfortable saying that the action
of lowering one's musket to the ground is both a dynamical

interpretant and, therefore,
It would seem,

then,

a

new sign.

that all deliberate actions

whether or not one thinks of them as speech acts--are
signs.

Even the deliberate action of writing in one's

diary "stands to somebody for something in some respect or
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capacity."

But in this case, since a diary
keeper's

private thoughts are deliberately written
most often as
signs only to the writer, the person who
writes in the
diary will also be the interpretant mind.

ality required of

a

deliberate action makes it natural to

think of these actions as signs.
a sign

The intention-

A deliberate action is

intended to convey meaning to someone

— if

only the

agent himself.
The final

(or

ultimate logical

)

interpretant "does not

consist in the way in which any mind does act but in the
way in which every mind would act"

[8.315

This

(1909)].

suggests that the final interpretant must be something
general.

It could never be the dynamical interpretant,

that interpretant
"single act"

— be

[5.475

it mental or non-mental

(c.

1906)].

— is

,

"

always a

Further, the final inter-

pretant could not be "a thought, that is to say,
sign

for

a

mental

for

—

if this sign be of an intellectual kind
as it
would have to be--it must itself have a logical interpretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate logical
interpretant of the concept.
[5.476 (c. 1906)]^
.

.

.

We are left with Peirce's discovery that the only candidate
for the ultimate logical interpretant is a
[5.476

(c.

1906)].

"

habit-change "

A habit-change is not a sign, and,

therefore, will not have a further logical interpretant.
Still it is general and, thus, can give us the meaning of
a

general or intellectual concept.

.
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It can be proved that the
only mental effect that
can be so produced and that
is not a sign but if
application is a habit-change meaning
bv
hah?f- change a modification
y a habit
dencies toward action, resulting of a person's tenfrom previous
previous exertions of his will
acts, or from a complexus of both
kinds of cause.
[5.476 (c. 1906)]^
A habit-change may be the result of
a person's previous
experiences or actions, or a combination of
;

both.

would seem that particular actions play
in causing habit-changes.

a

So it

significant role

Peirce seems to reinforce his

claim that actions may play

a

causal role in bringing about

habit-changes when he says later in the same article that
".

.

.

the event that causes a habit-change may be a

muscular effort, apparently"
hedges on this point.

[5.479

(c.

1906)].

But Peirce

He is quite reluctant to give such

an important role to individual actions after all, for he

also says:

But

I am persuaded that nothing like a concept can
be acquired by muscular practice alone.
When we
seem to do that, it is not the muscular action but
the accompanying inward efforts, the acts of imagination, that produces the habit.
[5.479 (c. 1906)]

In other words, Peirce seems to hold that any habit-change

will actually occur as a result primarily of some mental

effort rather than some repeated physical activity.

His

example and proof of this claim are, however, somewhat
dubious
Suppose

a

person who has never done so before tries

to stand on his left foot while rotating his right foot

:

]

187

in a clockwise direction and
his right fist in a counter-

clockwise direction.

Peirce observes that

a

first he will

be unable to perform this Peircean
triadic feat because
"he lacks a unitary concept of the
series of efforts that

success requires"

(5.479

(c.

1906)].

with practice and

attention to the efforts involved in the
execution of each
movement, he will soon "catch the idea" and
be able to

perform the feat.

But lest the reader be persuaded that

repeated actions play the significant role in the
acquisition of this habit-change and others, Peirce
offers the

following
that proof that it is in no degree the muscular
efforts, but only the efforts of the imagination that
hsve been his teachers, is that if he does not per—
form the actual motions, but only imagines them
vividly, he will acquire the same trick with only
so much additional practice as is accounted for by
the difficulty of imagining all the efforts that
will have to be made in a movement one has not
actually executed.
[5.479 (c. 1906)]
.

.

.

Though he admits that
There is an obvious difficulty of determining just
how much allowance should be made for this, in the
fact [that] when the feat is learned in either way,
it cannot be unlearned, so as to compare that way
with the other.
Ibid
[

.

But even given this difficulty, Peirce has clearly moved

from the weaker position that one cannot acquire

a

habit-

change from muscular practice alone to the stronger

position that one cannot acquire a habit-change from

muscular practice.

It is the "efforts of the imagination"
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that are one's teachers.

Peirce presents us with several other
exercises
intended to persuade us that a mental effort
is needed
for their successful completion.
Among the exercises:

reciting the "Peter Piper" verse; "spelling
without an
instant's hesitation," in the old way, the name
Aldibirontif oscoforniocrononhotontothologes"

legerdemain"

[

Ibid

.

]

.

;

and various "turns of

And he concludes:

It is from such experiments that I have been led
to estimate as nil the power of mere muscular
in contributing to the acguisition of ideas.
[5.479 (c. 1906)]

So for Peirce, it turns out that what is needed to acguire
a

habit-change is some mental effort.

Mere muscular effort

contributes nothing to such an acquisition.
I

believe the emphasis here should be properly placed

on the contribution of mere muscular efforts.

If Peirce

is simply emphasizing that muscular efforts alone will not

contribute to the acquisition of ideas,
right.

I

believe he is

Although deliberate actions (whether they be those

of the agent or some other person)

influence what we believe

and, hence, a habit-change, a change of beliefs is largely

the result of some reasoning process, some mental effort.

Muscular activity alone (mere muscular activity) will not
cause a change of beliefs.

However, if Peirce is main-

taining that muscular efforts do not contribute at all to
the acquisition of habit-changes, then some additional

7
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explanation is in order.
At this point,

I

wish to draw attention to an
equivo-

cation which seems inevitable when
Peirce speaks of habitchanges.
It is one which brings to mind
a similar shift

which

discussed in Chapter

I

l.

i

argued in that chapter

that Peirce gives two different
emphases to 'belief.'
one way, beliefs are considered as they
function in the

reasoning process— as habits of thought or
mind.

m

In

another way, beliefs are considered as rules
of, or guides
to, action.
Seen this way, beliefs are regarded as habits
of action.

But now the equivocation is slightly different.

The sorts of habits or habit-changes Peirce describes

here--the triadic feat, reciting the "Peter Piper" verse,
sleight of hand tricks, etc.
activities.

are all

"

non— mental

,

"

physical

And so it is quite natural to think of a

habit-change as an actual change in one's behavior or way
of acting.

Yet the discussion which accompanies the

examples points to an understanding of habit-changes as
being essentially mental.

Habit-changes are the ultimate

logical interpretants of general or intellectual concepts
[5.475 and 5.482

(c.

1906)]; as such, they are "mental

effects" which are also general [5.476

(c.

1906)].

They

are "a modification of a person's tendencies toward action"
[5.476

beliefs

(c.
.

1906

)

my underscore].

They are, in short,
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[Readiness]

to act in a certain way under
given cirby a given motive is a
habit, and a deliberate, or
self-controlled, habit
IS precisely a belief.
[5.480 (c. 1906)]

Now although it is possible to imagine

considered as

a

a

habit-change

belief being formed without the
influence

of any non-mental activity,

it is difficult to imagine a

habit-change considered as an actual change in
one's way
of acting being so formed.
Yet if by 'habit-change'
Peirce means an actual change in one's way of acting,
and
if Peirce is maintaining that muscular efforts
do not con-

tribute at all to the acquisition of these habit-changes,
then apparently we would be forced to accept the conclusion that one acquires these non-mental habits only through
the efforts of the imagination.

But

I

would suggest that

this does not seem to be an accurate account of how we

acquire changes in actual behavior, nor, more importantly,
does it seem to be a correct interpretation of Peirce's
use of 'habit-change.'

In the final analysis,

the correct reading of 'habit-changes'

I

believe

is that they are

mental effects (concepts or beliefs) which can (and often
do)

affect our ways of acting in the outer world.

ultimate logical interpretant is not an action, or

The
a

series

of repeated actions, or some physical habitual action;

rather, it is a habit of action, viewed variously by Peirce
as a conception, idea, or belief.

.
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Furthermore, Peirce does seem to hold
that actions
contribute causally to the acquisition
of habit-changes,
though actions alone can make no such
contribution. This
is the view which, I believe, gives
the most plausible

interpretation of the apparently conflicting
passages at
5.476 and 5.479 [See also 5.487].
The emphasis, for Peirce
is still on the mental activity which
causally contributes
to the acquisition of a habit-change, but
non-mental

activity should be understood as also making its contribution.

This interpretation is consistent with Peirce's

account of how the methods of science serve as an aid in
the acquisition and understanding of meanings
be taken up in the next section.

—a

point to

The point is worth men-

tioning here, however, because the final interpretant of

Peircean semiotics is the habit of Peircean pragmaticism.
And what is true of the former should also be true of the

latter
All in all, actions seem to play a vital role in an

important theory for Peirce.
interpretants

,

They may be signs, dynamical

and they may contribute to the acquisition

of habit-changes,

the final interpretants of signs.

And

pointed out in passing that one of the elements necessary
for a deliberate action to occur--desire--can function as
a

sign's immediate object.

Thus, to leave an account of

action out of Peirce's theory of signs, no matter how

I
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condensed the presentation of
that theory may be
give a di storted version of
Peirce's semiotics.

2

is to

Action and Pragmaticism

•

The move from Peirce's semiotics
to his pragmaticism
is quite natural at this point,
for the two theories come
together on at least one crucial point:
the ultimate
logical interpretant of Peircean semiotics
is the habit of
Peircean pragmaticism.
it is my belief that one can now
look at action as it bears on pragmaticism
without mistaking
this study for some undesirable form of
pragmatism.
My

meaning shall become clear momentarily.
section, then,

I

In this final

shall outline key elements of Peirce's

pragmaticism and follow this with

a

relation of actions to meanings.

Besides shedding light

discussion of the

on the role of action in pragmaticism, this final discussion

will serve to bring together many of the key issues

I

have

explored in the preceding chapters.
In "A Survey of Pragmaticism," Peirce reminds us that

pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things.
It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
of hard words and of abstract concepts
[5.464 (c. 1906); my underscore]
.

.

.

.

^
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And the method for determining
the meanings of hard words
and abstract concepts is,
of course, given in Peirce's
pragmatic, or more properly named,
pragmaticistic maxim:

might

Sactical'^bear^^^^'^*^^
actical bearing you conceive theconceivably have
p
object of vour
"5""
conception
of thoL
ef fToTsTs tL'wHOLE
^°-"Ption
of
the
object! !s!5l2

a“sn

In a footnote written in 1906,
Peirce defends his

multiple use of derivates of concipere
in the formulation
of the maxim as it first appeared
in 1878 in
"How to Make

Our Ideas Clear."

(That earlier formulation was essen-

tially the same as the 1905 statement.)

in the note,

Peirce emphasizes that meanings or intellectual
purport

must be general and since this is so, we cannot
look to
actions or anything else which is singular for meaning.
He says:

This employment five times over of derivates of
concipere must then have had a purpose. In point
of fact it had two.
One was to show that I was
speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of
intellectual purport
The other was to avoid all
danger of being understood as attempting to explain
a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but concepts.
I did not, therefore, mean to
say that acts, which are more strictly singular
than anything, could constitute the purport, or
adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol. I
compared action to the finale of the symphony of
thought, belief being a demicadence. Nobody conceives that the few bars at the end of a musical
movement are the purpose of the movement. They
may be called its upshot.
[5.402, n. 3 (1906)]
.

The message is clear:

we ought not to think of actions as

providing us with meanings.

Actions are singular; meanings

"
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are general.

In a sense, actions may
be thought of as

merely the upshot of our concepts,
of our beliefs, but
they are not "the final upshot
of thinking" as Peirce
seemed to suggest when he wrote
"How to Make Our

Ideas

Clear"

[5.397

(1878)].

The meaning of a concept will

always be given in terms of intellectual
or rational purport; in terms of something general,
it can never be
explained, according to Peirce, in terms
of percepts,
images, schemata, or actions.

.a conception that is, the rational purport
of a word or other expression, lies
exclusively
in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct
of
life.
[5.412 (1905)]
.

.

,

And the conceivable bearings

a

concept will have on the

conduct of life will be expressed as
statement.

a

(c.

conditional-future

[The pragmaticist "recognizes that the sub-

stance of what he thinks lies in
[5.499

a

1905)].]

a

conditional resolve.

And what a thing means

,

.

.

expressed as

conditional-future statement, "is simply what habits it

produces"

[5.400

(1878)].

Specific consequences or actions

are not habits; they cannot tell us what a thing means.
It is this emphasis which brings out the difference

between Peirce's pragmaticism and James's pragmatism.

In

giving just the right expression to Peirce's principle as
he presented it to the Philosophical Union of the University
of California on August 26,

nominalistic twist.

1898, James gave it his own

He announced the following:

,
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this
press Peirce s principle
exprLrPeircp'f^’'l°^
T"" by saying that evening to
the effec-

philosophic p
brought down t o some particularropositioH~5iF~?T«avs
conseo nenr- e
luture pract ical experience, whether
active of paLive
the point lying rather in the fact
that the experfe^ce
.

Zll

-ir,

a^ct^^e^i^'

For James, the meaning of a concept
lies in particular consequences rather than general habits. Pragmatism,
according to James, "agrees with nominalism,
for instance, in

always appealing to particulars."^^

And Peirce sarcasti-

cally points out the difference between his
pragmaticism
and James' pragmatism by saying that it differs
from his

only in that he [James] does not restrict the
meaning,
that is, the ultimate logical interpretant
as I do, to a habit, but allows percepts, that is
complex feelings endowed with compulsiveness, to be
such.
If he is willing to do this, I do not quite
see how he need give any room at all to habit.
[5.494 (c. 1906)]^^
•

.

.

In a 1902 contribution to the Dictionary of Philosophy

and Psychology

,

Peirce again takes the opportunity to dis-

tance his pragmaticism from the views of James.
in the selection on "Pragmatic and Pragmatism,

"

He claims,

that

James's doctrine and any ill-conceived version of his
"pragmatic" doctrine

appears to assume that the end of man is
action--a stoical axiom which, to the present writer
at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so
forcibly as it did at thirty.
If it be admitted,
on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that
that end must be something of a general description,
then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that
.

.

.
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upshot of our Concepts in order
to apprehend them, would
direct us towards
practical
facts, namely,
to
interpreters of our
thought!^

I5.ru902)r®

For Peirce,
life"

[5.429

than

"Doing is not the Be-all and the End-all
of
(1905)].

We must look to something other

practical facts, namely, to general ideas,
as the

true interpreters of our thought."

For action itself

wants an end, and that end must be something
general.
And as I have already pointed out,
the most perfect account of a concept that
words can convey will consist in a description of
the habit which that concept is calculated to
produce.
[5.491 (c. 1906)]
.

.

.

In a criticism of a definition of pragmatism given

by F. C. S. Schiller, Peirce again takes issue with a

version of pragmatism that regards particular actions as
the interpreters of thought.

In the language of his

semiotics, Peirce tells us that this particular definition
"would make the 'meaning' consist in the energetic inter-

pretant and would ignore the logical interpretant
feeble analysis"

[5.494

(c.

;

another

1906)].

The lines are clearly drawn.

For James, as well as

Schiller, meanings consist in particular consequences.

James is a "thorough nominalist" who "always emphasized

particular sensible experience." 13

For Peirce, meanings

are logical interpretants expressed as conditional-future

statements.

And the ultimate logical interpretant is the

.
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deliberately formed, self-analysing habit"
1906)

]

.

[5.491

(c.

We must look to habits for meaning.

Throughout his writings, Peirce steers away
from the
mere suggestion that particular actions
or consequences
give us the meanings of intellectual concepts.

To deny

this fundamental position of Peirce would
be to suggest

yet another feeble analysis a la James or Schiller.
have no intention of taking that wayward path.

I

Still, it

seems there is something constructive and important which

ought to be said about the role of action in Peirce's
pragmaticism, while avoiding tendencies towards nominalism.
I

propose to do this, and

I

look to the master himself for

guidance
The map— coloring problem as proposed by Peirce gives
us a reasonable place to start.

The problem roughly

sketched is to determine "the least number of different

colors that will always suffice" to color a map such that
no two regions which "abut along a common boundary-line"

will be the same color

[

[5.490

(c.

1906)].

Peirce argues

that somebody who is already skilled at map-coloring will

attempt to find the rule (which he already seems to follow
unconsciously) by engaging in various experiments in the
inner world.

And by this, it is clear Peirce means that

the skilled map-colorer entertains various mental hypo-

theses tested by mathematical calculations which are
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familiar to him.

But

I

would suggest that one who is not

as skilled as the "imagined
investigator," and perhaps

even the skilled investigator himself,
will be forced at
some point to test one hypothesis or
another— perhaps the
one that is finally adopted— in the outer
world of actions
and reactions.
To take an instance, an investigator might
actually

make

minute alterations of the boundaries between regions"

on some model, rather than merely imagine such
alterations.

And he may then observe that these "alterations can
neither

diminish nor increase the number of colors that will in all
cases just suffice"

[5.490

(c.

1906)].

And he may proceed

by making various calculations which are aided by the use,

perhaps, of a calculator, as well as notes and other

materials.

So although the bulk of the experimenter's work

may take the form of mental effort, he is aided in his in-

vestigation by some activity in the outer world.
conclusion of this experimentation

— should

And the

our investigator

arrive at one--will be the "deliberately formed, self-

analyzing habit"

[5.491

(c.

1906)].

In every case, after some preliminaries, the activity
takes the form of experimentation in the inner world;
and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion) is that under given conditions, the interpreter
will have formed the habit of acting in a given way
whenever he may desire a given kind of result.
[5.491 (c. 1906)]

,
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The investigator's habit would
be expressed as the
subjunctive statement:
If i were to color a map using
the
least number of colors with no two
colors next to each
other, I would use only three colors.
As a start, this
is what would be meant by the least
number of colors

which can be used to color
ting.

a

map with no two colors abut-

The meaning of an intellectual concept is the

habit-change

meaning by a habit-change a modification of
person's tendencies toward action, resulting from
previous experiences or from previous exertions of
this will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds
.

.

.

a

of cause.

[5.476

(c.

1906)]

So since actions contribute to the acquisition of habit-

changes, as

I

argued in the last section, they should

also be thought of as aiding in the acquisition and under-

standing of general concepts.
This is not a surprising result, given Peirce's

advocacy of the scientific method.

In describing the

experimentalist, Peirce says:
his disposition is to think of everything just
as everything is thought of in the laboratory, that
is, as a question of experimentation.
when
you have found, or ideally constructed upon a basis
of observation, the typical experimentalist, you
will find that whatever assertion you may make to
him, he will either understand as meaning that if
a given prescription for an experiment ever can be
and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a
given description will result, or else he will see
no sense at all in what you say.
[5.411 (1905)]
.

.

.

.

.

.
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For Peirce, the scientific
method of experimentation is
just the method used in solving
the map-coloring problem;
It IS the method he prescribes
for determining the meanings
of concepts.
since obviously nothing that might
not result
from experiment can have any direct
bearing upon
conduct, if one can define accurately
all
ceivable experimental phenomena which the the conaffirmation
or denial of a concept could imply,
one will have
herein a complete definition of the concept,
and
there is absolutely nothing more in it
.

.

.

.

[5.412

(1905)]

Among the ingredients of an experiment is
the experimenter's
"external

(or

quasi-external) ACT by which he modifies

those objects" chosen "to be operated upon"

[5.424

(1905)].

But as Peirce is quick to point out to an imagined
inter-

rogator, rational meaning does not consist in any one

experiment, but in

"

experimental phenomena ."

When an experimentalist speaks of a phenomenon such
as Hal's phenomenon," "Zeeman's phenomenon" and its
modification, "Michelson s phenomenon," or "the
chessboard phenomenon," he does not mean any particular
event that did happen to somebody in the dead past,
but what surely will happen to everybody in the
living future who shall fulfill certain conditions.
,

'

[5.425

(1905)]

Thus, the meaning of a concept is given, not by one experi-

ment, but by "all the conceivable experimental phenomena

which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply,"
not just for the experimenter, but for anyone in the future
"who shall fulfill certain conditions."

If my concept.

broadly speaking, is that three is the least number of
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colors one could use to color
a map with no two colors
abutting, then anyone else who
follows precise methods will
arrive at this same conclusion, and
any other number of
colors used will be too few or
too many.
of the myriads of forms into which
a proposilon may be translated, what is that
one which is
to be called its very meaning?
It is, according
to the pragmaticist, that form in
which the
sition becomes applicable to human conduct, proponot in
these or those special circumstances, nor
when one
entertains this or that special design, but
that
form which is most directly applicable
to selfcontrol under every situation, and to every
purpose.
5.427
1905 )]
•

.

.

[

(

Particular deliberate actions do not determine the

meanings of concepts, if by 'meanings' is meant "the
conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation
or
denial of

a

concept could imply."

But they may, and often

do, contribute to one's acquisition and understanding of

concepts.

As in the case of the map-coloring problem the

greater the knowledge and skills of the investigator, the
fewer experiments in the outer world will be necessary for

him to understand that only three colors are needed.

The

weaker one's grasp of relevant mathematical principles,
the more dependent one will be on activity in the outer

world in order to facilitate an understanding of the

problem's solution.

Because Peirce's theory of meaning

is based on the model of scientific investigation,

it is

not only useful but important to see that, for Peirce,

.

.
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particular actions contribute to
one's acquisition and
understanding of the meaning of
concepts just as the

activities of experimentation aid
in the confirmation or
denial of a hypothesis. The "very
meaning" of a concept
is to be understood as the conceivable
experimental phenomena which "the assertion of the
proposition virtually
predicts" (5.427 (1905)1. Anticipating and
predicting
future behavior is as important for the
ordinary man of
action as it is for the scientist. And it is,
as least

in part,

through individual actions or experiments
(either

thought or physical experiments) that predictions
can be

accurately made.
There is another point to be made here

— one

which

underscores Peirce's dispute with the nominalist.

Actions

causally contribute to the fact that one believes what
one does

.

But actions, it would seem, do not determine

what one believes

;

they do not determine, that is, the

content of one's belief.

Actions cannot "constitute the

purport, or adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol"
[5.402, n.

3

(1906)

]

To say that I hold that the import, or adequate
ultimate interpretation, of a concept is contained,
not in any deed or deeds that will ever be done,
but in a habit of conduct, or general moral determination of whatever procedure there may come to
be, is no more than to say that I am a pragmaticist
[5.504

(c.

1905)]

s

]

s

s

s

]
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When it comes to the meanings of
our beliefs, Peirce the
P^^9^sticist is also a realist.
It is,
in part, his

whole-hearted endorsement of the scientific
method which
leads him to this conclusion.
Of that method, Peirce says
the following:
Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in
more familiar
language, is this:
There are Real things, whose
characters are entirely independent of our opinions
about them; those Reals affect our senses
according
to regular laws, and, though our sensations
are as
different as are our relations to the objects, yet,
by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we
can
ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly
are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience
and he reason enough about it, will be led to the
one
True conclusion.
[5.384 (1877)]
.

.

.

we may define the real as that whose characters are

independent of what anybody may think them to be"
(1878)].

"...

reality means

dependence upon thought"
and 5.432

(1905)].

[5.503

a

[5.405

certain kind of non1905); See also 5.430

(c.

And included in Peirce's developed con-

cept of the real are the potentialities asserted in

a true

future subjunctive statement.
I must show that the will be
the actually is
and the have beens are not the sum of the reals.
They only cover actuality.
There are besides would
be
and can be
that are real.
[8.216 (c. 1910)
'

'

,

'

,

'

Thus, habits, expressed familiarly as future subjective

statements, are real for Peirce; they are "general principles" which "are really operative in nature"
(1903)

[5.101
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Perhaps Peirce's own best illustration
of the reality
of mere possibilities is found in the
pragmaticistic

solution he gives to the question, "Is

a

diamond which is

completely destroyed before being touched by any
object
really hard?" in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear,"
Peirce
held that questions of this sort "concern much more
the

arrangement of our language than they do the meaning of
our ideas"

[5.409

".

(1878)].

.

.it would

be merely a

question of nomenclature whether that diamond should be
said to have been hard or not"
in "Issues of Pragmaticism,

"

[5.453

(1905)].

However,

written in 1905, Peirce

effectively gives up that earlier view.

He says:

No doubt this is true, except for the abominable
falsehood in the word MERELY, implying that symbols
are unreal.
Nomenclature involves classification;
and classification is true or false, and the generals
to which it refers are either reals in the one case,
or figments in the other.
[5.453]
It is much more than a mere matter of nomenclature were we
to say that the diamond was

hard.

(or

alternatively, was not)

In describing something, we are asserting something

about what class that thing belongs to and if what we say
is true,

are real.

then the general possibilities to which it refers

"...

the reality of a diamond's hardness"

cannot "possibly consist in anything but in the truth of
a

general conditional proposition."
For to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry
relate except to the "behavior" of different possible

.

205

kinds of material substance? And in what
does that
behavior consist except that if a substance
certain kind should be exposed to an agency of a
of a
certain kind, a certain kind of sensible result
would ensue, according to our experience hitherto.
[5.457
If

I

(1905)]

were to release a heavy object from my hand, it

would (barring unusual circumstances) most surely
fall to
the ground.

Based on my experiences,

this would happen, but

I

I

would expect that

also believe that this

"

surely

happen to everybody in the living future who shall
fulfill certain cond itions"

[5.425

(1906)].

the meaning of a concept, the pragmaticist

'

In determining
s

task is that

of uncovering or discovering "a description of the habit

which that concept is calculated to produce "
1906)].

[5.491

(c.

This is, in short, Peirce's rule for attaining

the third grade of clearness of apprehension."
it is the pragmaticistic maxim [See p.

In full,

23 above]

Again, one is reminded of the scientist's task of

discovering and describing the laws operative in nature.
The laws of nature are not determined by the scientist's

investigation, but

a

true description of these laws may be

uncovered by his activities.

And it is the hope of the

scientific community that as theories are corrected and
false beliefs discarded, we will eventually be left with

only true beliefs.

"...

that we can be sure of nothing

in science is an ancient truth"

[1.137

(c.

1899)].

For

6
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the pragmaticist, too, the task is one of
discovering and

describing— interpreting— the habits operative in
the world
And as for the scientist, this is an ongoing
activity, for
Not only is our knowledge
limited in scope,
but It is even more important that we should
thoroughly realize that the very best of what we,
humanly speaking, know [we know] only in an uncertain
and inexact way.
[5.587 (1898)]
.

.

.

Like the scientist, we are constantly correcting our con-

osptions and discarding false beliefs in the hope of

acquiring only true beliefs.
Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism

— "that

our knowledge

is never absolute but always swims, as it were,

tinuum of uncertainty and of indeteminacy"
1897)]

— characterizes

reality.
a

1

concept

in a con-

[1.171

(c.

our ongoing activity of interpreting

A person may be wrong in his interpretation of

— in

his understanding of the habit which that

concept is calculated to produce; indeed, mankind in
general may, for many generations, hold as true

a

belief

which the "final settled opinion" of mankind rejects as
false.

But with sufficient experience and reasoning, all

men would arrive at the same, true set of beliefs
same,

— the

true interpretation of reality.

The perversity or ignorance of mankind may make this
thing or that to be held for true, for any number
of generations, but it can not affect what would be
the result of sufficient experience and reasoning.
And this it is which is meant by the final settled
This therefore is no particular opinion
opinion.
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but is entirely independent of
what vou t
number of men may think about it;
directly satisfies the definition and therefore it
of rlTlity
[7.336,

n.

11

(1873)]

any man, if he have sufficient
experience and he
reason enough about it, will be led to
the one True conclu
Sion" (5.384 (1877)].
Together, sufficient investigations
and reasoning will lead any man to one
conclusion to the
.

—

final settled opinion.
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately
agreed
to by all who investigate, is what we mean
by the
truth, and the object represented in this
opinion is
the real.
This is the way I would explain reality.
[5.407

Thus,

actions

(1878)]

it seems clear that, for Peirce, deliberate

— whether

referred to broadly as investigations,

experiments, or experiences

— will

contribute to one's

understanding and description of intellectual concepts
and,

in the long run, to the final settled opinion.

They

will never determine the meanings of intellectual concepts;

Peirce's conception of truth and reality preclude this.
But they will aid us in acquiring and understanding

interpretation of that reality.

a true

Through and through,

Peirce remains a scientist, pragmaticist

,

and realist,

even though actions be allowed their proper place in his

pragmatic ism.

a
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•

Concluding Remarks

In the preceding chapters,

have argued that a

I

Peircean theory of deliberate action can
be constructed
out of the material Peirce provides
in his account of
practical belief s— habits of action. I
argued that from
Peirce's conditional formulation of a
practical belief,
one can assume the conditions necessary for
a deliberate

action to occur, thus making the transition from
habits of
action to action.
Insofar as habits of action are causes
of one's predisposition to act, they causally
affect one's

deliberate actions.
In this chapter,

I

have shown that actions have an

important function in Peirce's theory of signs and theory
of meaning.

Whether one considers Peirce's semiotics or

his pragmaticism (and it is difficult to discuss one with-

out discussing the other), singular actions must be seen
as contributing to one's acquisition and understanding-- to

one's interpretation--of general habits of action.

Peirce

remains the pragmaticist and realist that he is, though

actions be given their due.

Thus, in effect,

I

have rounded

out the theory of action presented earlier by showing the

effect of actions on habits of actions.
There is, then, for Peirce,

continuum
actions.

— of

a

continuous circle

—

actions affecting habits, and habits affecting

And this brings to mind Peirce's principle of

.
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synechism which

I

discussed in Chapter

to regard everything as continuous"

I.

[7.565

This "tendency
(c.

1892)], is

as appropriate in considering
the relationship of actions
and habits of action as it was in
considering the relation-

ship of physical and mental phenomena.

But this ongoing

cycle of actions affecting habits and
habits affecting
actions would be pointless were it not
directed, according
to Peirce, by the principle of agapasm

discussed in Chapter III.

— the

operative desire

All activity, for Peirce, is

directed toward habit-taking
The agapastic development of thought should, if it
exists, be distinguished by its purposive character,
this purpose being the development of an idea.
[6.315

(1893)]

This evolutionary growth of an idea proceeds ideally from
the motive of "the love of mankind at large"

[6.291

(1893)],

where "progress comes from every individual merging his

individuality in sympathy with his neighbors"
(1893)].

[6.294

This is Peirce's message of hope and belief that

as rational beings we will act together towards a more

rational world.

Peirce, of course, developed his views

that, as a community of investigators, we are continuously

but progressively moving ever closer to a world of "concrete

reasonableness" before the rational beings of this planet
engaged in two world wars and embarked on their nuclear
follies.

Still synechism and agapasm are cornerstones of

Peircean doctrine and stand to remind us that actions
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serve the progress of thought.
the only ultimate good which the practical
facts to which it [the pragmaticistic maxim] directs
attention can subserve is to further the development
of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning
of
the concept does not lie in any individual reactions
all, but in the manner in which those reactions
contribute to that development
[5.3 (1902); my underscore]
.

.

.

.

Thus, without altering Peirce's overall views, it

should be clear that actions play a vital role in Peircean

philosophy.

They both affect and are affected by habits

of actions.

And,

in the end,

to ignore Peirce's thoughts

on actions is to ignore the role he assigns to actions in
the development of thought.

]

.
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NOTES

This calls to mind Frege's more rudimentary
examina-

tion of signs according to their sense and
meaning (or

reference).

In his paper "On Sense and Meaning," written

in 1892, he tells us that

It is natural now, to think of there being connected
with a sign (name, combination of words, written
mark)
besides that which the sign designates, which
may be called the meaning of the sign, also what I
should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein
the mode of presentation is contained.
,

Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob
Frege

ed

,

.

Peter Geach and Max Black (New Jersey:

Rowman

and Little-Field, 1980), p. 57.
2

in Speech Acts

,

John Searle argues that

language is engaging in
[p.

a

"

speaking a

rule-governed form of behavior"

41]

On the speaker's side, saying something and meaning
it are closely connected with intending to produce
certain effects on the hearer. On the hearer's
side, understanding the speaker's utterance is
closely connected with recognizing his intentions.
[p.

48]

A bridge between the two is possible, given the common
language of the speaker and hearer, and the constitutive
rules governing that language.
in the Philosophy of Language
1969)

,

pp.

40-50.

[

Speech Acts:

An Essay

(Cambridge University Press,

,

]

.

212

C.

Hardwick, ed

.

Semiotics and Signifies (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 33
4

.

The dynamical interpretant here is similar
to Searle's

notion of an illocutionary effect.
the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in
doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience
to recognize what we are trying to do.
But the
effect' on the hearer is not a belief or response,
it consists simply in the hearer understanding the
utterance of the speaker. It is this effect that I
have been calling the illocutionary effect.
_

[Searle, p.

47]

This is a more developed account of J. L. Austin's notion
of "securing uptake":

Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the
understanding of the meaning and of the force of
the locution.
So the performance of an illocutionary
act involves the securing of uptake
.

[

How to Do Things with Words (Oxford:

1962)

p.
5

Clarendon Press,

116.

The dynamical interpretant here is similar to Searle's

notion of a per locutionary effect [See Searle,

p.

25]

Searle, of course, relies heavily on Austin's earlier

account of perlocutionary acts which, however, fails to

distinguish between
tionary effect.

a

perlocutionary act and

a

perlocu-

For Austin, a perlocutionary act "is the

achieving of certain effects by saying something"
p.

[Austin,

120 ].

^See,

for example, Jarrett E. Brock's "Peirce and

.

213

Searle on Assertion" in Graduate Studies Texas
Tech Univer -

Proceedings of the

•

C.

S.

Peirce Bicentennial Inter -

national Congress, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner, et al
Texas:

(Lubbock,

.

Texas Tech Press, 1981), pp. 281-87.

7-r

In passing,

it should be noted that since the only

signs which have a logical interpretant "are either general

or closely connected with generals"

[5.488

(c.

1906)],

Particular actions will not have logical interpretants
Here ^Peirce seems to prefer the expression 'habit•

change'

to

'habit.'

However, there seems to be no signifi-

cant difference in his use of the two, and the one he seems
to favor is

'habit.'

Unless specified,

I

will generally

follow Peirce's choice of expressions.
9

And that, indeed, "is ugly enough to be safe from

kidnappers"

[5.414

(1905)].

^*^"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,"
in The Writings of William James:
ed.

John J. McDermott (Chicago:

Press, 1977)

,

pp.

A Comprehensive Edition
The University of Chicago

348-49; my underscore.

^^"What Pragmatism Means," p. 380 in McDermott.
12

•

•

As John Dewey aptly characterizes Peirce's position

in relation to James:
In the literal sense of the word pragmatist
Peirce is more of a pragmatist than James. He is
.

.

.

,

6

.

.
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^

nominalist.

That is to say, he emphaP^’^ticular sensible consequence,
fnrt much more the
and
habit, the generic attitude of
response, set up in consequence of
experiences with
a thing.
^

The Pragmatism of Peirce," in Chance, Love
and Logic

Morris

R.

Cohen (New York:

1923

p.

307

)

,

ed

,

Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc.,

Morris R. Cohen, American Thought (New York:

Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 1962),

p.

343.

See Edward C. Moore's discussions of Peirce's

realism in

(i)

"The Scholastic Realism of C. S. Peirce"

in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
No.

3,

March 1952, pp. 406-417, and

(ii)

,

Vol. XII,

"On an Alleged

Incompatibility between Peirce's Metaphysics and His
Pnagmaticism" in Graduate Studies Texas Tech University
pp.

,

169-178.
15

See Charles K. McKeon,

"Peirce's Scotistic Realism"

in Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce

Philip P. Wiener and Frederic

H.

Young (Cambridge:

University Press, 1952), pp. 238-250, for

a

,

ed.

Harvard

detailed dis-

cussion of the differences between scholastic realism and
Peirce's realism.
1

Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism is intimately

connected with his doctrine of synechism or continuity.
"The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism

215

objectified.
alj.

.

.

Now the doctrine of continuity is
that

;^ings so swim in continue"

[1.171

(c.

1897)].

Our

knowledge is in a continuous state of
uncertainty and indeterminacy because "all things are continuous"
[

(c.

1897)].

1.175

See 1.171-75 for Peirce's discussion of the

relationship between fallibilism, continuity, and
evolution.
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